What Is ‘Competition Law’? – Measuring EU Member States’ Leeway to Regulate Platform-to-Business Agreements

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens-Uwe Franck ◽  
Nils Stock
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States

Health Care Services and EU Competition Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Okeoghene Odudu
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Healthcare Service ◽  
Health Care Services ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Healthcare Services ◽  
System Matrix ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Care Services

This chapter investigates how, within a number of European Union (EU) Member States, competition law has been used to address problems of market power in the healthcare services sector. It summarizes the relevant EU and national competition laws and considers the experience of applying those laws to providers of healthcare services. The chapter is chiefly concerned with healthcare services in England, although examples are drawn for other EU Member States. Examination of the English experience provides a view of the use of competition law to address market power problems in most elements of the health system matrix. The chapter then considers three challenges that emerge from that experience of using competition law to address problems of market power in healthcare service markets. The first challenges the applicability of competition law to healthcare service providers operating in each or every element of the healthcare system matrix. The second, accepting applicability, questions the appropriateness of the substantive rules to healthcare services. The third, a battle of authority and autonomy, considers whether decisions made by healthcare service providers should be subject to external review and the type of review that competition law offers.

scholarly journals The Implementation of the ECN+ Directive in Hungary and Lessons Beyond

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 55-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J. Cseres
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Institutional Aspects ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
The Eu

In order to facilitate national competition authorities (NCAs) in their application of EU competition rules, the EU legislator adopted Directive 2019/1/EU. The Directive’s aim is to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers of competition law and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. The so-called ECN+ Directive introduces minimum harmonisation rules allowing competition authorities to have common investigative, decision-making (notably fining decisions) and enforcement powers. The Directive, furthermore, sets minimum safeguards for the NCAs’ independence, accountability and resources as well as harmonizes leniency programmes including the coordination of national leniency programmes with each other and with that of the European Commission. This paper critically analyzes the legal and policy developments that paved the way for the adoption of this Directive. Moreover, it examines the changes the implementation of the Directive is likely to generate in current Hungarian law and policy of competition protection. The focus of the paper’s assessment is on the institutional aspects of the Directive and the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in particular the mechanisms for ensuring independence and accountability of the NCAs. Through the assessment of the Hungarian implementation, the paper aims to shed light on a broader context of the Directive and the enforcement of EU competition law in EU Member States. The paper shows that the implementation of the Directive may fail to translate into (more) effective enforcement without an effective institutional capacity on the side of the NCAs, and in the broader legal and constitutional context of competition law and its multilevel enforcement

What is ‘Competition Law’?—Measuring EU Member States’ Leeway to Regulate Platform-to-Business Agreements

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens-Uwe Franck ◽  
Nils Stock
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Commercial Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Regulatory Interventions ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
Hotel Booking

Abstract If both national competition law and Article 101 TFEU apply to an agreement, the former must not set rules that are stricter than the latter. Member States remain free, though, to impose stricter rules if they are not classified as ‘competition law’. We analyse relevant jurisprudence by the English and French courts that have dealt with potential conflicts between, on the one hand, EU competition law and, on the other hand, the common law restraint of trade doctrine and the pratiques restrictives de concurrence under French commercial law. We develop criteria that allow (national) ‘competition law’ to be distinguished from similar regulatory interventions into agreements that pursue purposes distinct from Article 101 TFEU and which, therefore, must not be regarded as ‘competition law’. This article illustrates and elaborates on the challenges for the implementation of our approach by focusing on the ban on the use of parity clauses by hotel booking platforms in France, Austria, Italy, and Belgium. We map a possible way forward to prevent further regulatory fragmentation in the internal market with regard to the regulation of platform-to-business agreements.

scholarly journals The Scope of the Implementation of the Damages Directive in CEE States

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 13-29
Author(s):  
Michal Petr
Keyword(s):  
Czech Republic ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Eastern European ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Eastern European Countries ◽  
Limited Scope

The Damages Directive has a rather limited scope, focusing only on damages claims stemming from anticompetitive agreements or abuse of a dominant position, provided such conduct was able to affect trade between EU Member States. However, Member States are not limited by this scope and so they may decide, when implementing the Directive, to enhance not only claims for damages, but the overall private enforcement of competition law. In this article, we shall explore the scope of the implementing legislation of selected Central and Eastern European Countries, namely in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

Part VIII Cooperation in Antirust Enforcement, 21 Cooperation Between the Courts of the EU Member States and the Court of Justice: The Preliminary Reference Procedure

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Farley Martin
Keyword(s):  
National Court ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Member States ◽  
Reference Procedure ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Special Rules

This chapter addresses the cooperation between Member States’ courts and the Court of Justice in the context of the preliminary reference procedure. There are two points to be noted concerning the nature of the preliminary reference procedure and its relationship to competition law. First, the principal aim of the preliminary ruling and advisory opinion mechanisms is to provide a means of cooperation between the Court of Justice and the Member States. As such, the principal dialogue is between the referring national court or tribunal and the Court of Justice. In the preliminary reference procedure, the Commission holds the same status as any other interested party that is entitled to take part in the proceedings. Second, the procedural rules governing the preliminary ruling procedure remains essentially the same regardless of the subject matter concerned. No special rules apply with respect to cases concerning competition law.

Part VIII Cooperation in Antirust Enforcement, 20 Cooperation Between the Commission and the Courts of the EU Member States

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holzwarth Johannes
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
National Level ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules

This chapter explores the cooperation between the European Commission and Member States’ courts that apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The risk of inconsistent interpretations of EU competition rules renders cooperation between the Commission and Member State courts crucial, particularly due to the role that such courts play when it comes to the effective enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU at the national level: in the era of decentralisation, it is the national courts that will ultimately be called upon to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU either directly, or when reviewing national authorities’ decisions based on those provisions. The central role that the Commission retains for the enforcement of EU competition law means that it has a particularly strong interest in ensuring effective cooperation with national courts. Moreover, the importance of cooperation between the Commission and Member State courts is further increasing due to the rise of private enforcement. This type of enforcement is generally associated with civil actions and damages awarded by national courts or tribunals.

THE CASE FOR LIMITING PRIVATE EXCESSIVE PRICING LITIGATION

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 298-326
Author(s):  
Michal S Gal
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Monopolistic Competition ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Inherent Difficulty ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Economic Understanding ◽  
Error Costs ◽  
Private Litigation

ABSTRACT In the European Union, private litigation of competition law violations is in its nascence. As this article shows, excessive pricing raises strong concerns for such litigation, for three reasons: (1) the inherent difficulty of defining what constitutes an unfair price; (2) additional challenges inherent to private excessive pricing litigation, such as the need to pinpoint when exactly a price becomes unfair; and (3) the institutional features of general courts in EU member states, which are ill-suited to the required tasks. We elaborate on these concerns, pointing to four specific challenges inherent to private litigation and to three instances where a lack of sufficient economic understanding could entrap general courts (a cost trap, a fairness trap, and a monopolistic competition trap). Together, these factors create a risk of error costs much higher than any experienced so far, which could potentially reduce welfare. The article suggests some measures that can be taken to ensure that welfare is served.

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