International Court of Justice

1962 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 865-871 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Eastern Region ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
The Public ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
South West Africa ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government

South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa and Liberia v. South Africa): On October 2, 1962, the International Court of Justice held the first of the public hearings on the preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, raised by the government of the Republic of South Africa in these cases. After opening the sitting and briefly recalling the stages in the written proceedings covered since the institution of the cases on November 4, 1960, the President of the Court proceeded to the installation of the two judges ad hoc designated by the parties in accordance with Article 31, paragraphs 3 and 5, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The two judges ad hoc were Sir Louis Mbanefo, Chief Justice of the High Court, Eastern Region of Nigeria, designated by Ethiopia and Liberia acting in concert, and the Honorable Jacques Theodore van Wyk, Judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, designated by the government of the Republic of South Africa. The President announced that Judge Córdova was prevented by his health from sitting in the present proceedings.

Canada and Namibia

1980 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 314-323
Author(s):  
Livia Meret
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
South West ◽  
International Court ◽  
South West Africa ◽  
The Government ◽  
Legal Consequences

In 1971 The International Court of Justice in an Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia concluded that the mandate for South-West Africa had been validly terminated by the General Assembly in Resolution 2145 (XXI) of October 27, 1966, and that “the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under an obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory.” Further, the Court said that:States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and, in particular, any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration.

International Court of Justice

1962 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-217 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Time Limit ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Time Limits ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government

Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroun v. United Kingdom): In an order of July 6, 1961, the International Court of Justice fixed the time limits for the filing of pleadings in the case concerning the Northern Cameroons as follows: for the memorial of the Republic of Cameroun, November 1, 1961; and for the countermemorial of the United Kingdom, March 1, 1962. Subsequently, in an order of November 2, 1961, the Court, in accordance with a request from the agent of the government of the Republic of Cameroun, extended to January 3, 1962, the time limit for the filing of the memorial of the Republic of Cameroun and to May 2, 1962, the time limit for the filing of the countermemorial of the United Kingdom.

Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibiuty

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Bederman
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Law And Order ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Military Forces ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government

On July 28, 1986, the Republic of Nicaragua filed an application instituting proceedings against the Republic of Honduras in the International Court of Justice. Nicaragua alleged that Honduras had allowed armed bands, known as contras, to operate from its territory to the detriment of Nicaraguan sovereignty, that Honduran military forces had directly participated in attacks on Nicaragua and that the Government of Honduras had given material aid and logistical support to the rebels. Nicaragua requested that the Court declare the acts and omissions of Honduras to be violations of international law and order it to desist from all such activities and to make reparations to Nicaragua. Honduras objected to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility of the Application. The parties subsequently agreed that the Court should first decide these questions before proceeding to the merits. Relying on the Pact of Bogotá for its jurisdictional rationale, the Court unanimously held: that it had jurisdiction and that the Application could be entertained.

International Court of Justice

1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 670-670
Keyword(s):  
Political Party ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Colombian Government ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Right

This case was brought to the Court following a dispute between Colombia and Peru on the interpretation of the Convention on Asylum signed at Havana in 1928 and the right of asylum. The government of Peru charged that the government of Colombia did not keep within the terms of the treaty when asylum was granted to Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, a writer and the head of a political party, by the Colombian government in the Colombian Embassy in Lima, Peru. Since the Court had neither a national of Colombia or Peru sitting on the bench, both governments availed themselves of Article 31 (3) of the Statute and named Dr. José Joaquin Caicedo Castilla (Colombia) and Dr. Luis Alayza y Paz Soldan (Peru) to sit as judges ad hoc.

