A remark concerning decidability of complete theories

1950 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 277-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoni Janiczak

A formalized theory is called complete if for each sentence expressible in this theory either the sentence itself or its negation is provable.A theory is called deciddble if there exists an effective procedure (called decision-procedure) which enables one to decide of each sentence, in a finite number of steps, whether or not it is provable in the theory.It is known that there exist complete but undecidable theories. There exist, namely, the so called essentially undecidable theories, i.e. theories which are undecidable and remain so after an arbitrary consistent extension of the set of axioms. Using the well-known method of Lindenbaum we can therefore obtain from each such theory a complete and undecidable theory.The aim of this paper is to prove a theorem which shows that complete theories satisfying certain very general conditions are always decidable. In somewhat loose formulation these conditions are: There exist four effective methods M1, M2, M3, M4, such that(a) M1 enables us to decide in each case whether or not any given formula is a sentence of the theory;(b) M2 gives an enumeration of all axioms of the theory;(c) the rules of inference can be arranged in a sequence R1, R2, … such that if p1, … pk, r are arbitrary sentences of the theory, we can decide by M3 whether or not r results from p1, … pk, by the n-th rule;(d) M4 enables us to construct effectively the negation of each effectively given sentence.In order to express these conditions more precisely we shall make use of an arithmetization of the considered theory .

1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilary Putnam

The purpose of this paper is to present two groups of results which have turned out to have a surprisingly close interconnection. The first two results (Theorems 1 and 2) were inspired by the following question: we know what sets are “decidable” — namely, the recursive sets (according to Church's Thesis). But what happens if we modify the notion of a decision procedure by (1) allowing the procedure to “change its mind” any finite number of times (in terms of Turing Machines: we visualize the machine as being given an integer (or an n-tuple of integers) as input. The machine then “prints out” a finite sequence of “yesses” and “nos”. The last “yes” or “no” is always to be the correct answer.); and (2) we give up the requirement that it be possible to tell (effectively) if the computation has terminated? I.e., if the machine has most recently printed “yes”, then we know that the integer put in as input must be in the set unless the machine is going to change its mind; but we have no procedure for telling whether the machine will change its mind or not.The sets for which there exist decision procedures in this widened sense are decidable by “empirical” means — for, if we always “posit” that the most recently generated answer is correct, we will make a finite number of mistakes, but we will eventually get the correct answer. (Note, however, that even if we have gotten to the correct answer (the end of the finite sequence) we are never sure that we have the correct answer.)


1969 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabor T. Herman

The uniform halting problem (UH) can be stated as follows:Give a decision procedure which for any given Turing machine (TM) will decide whether or not it has an immortal instantaneous description (ID).An ID is called immortal if it has no terminal successor. As it is generally the case in the literature (see e.g. Minsky [4, p. 118]) we assume that in an ID the tape must be blank except for some finite number of squares. If we remove this restriction the UH becomes the immortality problem (IP).


1950 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 182-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Kalicki

Theorem. There is an effective procedure to decide whether the set of tautologies determined by a given truth-table with a finite number of elements is empty or not.Proof. Let W(P) be a w.f.f. with a single variable P and n a given n-valued truth-table with elements (values)Substitute 1, 2, 3, …, n in succession for P. By the usual contraction process let W(P) assume the truth-values w1, w2, w3, …, wn respectively. The sequencewill be called the value sequence of W(P).Value sequences consisting of designated elements of exclusively will be called designated; others will be called undesignated.All the W(P)'s will be classified in the following way:(a) to the first class CL1 of W(P)'s there belongs the one element P,(b) to the (t + 1)th class CLt + 1 belong all the w.f.f. which can be built up by means of one generating connective from constituent w.f.f. of which one is an element of CLt and all the others (if any) are elements of CLn ≤ t.For example, if N and C are the connectives described by a truth-table etc.Let ∣CLn∣ stand for the set of value sequences of the elements of CLn.


1957 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Ehrenfeucht

This paper contains examples T1 and T2 of theories which answer the following questions:(1) Does there exist an essentially undecidable theory with a finite number of non-logical constants which contains a decidable, finitely axiomatizable subtheory?(2) Does there exist an undecidable theory categorical in an infinite power which has a recursive set of axioms? (Cf. [2] and [3].)The theory T1 represents a modification of a theory described by Myhill [7]. The common feature of theories T1 and T2 is that in both of them pleonasms are essential in the construction of the axioms.Let T1 be a theory with identity = which contains one binary predicate R(x, y) and is based on the axioms A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, B4, Cnm which follow.A1: x = x. A2: x = y ⊃ y = x. A3: x = y ∧ y = z ⊃ x = z.(Axioms of identity.)B1: R(x, x). B2: R(x, y) ⊃ R(y, x). B3: R (x, y) ∧ R(y, z) ⊃ R(x, z).(Axioms of equivalence.)B4: x = y ⊃ [R(z, x) ≡ R(z,y)].Let φn be the formulawhich express that there is an abstraction class of the relation R which has exactly n elements.Let f(n) and g(n) be two recursive functions which enumerate two recursively inseparable sets [5], and call these sets X1 and X2.We now specify the axioms Cmm.It is obvious that the set composed of the formulas A1−A3, B1−B4, Cnm (n,m = 1,2, …) is recursive.The theory T1 is essentially undecidable; for if there were a complete and decidable extension T′1 (of it, then the recursive sets Z = {n: φn is provable in T′1} and Z′ = {n: ∼φn is provable in T′1} would separate the sets X1 and X2.


1973 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 310-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. G. Peretyat'kin

1989 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 264-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terrence Millar

An Ehrenfeucht theory is a complete first order theory with exactly n countable models up to isomorphism, 1 < n < ω. Numerous results have emerged regarding these theories ([1]–[15]). A general question in model theory is whether or not the number of countable models of a complete theory can be different than the number of countable models of a complete consistent extension of the theory by finitely many constant symbols. Examples are known of Ehrenfeucht theories that have complete extensions by finitely many constant symbols such that the extensions fail to be Ehrenfeucht ([4], [8], [13]). These examples are easily modified to allow finite increases in the number of countable models.This paper contains examples in the other direction—complete theories that have consistent extensions by finitely many constant symbols such that the extensions have fewer countable models. This answers affirmatively a question raised by, among others, Peretyat'kin [8]. The first example will be an Ehrenfeucht theory with exactly four countable models with an extension by a constant symbol that has only three countable models. The second example will be a complete theory that is not Ehrenfeucht, but which has an extension by a constant symbol that is Ehrenfeucht. The notational conventions for this paper are standard.Peretyat'kin introduced the theory of a dense binary branching tree with a meet operator [7]. Dense ω-branching trees have also proven useful [5], [11]. Both of the Theories that will be constructed make use of dense ω-branching trees.


Author(s):  
R. A. Crowther

The reconstruction of a three-dimensional image of a specimen from a set of electron micrographs reduces, under certain assumptions about the imaging process in the microscope, to the mathematical problem of reconstructing a density distribution from a set of its plane projections.In the absence of noise we can formulate a purely geometrical criterion, which, for a general object, fixes the resolution attainable from a given finite number of views in terms of the size of the object. For simplicity we take the ideal case of projections collected by a series of m equally spaced tilts about a single axis.


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