scholarly journals A Hardware Trojans Detection method by side-channel analysis

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin Ni
2014 ◽  
Vol 536-537 ◽  
pp. 558-561
Author(s):  
Wen Feng Feng ◽  
Lei Li ◽  
Zhen Li

In recent years, integrated circuits subject to hardware Trojans attack in the design and manufacturing process, the security of chip and hardware security was threatened. Some detection methods of have been proposed, the most common of those methods is based on side-channel signal analysis, however, since the effect of process noise, considering only the unilateral information that is difficult to effectively distinguish the noise and Trojans circuit. In this paper, the method still based on side-channel signal, but it is a combination of power and delay which was called the power-delay product (PDP). The idea proposed is verified by the benchmark circuit iscas85, the experimental results show that this method can effectively improve detection probability.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 01041
Author(s):  
Burcu Sönmez ◽  
Ahmet Bedri Özer

In this study, digital signature application was performed on FPGA with classical RSA and Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). The power consumption of the system was observed when the digital signature process was performed on the FPGA. In order to distinguish the modular exponentiation methods as the classical RSA and the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), the anomaly detection method was applied to the digital signature application using the power side channel analysis of the system. According to the obtained result, it is proved that information about the structure of the algorithm executing in the system can be obtained by using the power information consumed by a cryptographic device.


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