Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Human Rights Law: The Contribution of the International Criminal Court

1970 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Mohammed

The road to developing an international institutional capacity to prosecute crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide has been a long one, and has in many ways concluded with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). By looking at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as the ICC, this paper traces the evolution of the concept of individual criminal responsibility to its present incarnation. It argues that while the ICC presents its own unique ‘added value’ to the prosecution of international criminals, its application of justice continues to be biased by the influence of powerful states.

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Goy

For more than 15 years the two ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have interpreted the requirements of different forms of individual criminal responsibility. It is thus helpful to look at whether and to what extent the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR may provide guidance to the International Criminal Court (ICC). To this end, this article compares the requirements of individual criminal responsibility at the ICTY/ICTR and the ICC. The article concludes that, applied with caution, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR – as an expression of international law – can assist in interpreting the modes of liability under the ICC Statute. ICTY/ICTR case law seems to be most helpful with regard to accessorial forms of liability, in particular their objective elements. Moreover, it may assist in interpreting the subjective requirements set out in Article 30 ICC Statute.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1469-1488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph J.M. Safferling

Almost 60 years after the surviving Nazi-leaders were tried in the first ever international criminal tribunal for mass atrocities during World War II in Nuremberg, criminal responsibility for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes is perceived of as somewhat normal. Even if it is not yet an everyday event that human rights abusers are tried on an international level, the reality of the possibility of such a trial is present in the minds of the attentive public. This change was achieved over the last ten years. The establishing of the Yugoslavia-tribunal in 1993 was the turning point. Since then a number of both national and international trials held against human rights criminals has given the topic high priority. Finally the International Criminal Court (ICC) was founded and after a comparatively short time actually established and put in a position to operate. Sierra Leone relies on criminal prosecution in order to rebuild its society after a distracted and bloody civil war and a trial against Saddam Hussein seems a necessity. Many expectations are connected to criminal law and the working of the ICC. The dream of a world-wide justice, i.e. to attribute “just desert” to the offenders and to do justice to the victims, seems to have become reality. At the same time the establishing of an international criminal court is understood as a signal that will deter future offenders from committing human rights atrocities. The paper of Alexandra Kemmerer gives proof of how optimistically the EU promotes the idea of international criminal justice.


2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALICIA GIL GIL ◽  
ELENA MACULAN

AbstractThe jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) up to the Lubanga judgment showed definite interpretive trends on the modes of principal liability. This article aims first to make a critical assessment of these trends by focusing on methodological and substantive aspects. On the one hand, the practice of having resort to theories derived from Continental legal systems, albeit legitimate, is based on a methodology that raises some concerns as to the selection and (mis)interpretation of such theories. On the other hand, the Court has clearly adopted a wide interpretation of some critical elements in which the different modes of principal liability are grounded. This choice has caused a significant expansion of the scope of principal liability as well as a breach of the principles of legality and of individual criminal responsibility. In our opinion, the underpinning of these interpretations is a flawed understanding of the criteria for distinguishing between principals and accessories.This perspective has been overturned by the Katanga judgment, on which the second part of this article will focus. This judgment correctly argues that the distinction between perpetrators and accomplices is grounded only on the autonomous or vicarious character of their contribution to the offence. Furthermore, it follows a partly different approach as to both the methodology and the interpretation of the constitutive elements of principal liability. In our view, this approach better fits both the relevant statutory provision and the basic principles of criminal law.


2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Spieker

Non-international armed conflicts are more numerous, more brutal and entail more blood-shed today than international ones. The Statute of the International Criminal Court explicitly upholds the traditional distinction between international and non-international conflicts, and armed conflicts will have to be characterized accordingly. But the tendency to adapt the international humanitarian law (IHL) regime for non-international conflicts to the rules for international ones emerges. Article 7 on Crimes Against Humanity and Article 8(2)(c) and (e) on War Crimes amount to real progress in this respect. Yet, the regulation on war crimes in particular does not provide for comprehensive criminal responsibility of individual perpetrators in non-international conflicts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-233
Author(s):  
Dimitris Liakopoulos

The present study aims to explore the relationship between the dogmatic conditions of the founding and the exclusion of international individual criminal responsibility. There are few cases in which an International Criminal Court has used previous international jurisprudence to establish a crime of conduct in international customary law, and in any case the importance of international judgments can not be underestimated as a general interpretative tool.


