scholarly journals Implementing the board of directors’ mechanism – An empirical study of the listed firms in Libya

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jill Atkins ◽  
Mohamed Zakari ◽  
Ismail Elshahoubi

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which board of directors’ mechanism is implemented in Libyan listed companies. This includes a consideration of composition, duties and responsibilities of the board directors. This study employed a questionnaire survey to collect required data from four key stakeholder groups: Boards of Directors (BD), Executive Managers (EM), Regulators and External Auditors (RE) and Other Stakeholders (OS). The results of this study provided evidence that Libyan listed companies generally comply with the Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) requirements regarding the board composition: the findings assert that most boards have between three and eleven members, the majority of whom are non-executives and at least two or one-third of whom (whichever is greater) are independent. Moreover, the results indicate that general assemblies in Libyan listed companies are practically committed to the LCGC’s requirements regarding the appointment of board members and their length of tenure. The findings provide evidence that boards in Libyan listed companies are carrying out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with internal regulations and laws, as well as the stipulations of the LCGC (2007). Furthermore, the stakeholder groups were broadly satisfied that board members are devoting sufficient time and effort to discharge these duties and responsibilities properly. This study helps to enrich our understanding and knowledge of the current practice of corporate boards as a significant mechanism of corporate governance (CG) by being the first to address the board of directors’ mechanism in Libyan listed companies.

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chryssoula Tsene

Corporate governance is widely acknowledged as a key factor of market’s efficiency and corporate performance. Greek company law, under the influence of the financial crisis, has responded actively by incorporating in national law EU directives on corporate governance of listed companies and by adopting recently self-regulatory provisions. This regulatory framework contributes essentially to enhance board accountability and transparency, empower shareholder protection and promote financial disclosure. In that regard, two pillars should be illustrated as regards board of directors in listed companies: Greek company law provides traditionally for the establishment of the general duties of loyalty and care of all board members in companies limited by shares, which are furthermore reinforced by the provisions of the Hellenic Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies. Secondly, hard law rules introduce the participation of non-executive and non-executive independent directors as a legal mechanism of confronting agency problems in listed companies. These provisions have been strongly argued as regards the exact content of the obligations of all board members of listed companies to promote the corporate interest and especially as regards the monitoring role of non-executive directors. These conceptions should be followed by empirical researches in order to address a completely legal and functional approach.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 578-587
Author(s):  
Donatella Busso ◽  
Alain Devalle ◽  
Fabio Rizzato

Board evaluation is an evaluation of the performance of the board of directors and its committees, as well as their size, composition and operation. The aim of this paper is to investigate how entities do the evaluation of the performance of the board and how they disclose the self-assessment. We analysed the largest forty constituents of both Italy’s FTSE MIB index and the UK’s FTSE 100 index. The results show that although Corporate Governance Codes’ requirements are similar, implementation of these requirements and the related disclosure continue to show significant differences. The UK companies seem to have a stronger “forward-looking” approach compared to Italian companies. Disclosure provided by Italian companies is too often not enough to enable stakeholder understanding of the process and its outcome. This research contributes to the literature by providing results on the evaluation of boards of directors: regulators, practitioners and researchers must deal with this topic in order to strengthen the rules of corporate governance.


2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gizelle Willows ◽  
Megan van der Linde

Purpose By looking at both theoretical and empirical findings, this study aims to investigate whether gender diversity results in improved corporate governance and financial performance for companies. Design/methodology/approach An analysis of the board composition of the Johannesburg Securities Exchange Top 40 companies as at 30 June 2013 and a comparison of the financial performance of the company were conducted. Findings Female directors were found to make up, on average, 18.78 per cent of the board of directors, with the majority of these women being in non-executive positions. Women representation appears to influence company performance positively when using accounting-based measures of performance (such as return on assets and return on equity), but negatively when using market-based measures (such as Tobin’s Q). The critical mass concept is also assessed and is found to have a positive effect. Originality/value These findings are of relevance to the boards of directors adhering to corporate governance requirements by challenging the role of women on the board of directors, as well as that of investors and those in practice, to understand the current status of women representation.


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 188-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Spraggon ◽  
Virginia Bodolica ◽  
Tor Brodtkorb

This article contributes to the growing body of literature exploring the important role that information transparency plays in strengthening the national corporate governance regime. We review the 2007 amendments to the Canadian reporting legislation with the particular emphasis on sections pertaining to executive compensation and boards of directors. Taking into consideration the specificities of the „comply-or-explain‟ system in Canada, we seek to uncover the extent to which publicly-listed firms comply with these newly amended standards of corporate governance reporting. Based on a comparison of 403 proxy circulars issued in the post-amendment period, we identified important cross-firm variations in the type and format of disclosed information on executive compensation and corporate boards of directors. In order to address the problems that inter-organizational disclosure discrepancies generate for governance researchers and analysts, we provide several recommendations on how Canadian publicly-traded companies can improve their reporting practices


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (4-2) ◽  
pp. 221-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elsa Satkunasingam ◽  
Aaron Yong ◽  
Sern Cherk

The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2000 emphasises the monitoring role of the Board of Directors, especially that of independent directors. It has not however taken into account the cultural values in Malaysia which do not encourage differences of opinion or criticisms and has failed to provide sufficient safeguards for directors to exercise their role effectively. As a result, it is relatively easy for dominant Chairmen or CEOs especially in government-linked companies or CEO dominated companies to control the Board or senior management with very little opposition. This paper will discuss several incidences of financial mismanagement in companies caused by dominant directors with very little opposition from the rest of the board. It will highlight that the law has to take cultural values more seriously in order to equip the Board and especially independent directors with the ability to challenge dominant Board members.


NCC Journal ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-70
Author(s):  
Dipti Dhungel

This thematic paper has been prepared to find out how the composition of Board of Directors makes impact on performance of firms. To find this impact, the articles published in international journals have been reviewed. In addition to this detailed study of the legislator, the provision regarding composition of BOD in Nepal was made as stated in BAFIA and Company Act. The Board of Directorsis the elected members among the shareholders who could best represent the interest of each and every member. Corporate boards are one of the, if not the most important, internal corporate governance mechanisms that monitor and advise management in fulfilling the mandate to protect shareholder interests.There is still much debate as to the relationship between firm performance and boards of directors, which are arguably the main component of corporate governance.The thematic review concludes that the relationship between BOD and performance was not found on the basis of existing literature reviewed. Thus, the study opened the ground for the researcher to test this empirically.NCC JournalVol. 3, No. 1, 2018, Page: 65-70


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Álvaro Melón-Izco ◽  
Francisco J. Ruiz-Cabestre ◽  
M. Carmen Ruiz-Olalla

Motivated by the debate on the adequacy of the composition of boards of directors, we examine the effect that board diversity has on corporate governance performance in Spain, analysing gender diversity, diversity of director types and tenure diversity. The findings reveal that diverse boards of directors have a positive influence on good governance practices,improving the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms. These results could be interesting for practitioners and regulators.


2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Géraldine Carminatti-Marchand ◽  
Mathieu Paquerot

Most of studies on corporate governance are based on the Anglo-Saxon view. However in France the majority of the top managers graduate from Ena and Polytechnic. Belonging to one or the other of these two clans, with the underlying link to the civil service, can have serious repercussions on the system of corporate governance. The clan tries to increase their power in the firms. In order to do this, it needs to control firms’ leaders, but also the board of directors. The control of the board allows the system to master all shareholders’ objections. It is also a means to widen its influence. This study proposes an analysis of the links between the characteristics of leaders and boards as well as the consequences of this control of the clan on the performance of the firm.


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