The Impact of Government Subsidies on Industrial Management: The Israeli Experiment

1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 815
Author(s):  
Amos Perlmutter ◽  
Nachum Finger ◽  
Roy Popkin
Keyword(s):  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Industrial Management ◽  
The Impact

On the devaluation of expert opinion or why do we need a law about the basics of expert activity

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 19-24
Author(s):  
MARAT R. BIKTIMIROV ◽  
◽  
OLGA V. PILIPENKO ◽  
MAXIM S. SAFONOV ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Project Management ◽  
Structural Analysis ◽  
Expert Opinion ◽  
Knowledge Economy ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Digital Technologies ◽  
Accurate Assessment ◽  
Industrial Management ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Creative Construction

Taking practical responsible decisions in the field of social and industrial management in the context of rapid development of digital technologies in the era of the knowledge economy is impossible without reliance on expertise. A kind of organization of activities for the production of ‘predictions’ is required, when not only an accurate assessment of the impact of certain factors and their possible interactions with each other is given, but also as a result of creative construction of scenarios for the development of processes and events, an understanding comes which factors need to be taken into account. At the same time, the expertise constantly faces criticism, calling the conclusions of experts arbitrary, unreliable and subjective. Often, expertise is confused with monitoring, evaluation, diagnosis, inspection or counseling. The authors of the article carried out a structural analysis of the content of the expertise processes in the project management vector in the digitalization era and came to the conclusion that the effectiveness of the expertise is significantly increased in case of clear regulation of this type of activity, providing the necessary status.

scholarly journals Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism and Differential Game Model Construction of Mask Emergency Supply Chain Cooperation Based on COVID-19 Outbreak

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1115
Author(s):  
Shufan Zhu ◽  
Kefan Xie ◽  
Ping Gui
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Production Technology ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Dynamic Adjustment ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
The Impact

Incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mask supply chain into our framework and taking mask output as a state variable, our study introduces the differential game to study the long-term dynamic cooperation of a two-echelon supply chain composed of the supplier and the manufacturer under government subsidies. The study elaborates that government subsidies can provide more effective incentives for supply chain members to cooperate in the production of masks compared with the situation of no government subsidies. A relatively low wholesale price can effectively increase the profits of supply chain members and the supply chain system. The joint contract of two-way cost-sharing contract and transfer payment contract can promote production technology investment efforts of the supply chain members, the optimum trajectory of mask production, and total profit to reach the best state as the centralized decision scenario within a certain range. Meanwhile, it is determined that the profits of supply chain members in the joint contract can be Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision scenario. With the increase of production technology investment cost coefficients and output self-decay rate, mask outputs have shown a downward trend in the joint contract decision model. On the contrary, mask outputs would rise with growing sensitivity of mask output to production technology investment effort and increasing sensitivity of mask demand to mask output.

scholarly journals Research on forest insurance policy simulation in China

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-95
Author(s):  
Ning Ma ◽  
Can Li ◽  
Yang Zuo
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Forest Area ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Decision Making Rule ◽  
Forest Insurance

Purpose Forest insurance is a popular way to reduce the loss of forest disasters, so it is necessary to actively involve stakeholders. In the multi-agent simulation model, the government, insurance companies and forest farmers participate as three main stakeholders. The purpose of this paper is to mainly simulate the behavior of forest farmers under different environmental variables in order to find the important factors affecting the coverage of forest insurance, so as to improve the ability of forest farmers to resist risks in the face of disasters. Design/methodology/approach In the simulation process, the decision-making rule of a forest farmer’s purchasing behavior is a binary selection chain, which is created at random. Forest farmer agents who adapt to the environment will remain; on the contrary, those will be eliminated. The eliminated agents will renew their behavior selection chains through learning others’ successful behavior based on genetic algorithm. The multi-agent mode is set up on the Eclipse platform by using Java language. Findings The adjustment simulation experiments of insurance premium, insurance subsidy and forest area were carried out. According to the result, conclusions and suggestions are as follows: at present, government subsidies are necessary for the implementation of forest insurance; in the future, with the expansion of the insured forest area and the upgrading and large-scale operation of forest farms, forest farmers will be more willing to join forest insurance program, and, then, the implementation of forest insurance no longer requires government subsidies for forest insurance premiums. Originality/value This paper explores the impact of three important factors on the implementation of forest insurance.

scholarly journals The Impact of Government Subsidies on Private R&D Investment in Different Markets

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Jinglve Wang ◽  
Guohua Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Private Investment ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
End Products ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
D Investment ◽  
Governmental Subsidy

In contrast to the econometric models that have been commonly used throughout a large portion of the literature, we develop six game-theoretic models to analyze governmental subsidy strategies in different market environments and to investigate the question of whether government subsidies crowd in or crowd out private investment in R&D activities. Based on realistic situations, we classify governmental subsidy strategies into three types, namely, no subsidy provided, subsidies provided based on the price of the end products, and subsidies provided based on the cost of R&D. In addition, according to whether competition exists in the market, we classify markets into monopoly markets and duopoly markets. Our research shows (a) that the relationship between government subsidies and private R&D investment is deeply impacted by the form of the subsidies used; (b) that the characteristic value of the R&D project and the competitive environment of the market are the two key factors that should be considered when governments decide which form of subsidy to employ; and (c) the optimal amount for each type of subsidy.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document