Firms' Voluntary Disclosure Behavior Inferred from Stock Returns in the Earnings-Announcement and Non-Announcement Windows

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Zarowin ◽  
Jenny Wu Tucker
2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 449-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bjorn N. Jorgensen ◽  
Michael T. Kirschenheiter

We model managers' equilibrium strategies for voluntarily disclosing information about their firm's risk. We consider a multifirm setting in which the variance of each firm's future cash flow is uncertain. A manager can disclose, at a cost, this variance before offering the firm for sale in a competitive stock market with risk-averse investors. In our partial disclosure equilibrium, managers voluntarily disclose if their firm has a low variance of future cash flows, but withhold the information if their firm has highly variable future cash flows. We establish how the manager's discretionary risk disclosure affects the firm's share price, expected stock returns, and beta, within the framework of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. We show that whereas one manager's discretionary disclosure of his firm's risk does not affect other firms' share prices, it does affect the other firms' betas. Also, we demonstrate that a disclosing firm has lower risk premium and beta ex post than a nondisclosing firm. Finally, we show that ex ante, the expected risk premium and expected beta of each firm are higher under a mandatory risk disclosure regime than in the partial disclosure equilibrium that arises under a voluntary disclosure regime.


2007 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 1055-1087 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer W. Tucker

Prior research finds that firms warning investors of an earnings shortfall experience lower returns than non-warning firms with similar risks and earnings news. Openness thus appears to be penalized by investors. Yet, this finding may be due to a self-selection bias that occurs when firms with a larger amount of unfavorable non-earnings news (“other bad news”) are more likely to warn. In this paper I use a Heckman selection model to infer the amount of other bad news and document that, on average, warning firms have a larger amount of other bad news than non-warning firms. After controlling for this effect, I find that warning firms' returns remain lower than those of non-warning firms in a short-term window ending five days after earnings announcement. When this window is extended by three months, however, warning and non-warning firms exhibit similar returns. My evidence suggests that openness is ultimately not penalized by investors.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Dinesh Fernando ◽  
Justin Giboney ◽  
Richard A. Schneible

Purpose The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry between investors and the average information content of subsequent the earnings announcement. Design/methodology/approach The authors use empirical methodology relying on multiple regression analyses. The authors estimate models of trading volume and stock returns around the earnings’ release date as a function of voluntary disclosures, measured using information in the 8-K statements. Findings Voluntary disclosures prior to the earnings release date increase trading volume related to stock returns. In addition, voluntary disclosures also reduce stock price movement around that date. Research limitations/implications The results indicate that voluntary disclosures increase trading volume related to stock returns around the earnings release date. Such increases indicate increased differential precision among investors, demonstrating that voluntary disclosures increase differences in opinion among investors. The reduced stock price movement around the earnings release date also show that voluntary disclosures reduce the information content of earnings. One limitation is that the measure of voluntary disclosures does not consider the variation in the information content of individual disclosures. Practical implications Firms who make voluntary disclosures will need to carefully consider how to structure such releases to minimize asymmetry between investors. Investors should pay greater attention to finding out, and interpreting, voluntary disclosures by firms. Social implications Regulators have previously expressed concern about leveling the playing field between more and less informed investors. The results showing increased differences in information as a result of voluntary disclosures provide valuable insights as regulators debate the balance of mandated and voluntary disclosure. Originality/value This is the first study to investigate the effect of voluntary disclosures on information asymmetry among investors using trading volume and, consequently, the first to find increased differences among investors that result from those voluntary disclosures. The paper is also the first to use a direct measure of voluntary disclosure developed by Cooper et al. to demonstrate the negative relation between voluntary disclosure and the average informativeness of earnings announcements.