Author(s):  
Leila Nadya Sadat

This chapter asks why––and whether––the international community should finally codify crimes against humanity in an international convention, particularly given its recent inclusion in the Statute of the International Criminal Court. It considers the normative foundations and practical application of crimes against humanity by international and national courts, and how a new treaty might strengthen both the preventive and punishment dimensions of national and international responses to these crimes. It is a particularly appropriate contribution to a volume in honour of William Schabas, for he has been a member of the steering committee for the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative from the very beginning. Professor Schabas is a leading expert on international criminal law, the international criminal court, and international human rights law, and his contributions to the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative have been vital to the project’s success.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
Steven Freeland

The recent issue by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of an arrest warrant against Omar Al Bashir, the President of Sudan, for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, represents the first time that the ICC has acted in such a way against an incumbent Head of State. It has renewed the debate about the potential international criminal responsibility of Heads of State and has led to strong opinions both for and against such actions. Yet, the prosecution of Heads of State is by no means a new phenomenon, and its continued use represents an important element in the internationalisation of justice that has gained renewed emphasis over the past two decades. This article offers some thoughts and reflections on several key issues associated with this debate, focusing particularly on the political, legal and historical dimensions that have combined to allow for the prosecution under international criminal law of any person, irrespective of their official capacity. It also examines the important role in this regard for the ICC, the world's first permanent international criminal tribunal, as well as the increasing range of prosecutions now taking place within national jurisdictions, as the period of impunity in relation to the commission of international crimes that had existed for several decades up to the 1990s has come to an end. 


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 25 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 25 distinguishes various forms of criminal participation. Like much of the Rome Statute, it was a negotiated compromise crafted by jurists from different legal traditions. Concepts and words in one system did not necessarily have the same connotations as they did in others. Judge Van den Wyngaert has described article 25 as being ‘based upon an eclectic combination of sources from several national legal traditions’, adding that ‘such multi-faceted origins comes as no surprise, considering the States Parties' obvious wish to find a compromise between different legal traditions’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 1031-1055 ◽  
Author(s):  
W L Cheah

Abstract As commentators press the International Criminal Court and other internationalized criminal courts to adopt a more sensitive approach to culture-specific evidence when determining individual criminal responsibility, this article argues that important lessons may be obtained from Asian jurisdictions where courts have discussed and assessed such evidence. The Asian examples studied here highlight the possibilities and challenges of having courts consider culture-specific evidence. By comparing judicial experiences, this article also shows that a more sensitive judicial approach to culture-specific evidence may be cultivated if attention is given not only to the cultural knowledge of judges, but also the court’s broader legal architecture, the position of the accused, and judicial identity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alette Smeulers

Abstract Article 33 of the International Criminal Court Statute allows low-ranking perpetrators to — in exceptional cases — rely on the defence of superior orders. By doing so, Article 33 might be seen as an acknowledgement that within a specific context orders to commit international crimes might not always be manifest unlawful. Article 33(2), however, restricts the possibility to rely on this defence to perpetrators of war crimes and denies perpetrators of crimes against humanity and genocide a similar defence, since according to Article 33(2), such orders are considered always to be manifestly unlawful. This contribution questions whether such a distinction should be made. Many low-ranking perpetrators involved in such crimes by following superior orders seem to genuinely believe that they were doing the ‘right thing’. This article seeks to explain how these perpetrators might have come to such a belief, and the challenge this might represent to the core principles which underpin the concept of individual criminal responsibility.


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