The New Officer Corps: Implications for the Future

1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 315-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
June Teufel Dreyer
Keyword(s):  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Deng Xiaoping ◽  
Officer Corps ◽  
General Staff ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
The Future ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
The Military

In early 1975, in a speech to the cadres of the headquarters of the General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Deng Xiaoping delivered his blueprint for the military of the future. The radical restructuring of the military and its officer corps that it entailed was purportedly proposed by Mao Zedong himself. However, the fact that the speech was not made public until 1983, allegedly because it had been suppressed by the Gang of Four, makes it more likely that the architect of the reorganization, with its far-reaching implications for the PLA's officer corps, was Deng himself. Two decades later, at the close of the Deng era, it is important to examine the thrust of this document in assessing trends for the officer corps of the future.

scholarly journals Civil-Military Relations in China: Party-Army or National Military?

2002 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 10-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Shambaugh
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Leadership Transition ◽  
Chinese Politics ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The Future ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This article examines the changing dynamics of relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It argues that while the PLA remains politically loyal to the CCP, there is evidence of important changes in the institutional relationship between the two institutions. The partyarmy relationship is no longer as intertwined and symbiotic as it has historically been; rather, this article argues that there is evidence of a 'bifurcation' between the two. The catalysts for this change have been the professionalization and relative depoliticization of the military, as well as the leadership transition in the CCP. These changes raise important and central issues for the future of Chinese politics.*

Xi Jinping's Generals

2014 ◽  
Vol 06 (04) ◽  
pp. 5-12
Author(s):  
Zhiyue BO
Keyword(s):  
Support Group ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Vice Chairman ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Future ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
The Military ◽  
Commander In Chief

Since he became commander-in-chief in November 2012, Xi Jinping has promoted altogether 11 generals in three batches. The promotion of the third batch came in the shadow of expelling Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and Politburo member, from the Party. In the future, Xi Jinping will have to strike a balance between the anti-corruption campaign in the military and the establishment of a core support group in the People's Liberation Army.

The Evolving Role of the Military in China’s COVID-19 Response

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Nan LI
Keyword(s):  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
Security Challenges ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
Military Support ◽  
Civilian Leadership ◽  
The Military

The fear of political vulnerability stemming from an over-reliance on the military for containing COVID-19 led the civilian leadership to deploy the level and type of military support that were deliberately measured and technically specialised; the timings of this support were also carefully planned. The concern about COVID-19 causing significant infections among PLA (People’s Liberation Army) ranks that may hamper PLA response to the perceived external security challenges also proved to be premature.

Xi Jinping Overhauls the People’s Liberation Army

2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (02) ◽  
pp. 68-78
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE
Keyword(s):  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Long Distance ◽  
Control Structures ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
Power Projection ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
American Model ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Military

The overhaul of the People’s Liberation Army will move it away from its Soviet-style command and control structures towards the American model, which is believed to be more adapted to the new security environment and facilitates long distance power projection to protect China’s far-flung national interest abroad. The Communist Party’s organisational presence is reaffirmed to ensure the loyalty of the military as the Party considers it the ultimate source of its power and final defence of its rule.

Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect

1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 299-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellis Joffe
Keyword(s):  
Central Force ◽  
Pivotal Role ◽  
Communist Regime ◽  
Chinese Politics ◽  
Power Struggle ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
The Military ◽  
Near Future

It is axiomatic among observers that in the transition to the post-Deng era, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will play a pivotal role. This is understandable. Until now, the army has been a central force in Chinese politics owing to the unique Party-army relationship that has existed since the founding of the Communist regime. Although this relationship will change in the near future, the importance of the military will not: they will remain indispensable backers of the new leadership. This is because they command the forces which may be used to determine the outcome of an elite power struggle, displace rebellious local figures, put down a mass uprising or even carry out a coup.

Deng Xiaoping: The Soldier

1993 ◽  
Vol 135 ◽  
pp. 536-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
June Teufel Dreyer
Keyword(s):  
Military Training ◽  
Deng Xiaoping ◽  
Historical Legacy ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
Minor Part

Deng Xiaoping's attempt to modernize and professionalize the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will surely be remembered as one of the most important components of his historical legacy. Yet, ironically, Deng's military activities formed a decidedly minor part of his career. Deng received no formal military training, and Chinese Communist sources have very little to say about his military contributions before 1980; most of what was reported comes from his enemies and is difficult to corroborate. What has been written after 1980 has a suspiciously hagio-graphic ring and is also difficult to confirm.

Describing the Future Battlefield: A Study Concerning the Prussian General Staff’s Tasks Regarding Theatres of War (1816–1848)

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
Jacek Jędrysiak
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Internal Structure ◽  
Research Centre ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
General Staff ◽  
Main Research ◽  
Military Threat ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Military

In 1816 the Prussian General Staff (gs) became one of the institutions responsible for the Kingdom’s defence planning. During this time, the institution was comprised of three sections, the so-called Kriegstheater (Theatres of War), which were to prepare against the military threat posed by France, Austria and Russia. According to instructions issued in 1816, the gs was to assist commanders in every aspect of their decision-making process and serve as the army’s main research centre. General Karl von Grolman, who served as Chief of the General Staff between 1816 and 1819, believed that the defence plan should be preliminary, very thorough and based on accurate descriptions of the theatres of war. Contrary to often-repeated claims, his successors did not introduce major changes to the internal structure of the gs until 1848. The aim of this article is to bring the existing literature up to date regarding this task of the Prussian General Staff.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document