Hybrid warfare – a threat to the national security of the state

In the context of hybrid warfare, an urgent question arises as to the adequacy of responding to its challenges. Ukraine, the EU countries and NATO are facing new threats, which require democracies to make changes in military and political activities, to find new forms and methods of ensuring national security. Hybrid warfare as a form of undeclared war is conducted with the integrated use of military and non-military instruments (economic, political, informational and psychological, etc.), which fundamentally changes the nature of military struggle. Thus, the change in the nature of the current armed conflict and the hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine have created an impetus to accelerate transformations and structural changes in the security and defence sector of Ukraine. One of the priority areas of defence reform is the modernization of the management system of the security and defence sector in order to bring it in line with modern military conflicts, achieve interoperability of Ukraine’s defence forces, systematic transition to NATO standards (STANAG) in the organization, armament and training of troops (forces), as well as in the system of operational decision-making. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has launched a process of destroying the system of European and transatlantic security. The Kremlin’s hybrid actions against Ukraine and other regional states are undermining stability in the area from the Baltic to the Black Sea, creating a serious challenge to peace and security in the region. Ukraine can become a powerful ally with significant military capabilities and invaluable practical experience, including in the field of combating hybrid threats, with successful reforms for NATO membership and a relevant consensus in NATO.

Rusty guns and buttery soldiers: unemployment and the domestic origins of defense spending

Scholars and practitioners continue to debate transatlantic burden sharing, which has implications for broader questions of collective action and international organizations. Little research, however, has analyzed domestic and institutional drivers of burden-sharing behavior; even less has disaggregated defense spending to measure burden sharing more precisely. This paper enhances understanding of the relationship between national political economies and burden shifting, operationalizing burden shifting as the extent to which a country limits or decreases defense expenditures, while at the same time favoring personnel over equipment modernization and readiness in the composition of defense budgets. Why do countries choose to allocate defense resources to personnel, rather than equipment modernization? I find that governments slightly decrease top-line defense spending in response to unemployment while shifting much more substantial amounts within defense budgets from equipment expenditures into personnel. This research highlights the intimate connection between Europe’s economic fortunes, transatlantic security, and burden sharing in North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union – of particular interest as a pandemic buffets the transatlantic economy. It also points policy analysts toward factors more amenable to political decisions than the structural variables generally associated with burden sharing, bridging significant gaps between defense economics, security studies, and comparative political economy.

Nordic Security and Defence Cooperation: Differentiated Integration in Uncertain Times

A decade ago, Nordic cooperation on security and defence matters gained momentum, having been largely absent from the map of Nordic cooperation during the Cold War and its aftermath. This article analyses developments along three dimensions of Nordic cooperation: military defence (focusing on the Nordic Defence Cooperation), civil security (in the form of the ‘Haga’ process), and political cooperation (through the implementation of the Stoltenberg report). Three observations stand out as a result: First, that the three dimensions are intimately related against the background of a common Nordic conceptualization of security; second, that there is simultaneously variation in significant respects (such as driving forces, scope, and degree of institutionalization); and third, that Nordic security and defence cooperation has developed in the context of European and transatlantic security dynamics and cooperation. The second part of the analysis seeks to interpret this picture from the analytical perspective of differentiated integration. The article ends with a set of reflections on the future of Nordic security and defence cooperation in light of the Coronavirus pandemic.

Disinformation superspreaders: the weaponisation of COVID-19 fake news in the Persian Gulf and beyond

Many of the studies of disinformation tend to reflect transatlantic security concerns, and focus on the activities of Russia and China. There is notably less analysis of disinformation in the Arabic-speaking world and wider MENA region. This article analyses a number of MENA-based COVID-19 disinformation campaigns from 2020, highlighting how COVID-19 disinformation has been instrumentalised by regional actors to attack rivals or bolster the legitimacy of their own regimes. It highlights in particular how certain ‘superspreaders’ of disinformation tend to promote Saudi, Emirate and right wing US foreign policy in the Middle East.