Board Committee Overlap and the Use of Earnings in CEO Compensation Contracts

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Ellen Carter ◽  
Luann J. Lynch ◽  
Melissa A. Martin

Using proxy statement data describing the terms of compensation contracts, we examine how overlapping membership between compensation and audit committees influences the use of earnings metrics in compensation. Although research predicts that such overlap could either increase or decrease the reliance on earnings, we find that firms with overlapping directors rely less on earnings-based performance measures in incentive contracts without altering the overall level of performance-contingent cash bonuses. In addition, we provide evidence that firms substitute earnings measures with measures less subject to earnings management. Our findings are robust to potential alternative explanations, extend to an implicit relation between earnings and compensation for a larger sample, and are not driven by the tendency toward an overlapping committee structure more broadly. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 608-625 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amel Kouaib ◽  
Anis Jarboui ◽  
Khaireddine Mouakhar

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to focus on the moderating effect of mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) experience/education and earnings management in European companies. Design/methodology/approach Data from a sample of 302 European firms listed on Stoxx Europe 600 index and 596 CEOs from 2000 to 2014 are used to test the moderation model using moderation regression analysis. Findings Evidence reveals that CEO’s accounting-based attributes are negatively associated with accruals-based earnings management and positively associated with real earnings management (REM). Further, mandatory IFRS adoption significantly moderates the impact of CEO’s accounting-based traits on earnings-management activities. Research limitations/implications A small number of European firms were studied and, given the long study period, many firms with missing data were eliminated. To avoid a small sample size, countries with few observations were included, which leads to an uneven distribution between observations per country. Practical implications Findings from this paper can help: European firms to consider demographic traits when recruiting or promoting executives; the IASB to improve enforcement mechanisms and make IFRS implementation mandatory; and audit committees to effectively monitor REM. Originality/value This study is unique in providing European evidence for the moderating effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the relationship between CEOs’ accounting experience/education and earnings management activities. This paper is also relevant as it addresses the effectiveness and efficiency of accounting literates.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 88
Author(s):  
Anton Ferry Ananda ◽  
Santi Andriani

This study aims to determine the effect of independent commissioners and audit committees on earnings management. This research uses quantitative methods. The data used in this study are secondary data, i.e. data obtained through existing sources and do not need to be collected by the researcher themselves. The data is in the form of an annual report issued by companies listed in the 2015-2017 period which are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The population in this study are manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2015-2017 period. The results showed that the independent board of commissioners and the audit committee had no simultaneous effect on earnings management. This is consistent with the results of the simultaneous regression coefficient test (Test F) which shows the calculated F value is smaller than the F table, and with a determinant value of 3.1%. Partially the independent board of comissioners and audit committee has no effect on earnings management. Based on the results of the partial regression coefficient test (t test) on the variable independent commissioners and the audit committee showed a significance value greater than 0.05, so it was concluded that the two variables in this study had no effect on earnings management.Keywords: Audit Committee, Independent Board of Commissioners, Profit Management, Finance


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurul Nazlia Jamil ◽  
Sherliza Puat Nelson

Financial reporting quality has been under scrutiny especially after the collapse of major companies. The main objective of this study is to investigate the audit committee’s effectiveness on the financial reporting quality among the Malaysian GLCs following the transformation program. In particular, the study examined the impact of audit committee characteristics (independence, size, frequency of meeting and financial expertise) on earnings management in periods prior to and following the transformation program (2003-2009). As of 31 December 2010, there were 33 public-listed companies categorized as Government-Linked Companies (GLC Transformation Policy, 2010) and there were 20 firms that have complete data that resulted in the total number of firm-year observations to 120 for six years (years 2003-2009).  Results show that the magnitude of earnings management as proxy of financial reporting quality is influenced by the audit committee independence. Agency theory was applied to explain audit committee, as a monitoring mechanism as well as reducing agency costs via gaining competitive advantage in knowledge, skills, and expertise towards financial reporting quality. The study is important as it provides additional knowledge about the impact of audit committees effectiveness on reducing the earnings management, and assist practitioners, policymakers and regulators such as Malaysian Institute of Accountants, Securities Commission and government to determine ways to enhance audit committees effectiveness and improve the financial reporting of GLCs, as well as improving the quality of the accounting profession.     


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