The Legality of the Killing of Osama bin Laden

2013 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 47-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cerone

In assessing the legality of the killing of Osama bin Laden one is reminded of a saying about the situation in Lebanon. If you think you understand it, it has not been properly explained to you.Of course, one major obstacle is that we do not have all the facts. However, we also do not have all the law.The complexity of analyzing the legality of the killing begins with the threshold issue of applicable law. Is the conduct to be analyzed according to domestic law or international law? If domestic law, then which country’s domestic laws are applicable? Certainly that of the United States and Pakistan would be applicable. Saudi law might also apply (e.g., on the basis of nationality), in addition to the laws of those countries that have another basis under their domestic law for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction (e.g., on the universality principle).

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-135
Author(s):  
William S Dodge

Abstract In 2018, the American Law Institute published the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law, which restates the law of the United States governing jurisdiction, state immunity, and judgments. These issues arise with great frequency in international cases brought in US courts, including cases involving Chinese parties. This article provides an overview of many of the key provisions of the Restatement (Fourth). The article describes the Restatement (Fourth)’s treatment of the customary international law of jurisdiction, as well the rules of US domestic law based on international comity that US courts apply when deciding international cases.


Author(s):  
Muchlinski Peter T

This chapter investigates the legal basis for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over multinational enterprises (MNEs). The state’s exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction rests on the international law rules relating to state jurisdiction. A state’s legal jurisdiction can be divided between the jurisdiction to prescribe laws, to adjudicate disputes and to enforce legal orders and judgments. This classification follows the traditional division of governmental authority between legislative, judicial and executive powers, though each branch of government can engage in any of the three. The chapter evaluates the three heads of jurisdiction in turn, relying to a large extent on US practice, which is the most developed in this field. In more recent years, not only the United States, but other global economic powers, have sought to avoid extraterritoriality conflicts though harmonization of regulatory standards and the development of cooperative regulatory structures.


1954 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Finch

“The treaty-making power is an extraordinary power liable to abuse. Treaties make international law and also they make domestic law. Under our Constitution treaties become the supreme law of the land. They are indeed more supreme than ordinary laws, for congressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to the Constitution, whereas treaty law can override the Constitution. Treaties, for example, can take powers away from the Congress and give them to the President; they can take powers from the States and give them to the Federal Government or to some international body, and they can cut across the rights given the people by their constitutional Bill of Rights.”


1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry J. Bourguignon

In an article published in this Journal in 1932, Professor Edwin Dickinson pointed out that the Supreme Court, in the first thirty years of its existence, dealt with 82 cases which raised questions of international law. The Court and counsel before it repeatedly cited the familiar writers on the law of nations: Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, and Vattel. As Dickinson pointed out, “It is an ancient doctrine of the Anglo-American common law that the law of nations is incorporated in and in some sense forms part of the national law.” Largely through decisions based on the principles expressed by the classical writers, the law of nations was early incorporated as part of the law of the United States.


1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
René Lefeber

On 22 November 1996, the Council of the European Union adopted a framework regulation and agreed to joint action to ‘protect’ the interests of the European Union and its citizens against the extraterritorial application of legislation by non-member states. These measures were adopted in response to the extraterritorial application of certain measures by the United States, concerning trade with and investment in Cuba, as well as investment in Iran and Libya. These United States measures apply to all natural and legal persons irrespective of their nationality, residency, or place of activity. Thus, even nationals of a member state of the European Union residing and active in the European Union must comply with the United States measures. The enactment of this legislation marks a new episode in the on-going battle between the United States and the European Union over the frontiers of a state's (or an international organization's) jurisdiction to prescribe. This time, however, the European Union counteracted by the adoption of measures which can partly be characterized as retorsion measures and partly as countermeasures. The adoption of these measures by the European Union raises questions with respect to the legitimacy of the retorsion measures and the legality of the countermeasures.


1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 434-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brice M. Clagett

The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, otherwise known as the Helms-Burton Act, became law on March 12, 1996. Title III of the legislation creates a federal cause of action, on behalf of U.S. citizens whose property was confiscated without compensation by Cuba, against those who “traffic” in that property. Several governments—notably Canada, Mexico and those of the European Union, whose corporate citizens are the principal “traffickers”—have denounced the legislation as an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction that violates customary international law. These governments apparently see nothing wrong with permitting—even encouraging—their nationals to use and profit from property that rightfully belongs to others. The United States not only commands the moral high ground on this issue; it also has the better of the legal argument.


1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 759-764
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman ◽  
Diane Marie Amann

United States v. Balsys. 118 S.Ct. 2218.U.S. Supreme Court, June 25, 1998.Resolving a long-open question, the U.S. Supreme Court held in this 7-2 decision that a witness in a domestic proceeding may not invoke the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination if the witness fears that the testimony may be used in a prosecution outside the United States. Although grounded in domestic law, the three opinions in Balsys reveal tension between the judiciary's traditional deference to the political branches in foreign relations matters and its concern over the risk that individuals subject to prosecution abroad will suffer deprivation of liberty because of that deference.


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