International Court of Justice

1964 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 599-603
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
West Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Time Limit ◽  
The South ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
South West ◽  
International Court ◽  
South West Africa

South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa): By an order of February 5, 1963, the President of the International Court of Justice fixed September 30, 1963, as the time limit for the filing of the South African countermemorial in the South West Africa cases. At the request of the government of South Africa, the Court in its order of September 18, 1963, extended this time limit to January 10, 1964. By its order of January 20, 1964, the International Court noted that the South African countermemorial had been filed, and it fixed as time limits June 20, 1964, for the filing of the replies of Ethiopia and Liberia; and November 20, 1964, for the filing of the rejoinder by South Africa

International Court of Justice

1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-512 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Administrative Services ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
General Assembly Resolution ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government

Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroun v. United Kingdom): On May 30, 1961, the government of the Republic of Cameroun filed in the Registry of the Court an application instituting proceedings against the United Kingdom.1 The applicant alleged that the United Kingdom had failed to respect certain obligations of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Cameroons under British Administration of December 13, 1946. The application stated specifically: 1) that the Northern Cameroons had not been administered as a separate territory within an administrative union, but as an integral part of Nigeria; 2) that the objectives set forth in article 6 of the trusteeship agreement—the development of free political institutions and an increasing share for the inhabitants in the administrative services, as well as their participation in advisory and legislative bodies and in the government of the territory—had not been attained; 3) that the agreement did not authorize the administering power to govern the territory as two separate parts evolving differently politically; 4) that, with respect to General Assembly Resolution 1473 (XIV) of December 12, 1959, (a) provisions relating to the separation of the administration of the Northern Cameroons from that of Nigeria, had not been followed, and (b) conditions laid down for the drawing up of electoral lists had been interpreted in a discriminatory manner; and 5) that the acts of the local authorities in the period preceding the plebiscite authorized by the afore-mentioned resolution and during the subsequent election involved consequences in conflict with the trusteeship agreement.

The Admission of Judges Ad Hoc In Advisory Proceedings: Some Reflections in the Light of the Namibia Case

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 446-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michla Pomerance
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Organization ◽  
The South ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Legal Question ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
First Time

In the Namibia case, the International Court of Justice for the first time in its history received an application for the appointment of a judge ad hoc in advisory proceedings. The application was made by South Africa on the basis of Article 83 of the Rules of Court which provides for the possibility of seating judges ad hoc in advisory procedings involving “a legal question actually pending between two or more States.” No state or international organization entitled to appear before the Court opposed the South African request, and no state other than South Africa submitted an application for a judge ad hoc. After an oral hearing (held in camera over strong South African protests 8) in which only South Africa presented argument, the Court, in its Order of January 29, 1971, decided, by a vote of 10 to 5, to reject South Africa's application. The Court offered no explanation for its decision at the time. Of the five dissenting judges, only Judges Onyeama and Dillard appended to the Order the reasons for their dissent. The remaining dissenting judges (and, by implication, the Court itself) feared that early disclosure of the reasons for their stands entailed the risk of prejudging substantive questions in the case. (As will be seen below, Judges Onyeama and Dillard had no cause to entertain similar fears.) With the delivery of the opinion, however, all five dissenting judges voiced strong criticism of the Court's refusal to admit a South African judge ad hoc.

scholarly journals Public Interests in the International Court of Justice—A Comparison Between Nuclear Arms Race (2016) and South West Africa (1966)

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 68-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingo Venzke
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
West Africa ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
South West ◽  
International Court ◽  
South West Africa ◽  
Nuclear Arms Race ◽  
Nuclear Arms

In the present essay I compare the 2016 judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Nuclear Arms Race (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom) with the Court's 1966 judgment in South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa). A series of similarities between the two judgments are obvious: They are two of the three cases in the history of the Court in which the judges were equally split and the President had to cast his tie-breaking vote. The critique of the judgments has been exceptionally strong, in 2016 as in 1966. The core of the critique, then as now, has practically been the same—the Court retreats into an excessive formalism that protects great powers.

National Judges and Judges Ad Hoc of the International Court of Justice

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 889-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Schwebel
Keyword(s):  
Advisory Committee ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
International Justice ◽  
State Party ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
The World

When the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was drafted by an Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920, a paramount question was, should a judge of the nationality of a State party to the case sit?The sensitivity of the issue was encapsulated by a report of a committee of the Court in 1927 on the occasion of a revision of the Rules of Court. It observed that: “In the attempt to establish international courts of justice, the fundamental problem always has been, and probably always will be, that of the representation of the litigants in the constitution of the tribunal. Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives. This fact, known to all the world, the [Court's] Statute frankly recognises and deals with.”1

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