A Decision Theory Model for Course Placement

1998 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wim J. van der Linden
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Course Placement

A Decision Theory Model for Course Placement

1998 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wim J. van der Linden
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Probability Distributions ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Nonincreasing Function ◽  
Course Placement ◽  
Linear Utility ◽  
Theory Point ◽  
Specific Shape

The problem of how to place students in a sequence of hierarchically related courses is addressed from a decision theory point of view. Based on a minimal set of assumptions, it is shown that optimal mastery rules for the courses are always monotone and a nonincreasing function of the scores on the placement test. On the other hand, placement rules are not generally monotone but have a form depending on the specific shape of the probability distributions and utility functions in force. The results are further explored for a class of linear utility functions.

scholarly journals Autoimmunity: a decision theory model.

1987 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
J A Morris
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Theory Model

A Decision Theory Model for Health Monitoring of Aeroengines

1979 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 222-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
V.V.S. Sarma ◽  
K.V. Kunhikrishnan ◽  
K. Ramchand
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Health Monitoring ◽  
Theory Model

scholarly journals Belief, Faith, and Hope: On the Rationality of Long-Term Commitment

Mind ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Rational Action ◽  
The Face ◽  
Over Time ◽  
As If

Abstract I examine three attitudes: belief, faith, and hope. I argue that all three attitudes play the same role in rationalizing action. First, I explain two models of rational action—the decision-theory model and the belief-desire model. Both models entail there are two components of rational action: an epistemic component and a conative component. Then, using this framework, I show how belief, faith, and hope that p can all make it rational to accept, or act as if, p. I conclude by showing how my picture can explain how action-oriented commitments can be rational over time, both in the face of counterevidence and in the face of waning affections.

The Effect of Attentional Cueing upon Speed Discrimination

Perception ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 26 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 90-90
Author(s):  
M R Blakemore ◽  
R J Snowden
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Test Stimulus ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
The Other ◽  
Staircase Procedure ◽  
Attentional Cueing ◽  
Speed Discrimination ◽  
Study Participants

Motion processes have often been regarded as being preattentive in nature. Additionally, in a few attention studies attempts have been made to incorporate the methodology common to classical psychophysics. Speed discrimination with multiple grating patches has been investigated with uncertainty/search paradigms (Verghese and Stone, 1995 Vision Research35 2811 – 2823). Another method commonly used in attentional research is the cueing paradigm, which we have used here. In this study participants had to discriminate, using a 2AFC method, whether one of four grating patterns moved faster or slower than the other patches (of a standard speed 6 deg s−1). The speed of this test stimulus was altered from trial to trial with the use of an adaptive staircase procedure. Whilst the gratings were in motion a brief (32 ms) cue was presented. This could be either valid (58%), invalid (14%), or neutral (28%) in respect to the patch of grating which was moving at a different speed. The results demonstrate that cueing had a strong effect upon the discrimination judgement. The invalid trials had up to a factor of four increase in discrimination thresholds when compared to the valid trials. Further experiments with post-stimulus cueing suggested that a decision theory model may account for a large proportion of these cueing effects. This is in agreement with similar cueing studies (Kinchla et al, 1995 Perception & Psychophysics57 441 – 450) in which participants discriminated between different array elements.

scholarly journals Does a better model yield a better argument? An info-gap analysis

2017 ◽  
Vol 473 (2200) ◽  
pp. 20160890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yakov Ben-Haim
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Gap Analysis ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Computational Method ◽  
Probability Of Error ◽  
Model Yield ◽  
Low Probability ◽  
Lack Of Knowledge

Theories, models and computations underlie reasoned argumentation in many areas. The possibility of error in these arguments, though of low probability, may be highly significant when the argument is used in predicting the probability of rare high-consequence events. This implies that the choice of a theory, model or computational method for predicting rare high-consequence events must account for the probability of error in these components. However, error may result from lack of knowledge or surprises of various sorts, and predicting the probability of error is highly uncertain. We show that the putatively best, most innovative and sophisticated argument may not actually have the lowest probability of error. Innovative arguments may entail greater uncertainty than more standard but less sophisticated methods, creating an innovation dilemma in formulating the argument. We employ info-gap decision theory to characterize and support the resolution of this problem and present several examples.

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