Xi Jinping's Generals

2014 ◽  
Vol 06 (04) ◽  
pp. 5-12
Author(s):  
Zhiyue BO
Keyword(s):  
Support Group ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Vice Chairman ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Future ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
The Military ◽  
Commander In Chief

Since he became commander-in-chief in November 2012, Xi Jinping has promoted altogether 11 generals in three batches. The promotion of the third batch came in the shadow of expelling Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and Politburo member, from the Party. In the future, Xi Jinping will have to strike a balance between the anti-corruption campaign in the military and the establishment of a core support group in the People's Liberation Army.

Xi Jinping Overhauls the People’s Liberation Army

2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (02) ◽  
pp. 68-78
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE
Keyword(s):  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Long Distance ◽  
Control Structures ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
Power Projection ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
American Model ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Military

The overhaul of the People’s Liberation Army will move it away from its Soviet-style command and control structures towards the American model, which is believed to be more adapted to the new security environment and facilitates long distance power projection to protect China’s far-flung national interest abroad. The Communist Party’s organisational presence is reaffirmed to ensure the loyalty of the military as the Party considers it the ultimate source of its power and final defence of its rule.

The New Officer Corps: Implications for the Future

1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 315-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
June Teufel Dreyer
Keyword(s):  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Deng Xiaoping ◽  
Officer Corps ◽  
General Staff ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
The Future ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
The Military

In early 1975, in a speech to the cadres of the headquarters of the General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Deng Xiaoping delivered his blueprint for the military of the future. The radical restructuring of the military and its officer corps that it entailed was purportedly proposed by Mao Zedong himself. However, the fact that the speech was not made public until 1983, allegedly because it had been suppressed by the Gang of Four, makes it more likely that the architect of the reorganization, with its far-reaching implications for the PLA's officer corps, was Deng himself. Two decades later, at the close of the Deng era, it is important to examine the thrust of this document in assessing trends for the officer corps of the future.

scholarly journals Civil-Military Relations in China: Party-Army or National Military?

2002 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 10-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Shambaugh
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Leadership Transition ◽  
Chinese Politics ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The Future ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This article examines the changing dynamics of relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It argues that while the PLA remains politically loyal to the CCP, there is evidence of important changes in the institutional relationship between the two institutions. The partyarmy relationship is no longer as intertwined and symbiotic as it has historically been; rather, this article argues that there is evidence of a 'bifurcation' between the two. The catalysts for this change have been the professionalization and relative depoliticization of the military, as well as the leadership transition in the CCP. These changes raise important and central issues for the future of Chinese politics.*

scholarly journals Laser Challenge of China

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (10) ◽  
pp. 939-942
Author(s):  
Victor V Apollonov
Keyword(s):  
New Technologies ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Chinese Leader ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Innovative Technologies ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
The Military ◽  
People's Congress

Chinese President Xi Jinping, at a meeting with delegates of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) during the last session of the National People's Congress (NPC), demanded the introduction of scientific discoveries and innovative technologies in the army. Xi Jinping noted that new technologies are the key to modernizing the Armed Forces. The Chinese leader discussed with the military how to achieve the goals set in the field of national defense and army development and the implementation of the 13th five-year plan for the development of the armed forces. It is safe to say that Laser Weapons (LW) are on the agenda of China/1/

Implodes but Expands: How the ‘Islamic State’ Fights in Iraq

2020 ◽  
pp. 38-78
Author(s):  
Omar Ashour
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Military

The chapter is composed of seven sections. The second section overviews the military build-up of IS and its predecessors in Iraq from October 2002 – the date when the founding leader of its predecessor organizations, Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, arrived in the northeast of the country – to June 2014, the date of IS establishment and self-declaration as a “caliphate.” The third, fourth, and fifth sections outline the details of the three battlefronts of Fallujah, Mosul, and Ramadi, as a sample reflecting how ISIS/IS have fought in Iraq within specific timeframes. The sixth section of the chapter analyses how IS fights in Iraq, using empirical data and battlefield observations from the three battlefronts and elsewhere in Iraq. Finally, the concluding section focuses on the future of IS insurgency in Iraq, after losing territory and shifting back to guerrilla and terrorism strategies and tactics.

The Evolving Role of the Military in China’s COVID-19 Response

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Nan LI
Keyword(s):  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
Security Challenges ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
Military Support ◽  
Civilian Leadership ◽  
The Military

The fear of political vulnerability stemming from an over-reliance on the military for containing COVID-19 led the civilian leadership to deploy the level and type of military support that were deliberately measured and technically specialised; the timings of this support were also carefully planned. The concern about COVID-19 causing significant infections among PLA (People’s Liberation Army) ranks that may hamper PLA response to the perceived external security challenges also proved to be premature.

Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect

1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 299-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellis Joffe
Keyword(s):  
Central Force ◽  
Pivotal Role ◽  
Communist Regime ◽  
Chinese Politics ◽  
Power Struggle ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
The Military ◽  
Near Future

It is axiomatic among observers that in the transition to the post-Deng era, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will play a pivotal role. This is understandable. Until now, the army has been a central force in Chinese politics owing to the unique Party-army relationship that has existed since the founding of the Communist regime. Although this relationship will change in the near future, the importance of the military will not: they will remain indispensable backers of the new leadership. This is because they command the forces which may be used to determine the outcome of an elite power struggle, displace rebellious local figures, put down a mass uprising or even carry out a coup.

Resistance to state-orchestrated modernization in Xinjiang: The genesis of unrest in the multiethnic frontier

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-202
Author(s):  
Hasan H. Karrar
Keyword(s):  
State Building ◽  
Local Resistance ◽  
Autonomous Region ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
The Third ◽  
Chinese Nation ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

This article seeks to explain periodic unrest in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the years immediately following the Third Plenum. This unrest fractured along ethnic lines between the non-Han and the Han, and in so doing, threatened to unravel Deng Xiaoping’s modernization efforts. Simultaneously, the unrest challenged Beijing’s self-projection as a unitary multiethnic state, and singular Chinese nation. Beijing’s anxiety was evident in its response: memorializing state building on the frontier during the 1940s and 1950s; emphasizing nationalities work; and dispatching veteran revolutionaries to Xinjiang. Foremost amongst them was Wang Zhen (1908–1993), who had led the People’s Liberation Army into Xinjiang in October 1949. During four visits between 1980 and 1982, Wang admonished cadres to love Xinjiang and its people, and to settle contentedly on the frontier. In this article, I argue that in the post-1978 period, unrest in Xinjiang was local resistance to accelerated modernization after the Third Plenum. I also demonstrate how this local resistance to Deng-era modernization led to a deepening of Beijing’s appropriation of the frontier.

19th Party Congress and People’s Liberation Army’s Leadership Reshuffle

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 40-52
Author(s):  
Nan LI
Keyword(s):  
Political Control ◽  
Technical Expertise ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
People's Liberation Army ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
Party Congress

Appointing new Central Military Commission (CMC) members and chiefs of People’s Liberation Army services and theatres is to (i) ensure political loyalty by appointing people Xi Jinping knows well and trusts personally; (ii) promote functional and technical expertise-based professionalism; (iii) enhance CMC chair’s political control by reducing CMC size and increasing proportion of political officers in CMC; and (iv) enforce age requirements.

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