Perceptual Belief and Psychological Explanation

1989 ◽  
Vol 39 (156) ◽  
pp. 276
Author(s):  
Keith Quillen
1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Omar Khaleefa

The study is an investigation of the origins of psychophysics and experimentalpsychology. According to historians of psychology. FrancisBacon had the most crucial influence in the history of the experimentalmethod, because he emphasized the importance of induction, skepticism,quantification, and observation. The present study, however,attempts to show that Ibn al-Haytham laid the foundations of the aboveaspects of the experimental method. Furthermore, a number of historiansof psychology believe that Fechner was the founder of psychophysicswith his application “Filements of Psychophysics” in 1860.This study shows that in the eleventh century, Ibn al-Haytham made anoriginal contribution to the study of vision, wherein his psychophysicsborrowed its structure from physics and its spirit from psychology.Several aspects of visual perception were investigated by him, includingsensation (which occupies a central place in psychophysics), variationsin sensitivity, perception of colors. sensation of touch, perceptionof darkness, the psychological explanation of moon illusion, and binocularvision. This study presents five experiments by Ibn al-Haythamregarding the errors of vision, which is called in contemporary psychology“visual illusion.” These experiments have been applied andverified in Bahrain from both the physical and psychological perspectives.Finally, the study concludes that Ibn al-Haytham deserves the title“founder” of psychophysics as wellp the “founder” of experimentalpsychology. In this respect. Kitab ul-Manazir by Ibn al-Haytham.which appeared in the fmt half of the eleventh century, and not the“Elements of Psychophysics” by Fechner. which was published in thenineteenth century, marks the official “founding” of psychology,because it provides not only new concepts and theories but new methodsof measurement in psychology.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162097060
Author(s):  
Iris van Rooij ◽  
Giosuè Baggio

Drawing on the philosophy of psychological explanation, we suggest that psychological science, by focusing on effects, may lose sight of its primary explananda: psychological capacities. We revisit Marr’s levels-of-analysis framework, which has been remarkably productive and useful for cognitive psychological explanation. We discuss ways in which Marr’s framework may be extended to other areas of psychology, such as social, developmental, and evolutionary psychology, bringing new benefits to these fields. We then show how theoretical analyses can endow a theory with minimal plausibility even before contact with empirical data: We call this the theoretical cycle. Finally, we explain how our proposal may contribute to addressing critical issues in psychological science, including how to leverage effects to understand capacities better.


1985 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 368
Author(s):  
Gaddis Smith ◽  
Deborah Welch Larson

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 697-711 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Gergen

Extending early work on the limits of hypothesis testing, I propose that psychological explanations for behavior draw their intelligibility from tautology. A reliance on tautology is born of the impossibility for ostensively defining the explanans (e.g., the state of mind presumably giving rise to action). Thus, one makes psychological sense by explaining a given behavior in terms of a “miniaturized” form of itself. Further, because each definition of a mental term relies on another mental term for its meaning, we enter a condition of unbridled diffusion of definition. We may thus account for psychological explanations far removed from simple or transparent tautology. Through extended definitional sequences, we find that any given behavior can be explained by virtually any randomly drawn motive or trait. This includes otherwise counter-intuitive or paradoxical explanations. These developments bear importantly on the grounding assumptions for psychological research, mental and diagnostic testing, and psychotherapy.


Temida ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 15-18
Author(s):  
Zoran Ilic

The truth is not only about accepting the facts. The truth includes emotional components - longing for acknowledgment of mistakes and validation of painful losses and experiences. While one side in the conflict considers itself as the only victim and experiences determination and acknowledgment of the truth as a possibility for healing its own trauma through satisfaction of justice and compensation, the other side is not accepting the truth. For this other side, confrontation with the facts is a painful trauma, which endangers individual moral norms, threatens the national identity and requires, on individual level, plugging in the defense mechanism, in order to prevent penetration of painful emotions into the consciousness. Primitive psychological mechanisms of defense, focused around splitting (projection, denial), are the main obstacles in accepting the truth both on individual and group level. There is also another extreme form of reaction manifested through "hypertrophy" of the truth and one-sided self-accusation. In this paper the author presents psychological explanation of the process of accepting the truth as the prerequisite for reconciliation and transformation of the conflict.


1991 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 496-497
Author(s):  
Peter Godfrey-Smith

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