The Ohio Judicial Council Embarks on a Survey of Justice

1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 416-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. R. Aumann

In 1923 the first state judicial council in this country was established in Ohio. The Massachusetts act providing for such a council was introduced earlier and formed the basis for the Ohio law, but it was not adopted until 1924. The judicial council provided for by the Ohio law was composed of the chief justice of the supreme court, two associate justices, the chief justice of the court of appeal, one common pleas judge, one municipal court judge, and three lawyers.The council was charged with the duty of making a continuous study of the organization, rules, methods of procedure, and practice of the judicial system of Ohio, as well as the work accomplished and results produced by that system and its various parts. The results of this continuous study were to be reported biennially to the legislature, with such recommendations for the modification of existing conditions as the council might see fit to make. The council was authorized also to submit suggestions for the consideration of the judges of the several courts with regard to rules, practice, and procedure.To accomplish its purposes, the council was authorized to hold public hearings, administer oaths, and require the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and documents. A witness giving false testimony, or failing to appear when duly summoned, was made subject to the same penalties to which a witness before a court is subject. The clerks of the various courts and other officials are required to submit to the council such reports as the council may prescribe.

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-74
Author(s):  
Sankalp Mishra

There is a need for the establishment of regional benches of the Supreme Court. By the analysis of various statistical data, the paper puts forward the urgent need for widening the reach of the Supreme Court and also to rejuvenate and reestablish the tarnishing reputation of the Supreme Court as an ordinary court of appeal. The paper explores the essential reasons for the establishment of benches of Supreme Court that can be broadly divided into three heads namely (i) wide access to justice (ii) Supreme Court reduced to an ordinary court of appeal (iii) litigation as a measure of well-being. The paper also analyses the recommendations laid out in the 95th, 120th, 125th and 229th Law Commission reports and analyses problem in hand, on the basis of analysis and the immediate need for the reform of the judicial system.


1932 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman J. Padelford

The Conference held its ninth annual meeting in Washington on October 1-3, 1931. Authorized by the Judiciary Act of September 14, 1922, the conference of the senior circuit judges with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Attorney-General has become an established part of the judicial system of the United States. The reports of these conferences are to be found in the annual reports of the Attorney-General, beginning in 1924. The 1922 and 1923 reports may best be found in the Texas Law Review, Vol. II, pages 445 and 448, and in the Journal of the American Judicature Society, Vol. VIII, pages 85 and 92. In view of the general inaccessibility of the reports of the Attorney-General to the legal profession, it has been suggested that they be published in the Supreme Court Reports. The suggestion has not as yet, however, been adopted.


Author(s):  
Мишеле Де Мео ◽  
Mishele De Meo

The article contains the outline of the commercial litigation implemented in Italy taking into account the relevant amendments and changes adopted with the aim of rendering a “faster” justice. The author describes the Italian judicial system which involves courts of first instance (Giudice di Pace/Tribunale), the Court of Appeal (Corte d’Appello), and the Supreme Court or the Court of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione), indicating the statutorily prescribed criteria for referring a specific category of cases to the jurisdiction of each of those. The author dwells on the stages of civil proceedings, which include: pre-trial hearings, civil proceedings and judgment, appeal and cassation stages, as well as enforcement of judgments and orders. The special attention is paid for the procedure of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment and arbitration awards used in Italy. The author notes the tendency for a gradual replacement of the most of the old bilateral treaties in Europe by the European Regulations, at least in civil and commercial matters.


1992 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 1179
Author(s):  
W. F. Bowker

The creation of the Judicature Act in Alberta in 1919 and its amendments in 1920 led to a period of profound confusion within Alberta's judicial system. Two men, David Lynch Scott and Horace Harvey, were at the centre of this confusion. By exploring personal letters written by Horace Harvey and others, Dean Bowker exposes how the two judges and others behaved and felt as the question of who was the real Chief Justice in Alberta was argued through the Supreme Court and finally to the Privy Council. The letters illustrate that although this was a difficult time for the two men, both treated each other with respect and did what they could to ensure that the issue did not turn into a personal battle between themselves.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nirej Sekhon

The Supreme Court has cast judicial warrants as the Fourth Amendment gold standard for regulating police discretion. It has embraced a "warrant preference" on the premise that requiring police to obtain advance judicial approval for searches and seizures encourages accurate identification of evidence and suspects while minimizing interference with constitutional rights. The Court and commentators have overlooked the fact that most outstanding warrants do none of these things. Most outstanding warrants are what this article terms "non-compliance warrants": summarily issued arrest warrants for failures to comply with a court or police order. State and local courts are profligate in issuing such warrants for minor offenses. For example, the Department of Justice found that the municipal court in Ferguson, Missouri issued one warrant for every two of its residents. When issued as wantonly as this, warrants are dangerous because they generate police discretion rather than restrain it. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has, most recently in Utah v. Strieff, treated non-compliance warrants as if no different from the traditional warrants that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment warrant preference. This article argues that non-compliance warrants pose unique dangers, constitutional and otherwise. Non-compliance warrants create powerful incentives for the police to conduct unconstitutional stops, particularly in poor and minority neighborhoods. Their enforcement also generates race and class feedback loops. Outstanding warrants beget arrests and arrests beget more warrants. Over time, this dynamic amplifies race and class disparities in criminal justice. The article concludes by prescribing a Fourth Amendment remedy to deter unconstitutional warrant checks. More importantly, the article identifies steps state and local courts might take to stem the continued proliferation of non-compliance warrants.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Lieneke Slingenberg

In September 2012, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld a judgment of the Hague Court of Appeal that the eviction from basic shelter of a mother and her minor children, who did not have legal residence in the Netherlands, was unlawful. This ruling was instigated by a radically new interpretation of the European Social Charter’s personal scope and caused a major shift in Dutch policy. This article provides a case study into the legal reasoning adopted by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. It argues that, instead of relying on legal doctrinal reasoning for justifying the outcome, both courts referred to factors that the general public relies on to assess people’s deservingness of welfare. This finding raises fundamental questions about the relationship between human rights law and deservingness; and calls, therefore, for further research into the relevance of deservingness criteria in judicial discourse.


1947 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 325
Author(s):  
Edward L. Friedman ◽  
Samuel J. Konefsky

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