2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Brooke Elliott ◽  
Jessen L. Hobson ◽  
Kevin E. Jackson

ABSTRACT: This study examines disaggregated management forecasts as a mechanism to reduce investors’ fixation on announced earnings. Our experimental results suggest that investors’ earnings fixation is reduced when they initially observe a disaggregated management forecast (earnings and its components) versus when they observe an aggregated forecast (earnings only). We also provide theory-consistent evidence that this reduction in earnings fixation is associated with investors interpreting the summary net income figure as one of several similarly important evaluation inputs rather than a substantially more important input (relative to its components). Finally, we provide evidence that suggests our results are not bounded by the level of emphasis on net income in the subsequent earnings announcement, and not fully explained by three plausible alternative explanations. Our study extends the voluntary disclosure literature by providing evidence that the form of management disclosures can influence investors’ interpretation of subsequently announced information, and contributes to practice by providing a potential alternative to stopping earnings guidance.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsuan-Chu Lin ◽  
Chuan-San Wang ◽  
Ruei-Shian Wu

Purpose A firm’s ethical behavior is commonly perceived beneficial to the firm and its investors in the literature. However, activities of corporate social responsibility (CSR) are often delivered with multiple purposes, and their expenses are aggregated with other expenditures in financial statements. These two features motivate the authors to hypothesize and find that investors’ ability to predict future earnings of ethical firms may not be improved through observing the CSR activities. The study aims to suggest that CSR spending should be expressed separately from other expenses in financial reports to help investors predict the future performance of CSR firms. Design/methodology/approach The authors use future (forward) earnings response coefficients (FERC) to testing whether current stock returns reflect correct information about future earnings. The basic specification of FERC framework, initially developed by Collins et al. (1994), is a regression of current-year stock returns on past, concurrent and future reported earnings with future stock returns as a control variable. A significantly positive FERC provides evidence that investors have rich and correct information about future earnings. Findings The authors find less future earnings information contained in current stock returns for firms with higher intensity of CSR activities. The association is also negative between current stock returns and future earnings reported by firms with a higher degree of CSR spending aggregated with selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A). In additional analyses, the intensity of CSR activities is positively associated the uncertainty of benefits, measured by the standard deviation of future earnings over the next five years. This future earnings variability does not exist, even though CSR spending is aggregated with SG&A, consistent with the basic principle that accounting expenses create no future economic impacts. Originality/value The authors contribute to the current debate over consequences of CSR activities and accounting for CSR spending from a different angle. A common belief is that voluntary disclosure on CSR activities would aid in reducing costs of equity capital and financial reporting errors. These studies provide corporate managers with good reasons and motivations to expect beneficial consequences of voluntary disclosure. The results show that general investors are less capable of predicting future earnings when there is a higher degree of CSR spending aggregated with SG&A. It also highlights potential problems in the disclosure of general-purpose financial reporting to accounting standard setters.


2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 73-96
Author(s):  
Young Jun Cho ◽  
Yongtae Kim ◽  
Yoonseok Zang

ABSTRACT We examine the relation between information externalities along the supply chain and voluntary disclosure. Information transfers from a major customer's earnings announcement (EA) can substitute for its supplier's disclosure. Conversely, if the customer's EA increases uncertainties regarding the supplier's future prospects, it can increase the demand for disclosure. After controlling for information incorporated in supplier returns, we find that the supplier is more likely to issue earnings guidance after the customer's EA when the EA news deviates more from the market's expectation. The positive effect of the customer's news on earnings guidance is weaker when common investors, supply-chain analysts, or a common industry allow investors to better understand the value implications of the news, while the effect increases with the importance of the customer to the supplier. The effect is also stronger when EA news is negative rather than positive. Collectively, the results suggest that supply-chain relationships influence voluntary disclosure. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the text.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 32-47
Author(s):  
Jeetendra Dangol ◽  
Ajay Bhandari

The study examines the stock returns and trading volume reaction to quarterly earnings announcements using the event analysis methodology. Ten commercial banks with 313 earnings announcements are considered between the fiscal year 2010/11 and 2017/18. The observations are portioned into 225 earning-increased (good-news) sub-samples and 88 earning-decreased (bad-news) sub-samples. This paper finds that the Nepalese stock market is inefficient at a semi-strong level, but there is a strong linkage between quarterly earnings announcement and trading volume. Similarly, the study provides evidence of existence of information content hypothesis in the Nepalese stock market.


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