scholarly journals Pricing Unbundled Network Elements and the FCC's TELRIC Rule: Economic and Modeling Issues

2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy J. Tardiff

This paper addresses the fundamental question of what costs and prices would look like under competitive conditions and how close the FCC's total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC) pricing rules allow one to approximate such competitive outcomes. We consider: what types of firms would enter in competitive network industries, what effect would new entry have on the asset values and prices of incumbent firms, and what impact would competition have on (1) the types and vintages of capital equipment, (2) prices for that equipment, and (3) conditions in the operating environment? The paper concludes by highlighting alternative pricing proposals offered by contending parties and identifying the major drivers that explain what have proven to be large differences among competing proposals.

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (22) ◽  
pp. 6011-6020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Xiuli Wang ◽  
Xiong Wu ◽  
Furong Li ◽  
Chunlian Cao

1989 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles B. Moss ◽  
J.S. Shonkwiler ◽  
John E. Reynolds

AbstractThis study determines the effect of government payments on real agricultural asset values using Bayesian vector autoregression. In developing the empirical model, special attention is focused on the informational content of government payments. The results indicate that government payments to farmers have little effect on real asset values in the long run. In the short run, an increase in government payments to farmers may be associated with decline in asset values.


2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (8) ◽  
pp. 2485-2523
Author(s):  
Maryam Farboodi ◽  
Laura Veldkamp

“Big data” financial technology raises concerns about market inefficiency. A common concern is that the technology might induce traders to extract others’ information, rather than to produce information themselves. We allow agents to choose how much they learn about future asset values or about others’ demands, and we explore how improvements in data processing shape these information choices, trading strategies and market outcomes. Our main insight is that unbiased technological change can explain a market-wide shift in data collection and trading strategies. However, in the long run, as data processing technology becomes increasingly advanced, both types of data continue to be processed. Two competing forces keep the data economy in balance: data resolve investment risk, but future data create risk. The efficiency results that follow from these competing forces upend two pieces of common wisdom: our results offer a new take on what makes prices informative and whether trades typically deemed liquidity-providing actually make markets more resilient. (JEL C55, D83, G12, G14, O33)


Author(s):  
Jörg Schimmelpfennig

The purpose of this chapter is to rectify the at best unprofessional intermingling of objectives and constraints and present a proper theory of first-best and second-best pricing in urban rail networks. First, in view of the flaws of both Dupuit's – though nevertheless ingenious idea of – consumer surplus as well its cannibalized version found in most of today's economics textbooks, a proper definition of economic welfare resting on Hicks'sian variations instead is provided. It is used to derive efficient pricing rules that are subsequently applied to specific questions arising from running an urban railway network such as overcrowding, short-run versus long-run capacity or competing modes of transport like the private motor car. At the same time, another look is taken at economic costs, and in particular economic marginal costs, differing from commercial or accounting costs. Among other things, it is shown that even with commercial marginal costs being constant first-best pricing might not necessarily be incompatible with a zero-profit budget.


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