Constitutional Law. Tenth Amendment. Ninth Circuit Holds Interim Enforcement Provisions of the Brady Bill Constitutional. Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), Petition for Cert. Filed, 64 U. S. L. W. 3642 (U. S. Mar. 15, 1996) (No. 95-1478)

James Bryce was a contemporary of Albert Venn Dicey. Bryce published in 1888 The American Commonwealth. Its detailed description of the practical operation of the United States Constitution was influential in the framing of the Australian Constitution in the 1890s. The project of this article is to shed light on that influence. The article compares and contrasts the views of Bryce and of Dicey; Bryce's views, unlike those of Dicey, having been largely unexplored in contemporary analyses of our constitutional development. It examines the importance of Bryce's views on two particular constitutional mechanisms – responsible government and judicial review – to the development of our constitutional structure. The ongoing theoretical implications of The American Commonwealth for Australian constitutional law remain to be pondered.

Download Full-text

International Agreements and U.S. Foreign Relations Law

The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190653330.013.9 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 155-171

Author(s):

Jean Galbraith

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Foreign Relations ◽

Constitutional Law ◽

Comparative Law ◽

The United States ◽

International Agreements ◽

Constitutional History ◽

Administrative Reforms ◽

Administrative Efficiency ◽

International Commitments

Over its constitutional history, the United States has developed multiple ways of joining, implementing, and terminating treaties and other international commitments. This chapter provides an overview of the law governing these pathways and considers the extent to which comparative law has influenced them or could do so in the future. Focusing in particular on the making of international commitments, the chapter describes how, over time, the United States came to develop alternatives to the process set out in the U.S. Constitution’s Treaty Clause, which requires the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. These alternatives arose partly from reasons of administrative efficiency and partly from presidential interest in making important international commitments in situations where two-thirds of the Senate would be unobtainable. These alternatives have had the effect of considerably increasing the president’s constitutional power to make international commitments. Nonetheless, considerable constraints remain on presidential power in this context, with some of these constraints stemming from constitutional law and others from statutory, administrative, and international law. With respect to comparative law, the chapter observes that U.S. practice historically has been largely but not entirely self-contained. Looking ahead, comparative practice is unlikely to affect U.S. constitutional law with respect to international agreements, but it might hold insights for legislative or administrative reforms.

Download Full-text