The Economics of Political Violence: The Effect of Political Instability on Economic Growth.

1992 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Quee-Young Kim ◽  
Dipak K. Gupta
2016 ◽  
Vol 230 ◽  
pp. 325-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aftab Hussain Tabassam ◽  
Shujahat Haider Hashmi ◽  
Faiz Ur Rehman

Author(s):  
Matundura Erickson ◽  

The government has attempted to target specific macroeconomic factors in order to stimulate economic growth in Kenya through monetary and fiscal policies. Despite these efforts, Kenya's GDP growth is hampered by high interest rates and high interest rate volatility. Kenya's ability to address macroeconomic instability hinges on its ability to increase economic growth. Auxiliary evidence shows that perspectives on the relationship between ICT and economic growth are segmented. The goal of this study was to determine the impact of ICT on economic growth in Kenya, as well as the moderating effect of political instability on the relationship. The research was based on Solow's theory of growth. An explanatory research design was used, with data spanning from 1990-2020 obtained from Kenya Bureau of Statistics. In the empirical analysis, the study used the bound test to test for a long-run relationship and the Autoregressive Distributed Lag model (ARDL) to evaluate the relationship between the variables. The data was subjected to an Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test to determine stationarity.The long run ARDL results indicated that the coefficients of; ICT rate were insignificant . However with the introduction of political instability as the moderator ICT was significant and positively affected economic growth. Political instability moderated the relationship between ICT ( and economic growth. As a result, promoting effective governance should help to improve political stability. The findings of this study will help the government figure out how to address the problem of low economic growth. According to the study, the government should invest in the ICT sector to improve its accessibility and affordability. Additionally, the government should work to improve political stability and good governance by gradually establishing institutions that uphold the rule of law and provide security.


10.3386/w4173 ◽  
1992 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Alesina ◽  
Sule Ozler ◽  
Nouriel Roubini ◽  
Phillip Swagel

Author(s):  
Cynthia McClintock

Since Peru’s independence in 1824, politics in the country have been turbulent. Repeatedly, democracy was attempted but not sustained. Between 1919 and 2000, no Peruvian political regime—either democratic or authoritarian—endured more than 12 years. Scholars agree that the primary reason for Peru’s history of political turbulence was the severity of its overlapping ethnic, class, and geographical cleavages. Peru’s renowned novelist Mario Vargas Llosa wrote that the country was “an artificial gathering of men from different languages, customs, and traditions whose only common denominator was having been condemned by history to live together without knowing or loving one another.” However, in the 21st century, cleavages have attenuated and the possibility of a cohesive nation emerged. Peru has been democratic for more than 18 years—longer than ever before. With one-person, one-vote elections, political violence has been rare and economic growth rapid. However, Peru’s economic growth has been based heavily on mining and other extractive industries, and it is not clear that cleavages have attenuated sufficiently for democracy to be consolidated. In addition, democracy is challenged by bitter legacies from the 1980s–1990s conflict with the Shining Path guerrillas and the 1990–2000 authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori. Further, in 2017–2018, it was all too apparent that Peru’s political and economic elites remain complicit in corrupt global financial networks.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 883-910
Author(s):  
Nauro Campos ◽  
Menelaos Karanasos ◽  
Panagiotis Koutroumpis ◽  
Zihui Zhang

AbstractAre institutions a deep cause of economic growth? This paper tries to answer this question in a novel manner by focusing on within-country variation, over long periods of time, using a new hand-collected data set on institutions and the power-ARCH econometric framework. Focusing on the case of Brazil since 1870, our results suggest (a) that both changes in formal political institutions and informal political instability affect economic growth negatively, (b) there are important differences in terms of their short- versus long-run behaviour, and (c) not all but just a few selected institutions affect economic growth in the long-run.


Significance Opposition leader Raila Odinga and supporters of his National Super Alliance (NASA) have long since lost faith in the capacity of the IEBC to deliver a free and fair election and have regularly alleged that the ruling party plans to steal the vote. Opposition supporters claim Msando was killed because he was determined to ensure that the technology designed to prevent electoral fraud worked -- his murder lends credibility to Odinga's narrative that the process is being undermined from within. With only a week until the election, attention is focused not on political platforms but on the potential for voter fraud or a contested result. Impacts Electoral controversies and the delegitimisation of the electoral commission increase the risk of post-election violence. Widespread ethnic clashes on the scale of 2007-08 are unlikely due to heavy deployments of state security forces. Political instability, even if limited, will deter tourism and investment, hurting short-term economic growth.


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