The Codification of International Law

1911 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 871-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest Nys

Law is the whole of the rules which regulate the relations of men. At the commencement of civilization and, even at the present day, primitive peoples and nations not in a complete state of civilization have clothed these rules with supernatural attributes; they have been represented as having been imposed upon mankind by a supernatural power; they have been given the effect of magic formulas, which, it is to be supposed, result in the chastisement and punishment of those who violate their dictates. Following the development of humanity step by step, three separate domains of law have been marked out: private law, or the law of men in the character of individuals; public or political law, or law as applied to men in their capacity as members of the state; and finally, the law of nations or international law, in other words, the law of states.

Author(s):  
David Boucher

The classic foundational status that Hobbes has been afforded by contemporary international relations theorists is largely the work of Hans Morgenthau, Martin Wight, and Hedley Bull. They were not unaware that they were to some extent creating a convenient fiction, an emblematic realist, a shorthand for all of the features encapsulated in the term. The detachment of international law from the law of nature by nineteenth-century positivists opened Hobbes up, even among international jurists, to be portrayed as almost exclusively a mechanistic theorist of absolute state sovereignty. If we are to endow him with a foundational place at all it is not because he was an uncompromising realist equating might with right, on the analogy of the state of nature, but instead to his complete identification of natural law with the law of nations. It was simply a matter of subject that distinguished them, the individual and the state.


1941 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 462-481 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Mervyn Jones

It is impossible to deny that the early rule of international law was that the head of state, either directly or through his agents, was alone competent to make treaties, which were binding upon his successors. This was natural at a time when no type of international agreement was known other than the treaty in solemn form to which monarchs were parties. Today, new types of agreement have come into being, to which the parties are not heads of states but either the state itself (as in the Treaty of Versailles, 1919) or governments or departments of state. In all these cases, and even in cases where the parties are formally the heads of states, the unit now considered to be bound is the state, through its organs. This substitution of states for monarchs as the subjects of the law of nations, at any rate in the matter of treaties, has been brought about very largely by the French and American Revolutions of the eighteenth century, and by the development of the notion of the state as an international person. The question of the competence to make treaties binding on states, who may by their laws have limited that competence, has therefore become one of great interest in modern theory.


Author(s):  
Francesco Palermo

In public law, the concept of property plays, arguably, a much more limited role than in private law. At a closer look, however, a rather different picture emerges. In fact, in public (national and international) law, property is less (if at all) regulated, but not less important than in private law. Rather, it is implicitly assumed and developed in collective rather than individual terms. Especially in the nation state construct, territory is the property of a state and the state is the property of a group of people (the dominant nation), whose power to control a territory is called sovereignty. For this reason, when the question emerges of how to deal with a territory predominantly inhabited by a minority group, the answers by different actors involved might be diametrically opposite. This is essentially because the link between people and territory is always framed in terms of ownership: who “owns” a territory? And how to deal with those who inhabit the territory without (being seen as those) owing it? This essay explores the responses to such questions. The focus will be on challenges posed by autonomy regimes as instruments for the accommodation of minority issues, including the evolving concept of territory. Against this background, the different understandings of the link and the recent practice of selected international bodies will be analysed, leading to some concluding remarks. It will be argued that territory is an unavoidable point of reference, but many aspects are not sufficiently addressed, such as the issue of the addressees of such arrangements, the evolution that minority-related concepts are facing in the present era, marked by the challenge of diversity and the overall understanding of territorial arrangements.


2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-571 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Richardson

Although careful scholarly treatment of the history of international law is now thriving, within U.S. courts that history now begins with one eighteenth-century treatise published in Neuchâtel, Switzerland, in 1758 and published in translation for modern readers under the aegis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1916. This treatise is Emer de Vattel’s Droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains. My aim in this article is to appraise the elevation of Vattel to vaunted originalist heights in U.S. law. The claim that Vattel’s theory of the law of nations completely represents how the Founding Fathers (Founders) understood the law of nations should be rejected as a matter of history.


1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 516-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Feinstein

Dean Acheson frankly reconfirmed the right of self-preservation, when he asserted, “…law simply does not deal with … questions of ultimate power—power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty…. No law can destroy the state creating the law. The survival of states is not a matter of law”. It is beyond the law.Given the existence of man's elementary loyalty to autonomous states, the necessity for using force springs from the need of states to depend fundamentally on self-help in order to guarantee their survival and welfare. This search for security in a system of politics without government, forces the state to be dependent upon military self-help.


Author(s):  
Foakes Joanne ◽  
Denza Eileen

This chapter provides an overview of diplomatic privileges and immunities. Two fundamental rules of diplomatic law—that the person of the ambassador is inviolable and that a special protection must be given to the messages which are sent to and received from the ambassador’s sovereign—have been recognized from time immemorial among civilized States. The law of nations—now known as public international law—required States which accepted foreign diplomats to guarantee rights necessary to enable them to exercise their functions, including independence from local jurisdiction. It was important that ambassadors should not be afraid of traps or distracted by legal trickery. As such, the chapter discusses several areas where these privileges and immunities occur: the premises of the mission, the diplomatic asylum, the exemption of mission premises from taxation, the inviolability of mission archives, freedom of communications, the diplomatic bag, and freedom of movement.


Author(s):  
Fox Hazel

This chapter provides an account of the immunities of the State, its officials, and state agencies in international law. It first offers a general description of the plea of state immunity and a brief historical account of the development of the law of state immunity. Then it briefly sets out the law relating to the immunities of the State itself as a legal person, followed by the law applicable to its officials and to state agencies. In addition an account based on customary international law will be provided on the immunities of senior state officials. The chapter concludes by taking note of the extent to which the practice of diplomatic missions at the present time accords with requirements of state immunity law as now set out in written form in the 2004 UN Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property.


Author(s):  
Nan Goodman

This book traces the emergence of a sense of kinship with and belonging to a larger, more inclusive world within the law and literature of late seventeenth-century Puritanism. Connected to this cosmopolitanism in part through travel, trade, and politics, late seventeenth-century Puritans, it is argued, were also thinking in terms that went beyond these parameters about what it meant to feel affiliated with people in remote places—of which the Ottoman Empire is the best, but not the only example—and to experience what Bruce Robbins calls “attachment at a distance.” In this way Puritan writers and readers were not simply learning about others but also cultivating an awareness of themselves as “stand[ing] in an ethically significant relation” to people all around the world. The underlying source of these cosmopolitan predilections was the law, specifically the law of nations, often considered the precursor to international law. Through the terms for sovereignty, obligation, and society made available by a turn toward the cosmopolitan within the law, the Puritans experimented with concepts of extended obligation and ideas about a society consisting of all humans, not just those living on certain trade routes or within certain foreign communities. In mapping out these thought experiments, The Puritan Cosmopolis uncovers Puritans who were reconceptualizing war, contemplating new ways of cultivating peace, and rewriting the rules for being Puritan by internalizing legal theories about living in a larger, more inclusive world.


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