Are Markets for Natural Disaster Insurance Adversely Selected? Evidence from the National Flood Insurance Program

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Schwarz
2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 165-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erwann O Michel-Kerjan

Hurricane Betsy, which hit Louisiana September 9, 1965, was one of the most intense, deadly, and costly storms ever to make landfall in the United States: it killed 76 people in Louisiana and caused $1.5 billion in damage—equal to nearly $10 billion in 2010 dollars. In 1965, no flood insurance was available, so victims had to rely on friends and family, charities, or federal relief. After that catastrophe, the U.S. government established a new program in 1968—the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)—to make flood insurance widely available. Now, after more than 40 years of operation, the NFIP is today one of the longest standing government-run disaster insurance programs in the world. In this paper, I present an overview of the 40 years of operation of the National Flood Insurance Program, starting with how and why it was created and how it has evolved to now cover $1.23 trillion in assets. I analyze the financial balance of the NFIP between 1969 and 2008. Excluding the 2005 hurricane season (which included Hurricane Katrina) as an outlier, policyholders have paid nearly $11 billion more in premiums than they have received in claim reimbursements over that period. However, the program has spent an average of 40 percent of all collected premiums on administrative expenses, more than three quarters of which were paid to private insurance intermediaries who sell and manage flood insurance policies on behalf of the federal government but do not bear any risk. I present challenges the NFIP faces today and propose ways those challenges might be overcome through innovative modifications.


Author(s):  
Okmyung Bin ◽  
John Bishop ◽  
Carolyn Kousky

AbstractThis study examines possible redistributional effects of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), using a nationwide database of flood insurance policies and claims between 2001 and 2013 from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Applying methods from the tax and transfer progressivity literature, we use the departure from per capita income proportionality at the zip code level as our measure of progressivity. Our findings indicate that premiums as a percentage of coverage purchased are regressive: premium shares are larger than income shares for lower-income zip codes. Payouts, however, also as a percentage of coverage purchased, are progressive, meaning lower-income zip codes receive a larger portion of claims paid. Overall net premiums (premiums – payouts) divided by coverage are also regressive. Our findings are driven by certain aspects of the current rate structure of the NFIP, as well as how income is related to risk. We discuss potential policies to provide assistance to lower-income households in purchasing flood insurance.


Author(s):  
Christina Lindemer ◽  
Jeffrey Gangai ◽  
Christopher Mack ◽  
Elena Drei-Horgan ◽  
Darryl Hatheway

Flood Insurance Studies (FISs) produced by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) per the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) regulations and guidelines adopt storm-induced erosion criteria often called the “540 rule”. The methods used in the erosion analysis have been in place since the 1980s. The method requires dunes to be classified as fully eroded, or “removed”, when their cross-sectional reservoir is smaller than 540 square feet. Since the rule’s first application, additional data and recent evidence have become available leading FEMA to identify this approach as an area of the program in need of updating and improvement. Experts involved in conducting coastal hazard analyses for FEMA studies recommend exploring opportunities to improve FEMA guidelines for erosion criterion and revise NFIP regulations and guidance, as needed, to ensure that storm-related erosion hazards are appropriately evaluated and mapped along US coastlines.


2003 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 639-647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Keeler ◽  
Warren Kriesel ◽  
Craig Landry

This paper uses the results of a nationwide survey of coastal property owners to estimate the demand for insurance against erosion damage. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) does not technically cover such damage, although in practice there is considerable uncertainty about this point. The ability to insure against such losses has implications for the choice of beach management strategies and for NFIP management. We find significant demand for insurance at prices in the range of current flood insurance premiums, although median willingness to pay appears to be less than the cost of providing such insurance.


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