Constitutional Law of the United States

1936 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 102 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. D. G. Ribble ◽  
Hugh Evander Willis
2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-200
Author(s):  
Stephen Gageler

James Bryce was a contemporary of Albert Venn Dicey. Bryce published in 1888 The American Commonwealth. Its detailed description of the practical operation of the United States Constitution was influential in the framing of the Australian Constitution in the 1890s. The project of this article is to shed light on that influence. The article compares and contrasts the views of Bryce and of Dicey; Bryce's views, unlike those of Dicey, having been largely unexplored in contemporary analyses of our constitutional development. It examines the importance of Bryce's views on two particular constitutional mechanisms – responsible government and judicial review – to the development of our constitutional structure. The ongoing theoretical implications of The American Commonwealth for Australian constitutional law remain to be pondered.


Author(s):  
Jean Galbraith

Over its constitutional history, the United States has developed multiple ways of joining, implementing, and terminating treaties and other international commitments. This chapter provides an overview of the law governing these pathways and considers the extent to which comparative law has influenced them or could do so in the future. Focusing in particular on the making of international commitments, the chapter describes how, over time, the United States came to develop alternatives to the process set out in the U.S. Constitution’s Treaty Clause, which requires the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. These alternatives arose partly from reasons of administrative efficiency and partly from presidential interest in making important international commitments in situations where two-thirds of the Senate would be unobtainable. These alternatives have had the effect of considerably increasing the president’s constitutional power to make international commitments. Nonetheless, considerable constraints remain on presidential power in this context, with some of these constraints stemming from constitutional law and others from statutory, administrative, and international law. With respect to comparative law, the chapter observes that U.S. practice historically has been largely but not entirely self-contained. Looking ahead, comparative practice is unlikely to affect U.S. constitutional law with respect to international agreements, but it might hold insights for legislative or administrative reforms.


1911 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 545
Author(s):  
Thomas Reed Powell ◽  
Westel Woodbury Willoughby

2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Alexander

AbstractA constitution is, as Article VI of the United States Constitution declares, the fundamental law of the land, supreme as a legal matter over any other nonconstitutional law. But that almost banal statement raises a number of theoretically vexed issues. What is law? How is constitutional law to be distinguished from nonconstitutional law? How do morality and moral rights fit into the picture? And what are the implications of the answers to these questions for such questions as how and by whom should constitutions be interpreted? These are the issues that I shall address.Alexander proceeds as follows: In section I he takes up law's principal function of settling controversies over what we are morally obligated to do. In section II he then relate law's settlement function to the role of constitutional law. In particular, he discusses how constitutional law is distinguished from ordinary law, and he also discusses the role of constitutions in establishing basic governmental structures and enforcing certain moral rights. In section III he addresses the topic of constitutional interpretation, and in section IV the topic of judicial review. Finally, in section V, he discusses constitutional change, both change that occurs through a constitution's own rules for amendments and change that is the product of constitutional misinterpretations and revolutions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-204
Author(s):  
Richard W. Garnett

A crucial, but often overlooked, dimension of the human and constitutional right to religious freedom is the autonomy of religious institutions, associations and societies with respect to matters of governance, doctrine, formation and membership. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed this autonomy in the context of American constitutional law, it is vulnerable, and even under threat, for a variety of reasons, including a general decline in the health of civil society and mediating associations and a crisis of confidence and authority caused by clerical sexual abuse and churches’ failure to respond to it.


Author(s):  
Goldsworthy Jeffrey

Much of the controversy surrounding constitutional interpretation concerns two issues. The first is a version of a conundrum that has perplexed lawyers for millennia: should the interpretation of a law he governed mainly by its ‘letter’, or by its ‘spirit’? The second issue is the extent to which the meaning of a constitution can, and should, be determined by the original intentions, purposes, or understandings of its founders. This issue pits so-called ‘non-originalists’ against ‘originalists’. This book explores the constitutions of six countries — Australia, Canada, Germany, India, South Africa, and the United States — and how they have been interpreted by their highest courts. It examines whether the courts' interpretive practices have changed over time, the apparent reasons for any changes, and whether the courts apply the same interpretive principles to different areas of constitutional law, such as federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights. The book then reflects on the institutional, political, social, and cultural contexts that might help to explain differences between the practices of these courts.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document