The Argentine Proposal for Non-belligerency, April 1940

1969 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 571-604 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph S. Tulchin

Argentine neutrality during World War II with its suspicious leanings toward fascism has become a cliché in inter-American relations. As far as the United States was concerned at that time, the Argentine Republic was the black sheep of the hemispheric community, the only nation that failed to cooperate wholeheartedly in the crusade against the Axis. The famous State Department “Blue Book,” so conveniently published prior to the Argentine general elections of 1946, spelled out the aid and comfort the Nazis had derived from Argentina's neutrality. By only the narrowest margin did Argentina avoid being drummed out of the hemispheric organization and barred from membership in the new United Nations.It seems strange, therefore, to recall that it was the Argentine government that first suggested, in the spring of 1940, that the nations of the Western Hemisphere discard the posture of traditional neutrality in the face of the spreading conflagration in Europe, on the grounds that it was anachronistic and did not protect their interests.

1965 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 146
Author(s):  
Henry Zamensky ◽  
Stetson Conn ◽  
Rose C. Engelman ◽  
Byron Fairchild

2021 ◽  
pp. 61-81
Author(s):  
Payam Ghalehdar

This chapter serves as an introduction to the first three case studies of the book’s empirical analysis, which comprise Part I. It sketches the evolution of US attitudes toward states in the Western Hemisphere. It shows how US interpretations of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine became more hegemonic with the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary and how US expectations toward hemispheric states were relaxed in the interwar years, culminating in the Good Neighbor Policy. The chapter briefly illustrates how the attenuation of hegemonic expectations allowed Franklin D. Roosevelt to abstain from intervening in the 1933 Cuban Crisis. The aftermath of World War II put an end to the Good Neighbor Policy. Following the 1959 Cuban Revolution, John F. Kennedy expanded hegemonic expectations again, now to include domestic economic policy decisions of hemispheric states. The chapter concludes by showing that after the end of the Cold War, the United States has continued to harbor hegemonic expectations toward the Western Hemisphere.


2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 223-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW JOHNSTONE

The eve of World War II saw the development of direct connections between public relations experts and issues of foreign affairs in the United States. Public relations professionals assisted both internationalists and noninterventionists to spread their arguments across the nation, helping them to hone their messages, to organize, and to raise money. All of the main citizens’ organizations created during this period sought public relations assistance in the face of growing popular awareness of global events, and with an awareness of the need for public relations counsel in the face of an increasingly measurable concept of public opinion.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Matz

This article provides an in-depth examination of the U.S. government's role in the case of Raoul Wallenberg, the courageous Swedish envoy who died mysteriously in the Soviet Union after being arrested by Soviet occupation forces at the end of World War II for unknown reasons. The article recounts how U.S. officials, particularly the diplomat Herschel V. Johnson, tried to alleviate the plight of Hungarian Jews after German forces occupied Hungary in 1944. A key part of this policy was their effort to work with Sweden in enlisting Wallenberg's help. The U.S.-Swedish relationship was never particularly close, and the mistrust that officials in each country felt toward the other side impeded any coordinated action. The article discusses the bureaucratic impediments on the U.S. side and highlights some of the obstacles that Johnson strove to overcome. The article builds on the report produced by the Eliasson Commission documenting the Swedish government's handling of the Wallenberg case. Although the Swedish authorities bore by far the greatest amount of blame for doing nothing in the face of Soviet stonewalling, Matz argues that U.S. officials also made significant misjudgments that may have exacerbated the situation.


Author(s):  
Amanda L. Tyler

The bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, ushered the United States into World War II. Within hours, and suspension and martial law came to rule the Hawaiian Territory. On the mainland, the military imposed curfews, designated huge portions of the western United States to be military areas of exclusion, and ultimately created “relocation centers” across the west to detain over 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, including over 70,000 citizens. As this chapter explores, in the face of serious constitutional questions about the propriety of martial law, internment of citizens, and military trials of civilians, constitutional considerations generally gave way to war hysteria. But, as many key government actors recognized at the time, the detention of Japanese American citizens violated the Suspension Clause, standing as it did at odds with the entire history of the Clause. As challenges to the relevant military policies spilled over into the courts, the institution arguably best situated to identify and highlight their constitutional infirmities—the Supreme Court—never did so, leaving this episode standing as both a dangerous and deeply problematic precedent in American constitutional history.


1972 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen James Randall

Recent research on U.S. diplomacy in Latin America has indicated the prominent role of the State Department in gaining for American airlines a major share of interamerican aviation in the mid-1920s. The department's campaign to “de-Germanize” commercial aviation in the western hemisphere immediately prior to and during World War II has also drawn the attention of historians (McCann, 1968; Newton, 1965; Conn, 1960; Burden, 1943). Yet little analysis has been directed to U.S. policy in the late 1920s and early 1930s, crucial years for the shift of power away from European-supported commercial airlines in Latin America to Pan American Airways.


1984 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger R. Trask

Between 1945 and 1947, Argentina posed a complex and exasperating problem for the United States as it endeavored to develop policy to guide its relations with Latin America. Among the questions involved were how to deal with an alleged neofascist dictator in Argentina, how to preserve the aura of the so-called Good Neighbor policy, whether to provide arms and economic aid to Latin America, and whether to enter into a collective security agreement for the western hemisphere.


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