A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy

2001 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
Stanley Hoffmann ◽  
Gülnur Aybet
2010 ◽  
Vol 109 (729) ◽  
pp. 308-309
Author(s):  
Dmitri Trenin

Building a stable European security architecture requires that the use of force between Russia and its neighbors or NATO be removed from the strategic equation.


1992 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
SAMUEL F. WELLS

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Rojansky

At the present moment of obvious tension between Moscow and Washington, it may be tempting to dismiss the likelihood of progress on any diplomatic front, let alone in the complex multilateral format of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Yet the 1972–75 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (csce) itself took place against a backdrop of intense rivalry between the u.s. and Soviet-led blocs, suggesting that reasoned dialogue and consensus on core issues of shared security in the osce space is possible, despite—or perhaps even because of—the looming threat of conflict between geopolitical rivals. Despite some superficial similarities, relations between Russia and the United States today are sufficiently different from the past that they cannot accurately be described as a conflict in the same category as the Cold War. The u.s.-Russia relations have been severely strained over the crisis in Ukraine, but management of the crisis alone will not be enough to restore productive relations between Washington and Moscow or to repair the damage to European security. The best hope is likely a return to the principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and through a similarly inclusive region-wide dialogue. Today, the United States, Europe, and Russia all share an interest in renewal of just such a dialogue, although what will not—indeed what must not—return is the Cold War “balance of terror” that exerted pressure on all sides to participate seriously in the original Helsinki process.


World Affairs ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 180 (4) ◽  
pp. 25-46
Author(s):  
Eugene P. Trani ◽  
Donald E. Davis

American-Russian relations have been troubled from Lenin to Putin, from Wilson to Trump. Woodrow Wilson insisted that no one power should dominate Europe. This detailed analysis shows that Wilson was the first “Cold War Warrior,” and his “quarantine” policy toward Russia was the precursor of the policy the United States has generally followed toward Russia since the end of World War II. Wilson tried to avoid taking sides in the Bolshevik Revolution but finally was drawn into it from relentless Allied pressure. Yet he kept intervention minimal. Afterward, he quarantined communism until FDR recognized Russia and, later, allied with Stalin against Hitler. Truman and his successors renewed “quarantine,” calling it “containment.” With the USSR’s collapse, the shape and stability of Wilson’s Europe reappeared. The West has preserved that Europe through the EU, NATO, and sanctions against Putin’s restoring a Soviet sphere. America should now be clear, as Wilson once was, in supporting European security.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-125
Author(s):  
Roman Petyur

Independent Ukraine will soon turn 30, but the country in the heart of Europe cannot boast a predictable and stable security position. The conflict with Russia after the regime change in 2014 proved, that a prolonged conventional war in Europe is still a probability. In order to install a durable peace, the all-European security arrangement shall have no low-profile security positions of those European countries, which do not enjoy membership in military unions. The Cold-war legacy of perception of security as a divisible notion is a contradiction to the idea of security for Europe. As long as there are divergences in the level of security, there would be a temptation to test the opponent’s readiness and strength on the territory of a weaker country. This is what happened in Georgia in 2008 and has been happening in Ukraine since 2014. In search for a solution, a special attention shall be paid to the issues of status and perception of security. For a small power, which is not a member of a military bloc, it is existential to follow an approach of collective security, not collective defence. Perception of security as indivisible supposes prioritising intensive engagement of the UN and the OSCE. Ukraine as a small power shall also enhance its security position through implementation of decent democratic procedures and true market reforms. These measures have a potential to create global economic linkages through integration of Ukraine’s economy to the global capitalist system not as a supplier of raw materials, but on parity basis.


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