Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force.

1978 ◽  
Vol 28 (113) ◽  
pp. 366
Author(s):  
Jane Heal ◽  
Jerrold J. Katz
2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 477-488
Author(s):  
Chiara Fedriani

Summary:This paper looks at uses and pragmatic functions of five hypothetic clauses used parenthetically in Late Latin to soften the illocutionary force of potentially face-threatening acts such as orders and requests. Specifically, the data show that these politeness markers typically mitigate a very specific type of interactional move, i.e., meta-textual proposals with topic-management, turn-yielding, and discourseorganizational concerns. Moreover, the corpus-based study has revealed that they are found above all in Augustine’s philosophical dialogues. Evidence from earlier research has shown, on the other hand, that in Classical Latin si placet was used almost exclusively in Cicero’s philosophical dialogues: this suggests a process of imitation within a very specific discourse tradition, where these markers are perceived as a stylistic feature typical of urbane conversations among educated friends.


2020 ◽  
Vol 132 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-306
Author(s):  
Lorena Núñez Pinero

This paper offers a pragmatic analysis of a rarely used construction in Classical Spanish: an emphatic comparison of equality with optative illocution A comparative sentence such as Así me ayude Dios como fue buena mi intención (’May God help me just as my intention was good‘) is used for emphasizing the assertion fue buena mi intención (’my intention was good‘) This construction is probably a Latinism It occurs in Latin, especially in Plautus and Terence, and is mostly attested in Spanish in humanistic comedy and in the Celestinesque tradition of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries The first member of the construction is interpreted at the pragmatic level as a reinforcer of the illocutionary force of the comparative construction as a whole, which expresses an indirect assertive speech act Speakers perform this type of act by satisfying its sincerity condition: they believe that the event of the second member is true, because if it were not, they would run a risk, i.e. the optative would entail a curse for themselves By contrast, when the event is true, the optative entails a good wish for themselves This paper also analyzes how the pragmatic properties of the construction are reflected in its semantic and morphosyntactic properties


Author(s):  
Craige Roberts

This essay sketches an approach to speech acts in which mood does not semantically determine illocutionary force. The conventional content of mood determines the semantic type of the clause in which it occurs, and, given the nature of discourse, that type most naturally lends itself to a particular type of speech act, i.e. one of the three basic types of language game moves—making an assertion (declarative), posing a question (interrogative), or proposing to one’s addressee(s) the adoption of a goal (imperative). There is relative consensus about the semantics of two of these, the declarative and interrogative; and this consensus view is entirely compatible with the present proposal about the relationship between the semantics and pragmatics of grammatical mood. Hence, the proposal is illustrated with the more controversial imperative.


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