scholarly journals Civil-Military Relations in China: Party-Army or National Military?

2002 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 10-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Shambaugh

This article examines the changing dynamics of relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It argues that while the PLA remains politically loyal to the CCP, there is evidence of important changes in the institutional relationship between the two institutions. The partyarmy relationship is no longer as intertwined and symbiotic as it has historically been; rather, this article argues that there is evidence of a 'bifurcation' between the two. The catalysts for this change have been the professionalization and relative depoliticization of the military, as well as the leadership transition in the CCP. These changes raise important and central issues for the future of Chinese politics.*

Author(s):  
Jun Koga Sudduth

Political leaders face threats to their power from within and outside the regime. Leaders can be removed via a coup d’état undertaken by militaries that are part of the state apparatus. At the same time, leaders can lose power when they confront excluded opposition groups in civil wars. The difficulty for leaders, though, is that efforts to address one threat might leave them vulnerable to the other threat due to the role of the military as an institution of violence capable of exercising coercive power. On one hand, leaders need to protect their regimes from rebels by maintaining strong militaries. Yet, militaries that are strong enough to prevail against rebel forces are also strong enough to execute a coup successfully. On the other hand, leaders who cope with coup threats by weakening their militaries’ capabilities to organize a coup also diminish the very capabilities that they need to defeat their rebel challengers. This unfortunate trade-off between protection by the military and protection from the military has been the long-standing theme in studies of civil-military relations and coup-proofing. Though most research on this subject has focused primarily on rulers’ maneuvers to balance the threats posed by the military and the threats coming from foreign adversaries, more recent scholarship has begun to explore how leaders’ efforts to cope with coup threats will influence the regime’s abilities to address the domestic threats coming from rebel groups, and vice versa. This new wave of research focuses on two related vectors. First, scholars address whether leaders who pursue coup-proofing strategies that weaken their militaries’ capabilities also increase the regime’s vulnerability to rebel threats and the future probability of civil war. Second, scholars examine how the magnitude of threats posed by rebel groups will determine leaders’ strategies toward the militaries, and how these strategies affect both the militaries’ influence over government policy and the future probability of coup onsets. These lines of research contribute to the conflict literature by examining the causal mechanisms through which civil conflict influences coup propensity and vice versa. The literatures on civil war and coups have developed independently without much consideration of each other, and systematic analyses of the linkage between them have only just began.


1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 299-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellis Joffe

It is axiomatic among observers that in the transition to the post-Deng era, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will play a pivotal role. This is understandable. Until now, the army has been a central force in Chinese politics owing to the unique Party-army relationship that has existed since the founding of the Communist regime. Although this relationship will change in the near future, the importance of the military will not: they will remain indispensable backers of the new leadership. This is because they command the forces which may be used to determine the outcome of an elite power struggle, displace rebellious local figures, put down a mass uprising or even carry out a coup.


1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 315-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
June Teufel Dreyer

In early 1975, in a speech to the cadres of the headquarters of the General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Deng Xiaoping delivered his blueprint for the military of the future. The radical restructuring of the military and its officer corps that it entailed was purportedly proposed by Mao Zedong himself. However, the fact that the speech was not made public until 1983, allegedly because it had been suppressed by the Gang of Four, makes it more likely that the architect of the reorganization, with its far-reaching implications for the PLA's officer corps, was Deng himself. Two decades later, at the close of the Deng era, it is important to examine the thrust of this document in assessing trends for the officer corps of the future.


2014 ◽  
Vol 06 (04) ◽  
pp. 5-12
Author(s):  
Zhiyue BO

Since he became commander-in-chief in November 2012, Xi Jinping has promoted altogether 11 generals in three batches. The promotion of the third batch came in the shadow of expelling Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and Politburo member, from the Party. In the future, Xi Jinping will have to strike a balance between the anti-corruption campaign in the military and the establishment of a core support group in the People's Liberation Army.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Vuving

This chapter explores the architecture of civil-military relations in Communist Party-ruled Vietnam. Contrary to the dominant paradigm of civil-military relations in the West, civil-military relations in Vietnam follow a very different logic, that of the Leninist system. The relationship between the military and the party-state in Vietnam is characterized by mutual embeddedness. This is not a zero-sum game as the concept of civilian control implies. In the Leninist system, the military's politicization, political influence and involvement in politics are critical for the Communist Party's hegemony. The Party's absolute, direct, and comprehensive control of the military is the core of civil-military relations in the Leninist system. However, Party control is a reciprocal relationship that gives military leaders more say and more privileges than they would have under more democratic conditions. This reciprocity explains the system’s endurance as well as its internal stability. The Vietnam People's Army is deeply politicized and the political control of the military serves the interests of both the Party and the military leadership. Barring a major political reform in the Vietnam Communist Party itself, the Vietnam People's Army will remain more political than professional and commercial.


Asian Survey ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 198-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Talbot

This article focuses on three areas that dominated Pakistan during 2002. The first was the transition to democracy in October. The background to the elections and the controversies surrounding this are examined along with the main party groupings and the outcomes. Second, the article considers the tense relations with India that threatened war both in January and May. The military standoff is explained in terms of the cross-border terrorism issue. Third, the article explains that Pakistan itself was a major victim of terrorism during the year. These outrages were designed to hit out at soft Western targets and to undermine the Musharraf government. Uncertainties abounded in Pakistan throughout much of the year. These arose firstly from the military standoff with India that followed the December 13, 2001, attack on India's Parliament; secondly, from the threat of terrorist outrages within Pakistan; and thirdly, from anxieties concerning the future of civil-military relations in the wake of the October parliamentary elections.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document