The Impact of Government Subsidies on Private R&D Investment in Different Markets

In contrast to the econometric models that have been commonly used throughout a large portion of the literature, we develop six game-theoretic models to analyze governmental subsidy strategies in different market environments and to investigate the question of whether government subsidies crowd in or crowd out private investment in R&D activities. Based on realistic situations, we classify governmental subsidy strategies into three types, namely, no subsidy provided, subsidies provided based on the price of the end products, and subsidies provided based on the cost of R&D. In addition, according to whether competition exists in the market, we classify markets into monopoly markets and duopoly markets. Our research shows (a) that the relationship between government subsidies and private R&D investment is deeply impacted by the form of the subsidies used; (b) that the characteristic value of the R&D project and the competitive environment of the market are the two key factors that should be considered when governments decide which form of subsidy to employ; and (c) the optimal amount for each type of subsidy.

Governmental subsidy policies and supply chain decisions with carbon emission limit and consumer’s environmental awareness

The carbon emission reduction has become an inevitable trend. Under the low-carbon environment, the government has been acting as an important role in the operation and management of supply chain. This paper considers four different governmental subsidy strategies, which includes none of members is subsidized (NS Scenario), only retailer is subsidized (RS Scenario), only manufacturer is subsidized (MS Scenario) and both members are subsidized (SS Scenario). A Stackelberg game model, which incorporates both governmental regulation and consumer’s awareness of carbon emission, is developed to present the pricing and emission reduction behaviors for the supply chain members as well as the subsidy policies of government under different governmental subsidy strategies, and analyze the impact of relevant coefficients on the decisions and supply chain profits. It can be concluded that subsidizing to both members is more profitable for supply chain members and government in terms of environment protection and economic development. The results provide some managerial insights for the decision-makers and policy-makers to implement sustainability initiatives.

Applying Fuzzy Multiobjective Integrated Logistics Model to Green Supply Chain Problems

The aim of this paper is attempting to explore the optimal way of supply chain management within the domain of environmental responsibility and concerns. The background of this research involves the issue of green supply chain management (GSCM) and the concept of the multiobjective integrated logistics model. More specifically, in this paper, we suggest the fuzzy multiobjective integrated logistics model with the transportation cost and demand fuzziness to solve green supply chain problems in the uncertain environment which is illustrated via the detailed numerical example. Results and the sensitivity analysis of the numerical example indicate that when the governmental subsidy value increased the profits of the reverse chain also increased. The finding shows that the governmental subsidy policy could remain of significant influence for used-product reverse logistics chain.