scholarly journals The Law of Hostile Military Expeditions as Applied by the United States

1914 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 224-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy Emerson Curtis

The manner of the performance of the duty of preventing hostile expeditions, and the means to be employed for that purpose, are matters largely or entirely for the discretion of the individual state. It cannot be said that any particular method is required or sanctioned by international law. This discretion is limited, however, by practical necessity and by the exigency of good faith.

1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry J. Bourguignon

In an article published in this Journal in 1932, Professor Edwin Dickinson pointed out that the Supreme Court, in the first thirty years of its existence, dealt with 82 cases which raised questions of international law. The Court and counsel before it repeatedly cited the familiar writers on the law of nations: Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, and Vattel. As Dickinson pointed out, “It is an ancient doctrine of the Anglo-American common law that the law of nations is incorporated in and in some sense forms part of the national law.” Largely through decisions based on the principles expressed by the classical writers, the law of nations was early incorporated as part of the law of the United States.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 47-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cerone

In assessing the legality of the killing of Osama bin Laden one is reminded of a saying about the situation in Lebanon. If you think you understand it, it has not been properly explained to you.Of course, one major obstacle is that we do not have all the facts. However, we also do not have all the law.The complexity of analyzing the legality of the killing begins with the threshold issue of applicable law. Is the conduct to be analyzed according to domestic law or international law? If domestic law, then which country’s domestic laws are applicable? Certainly that of the United States and Pakistan would be applicable. Saudi law might also apply (e.g., on the basis of nationality), in addition to the laws of those countries that have another basis under their domestic law for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction (e.g., on the universality principle).


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-164
Author(s):  
Kazuki Hagiwara

The United States suspended the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) ‘in accordance with customary international law’. However, State practice prior to the International Law Commission's codification of the law of treaties did not contribute to clarifying the extent of a right to suspend and the proper conditions for its exercise under customary international law. The few instances regarding suspension due to a serious breach did not demonstrate how the treaties in question were suspended but were a mere reference to a right of suspension in diplomatic or political documents. Against that backdrop, this article seeks to delineate what customary rules the United States believed it was observing and to clarify to what extent those rules are identical to or different from the codified rules on suspension in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Convention). Because the codified procedural safeguards or the mechanism of acquiescence under Article 65 of the Convention were considered as the progressive development of international law, it appears possible to suspend the INF Treaty unilaterally outside the Convention and under the customary rules by which the United States is bound. The INF Treaty was suspended by the United States and by Russia in sequence. That Russian suspension appears to have been an exceptio non adimpleti contractus to prevent the asymmetric execution of the INF Treaty that had been previously suspended by the United States.


1937 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-288
Author(s):  
Robert R. Wilson

Written agreements record much that has been accomplished toward setting up a specific law between states. If international law is still essentially a customary law, with the weaknesses characterizing any such law, it is also true that through a process of transmutation many customary rules have at length been given more or less precise form through their inclusion in conventions. The opinion has been expressed that only by such a process will this law escape from being “a junk heap of antiquated and perverted forms of justice that has been brought about by the supremacy of power.” It is of course possible to have treaty provisions which merely incorporate by reference, and perhaps emphasize without stating, the rules generally accepted by civilized states.The reference may be to international law in terms, or to the established body of the law by plain implication. Even if an existing rule is referred to for the purpose of waiving rights under it as between the parties, there is ordinarily an implied recognition of what has become established through custom.


1984 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter V. N. Henderson

I. The Evolution of the Law of Recognition until 1913To state that the United States imperialistically meddled in Mexican internal affairs in 1913 would scarcely surprise the scholarly community. The theme of United States imperialism in Latin America has been the subject of dispassionate scholarship and patriotic diatribes. Regardless of their perspective, writers have generally focused upon the political, social, strategic, and economic aspects of intervention. Considerably less attention has been given the United States' creative use of international law to affect the internal stability of Latin American nations. This article will contribute to bridging this gap by analyzing the manner in which Woodrow Wilson used the law of recognition to unseat Mexico's dictator, Victoriano Huerta; a man Wilson considered unfit to govern.


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