scholarly journals The optimality of induction as an axiomatization of arithmetic

1983 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 182-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Leivant

By induction for a formula φ we mean the schema(where the terms in brackets are implicitly substituted for some fixed variable, with the usual restrictions). Let be the schema IAφ for φ in Πn (i.e. ); similarly for . Each instance of is Δn+2, and each instance of is Σn+1 Thus the universal closure of an instance α is Πn+2 in either case. Charles Parsons [72] proved that and are equivalent over Z0, where Z0 is essentially Primitive Recursive Arithmetic augmented by classical First Order Logic [Parsons 70].Theorem. For each n > 0 there is a Πn formula π for whichis not derivable in Z0from(i) true Πn+1sentences; nor even(ii) Πn+1sentences consistent withZ0.

1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 708-713 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas N. Hoover

The probability logic is a logic with a natural interpretation on probability spaces (thus, a logic whose model theory is part of probability theory rather than a system for putting probabilities on formulas of first order logic). Its exact definition and basic development are contained in the paper [3] of H. J. Keisler and the papers [1] and [2] of the author. Building on work in [2], we prove in this paper the following probabilistic interpolation theorem for .Let L be a countable relational language, and let A be a countable admissible set with ω ∈ A (in this paper some probabilistic notation will be used, but ω will always mean the least infinite ordinal). is the admissible fragment of corresponding to A. We will assume that L is a countable set in A, as is usual in practice, though all that is in fact needed for our proof is that L be a set in A which is wellordered in A.Theorem. Let ϕ(x) and ψ(x) be formulas of LAP such thatwhere ε ∈ [0, 1) is a real in A (reals may be defined in the usual way as Dedekind cuts in the rationals). Then for any real d > ε¼, there is a formula θ(x) of (L(ϕ) ∩ L(ψ))AP such thatand


1975 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 567-575 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Ellentuck

Let L be a first order logic and the infinitary logic (as described in [K, p. 6] over L. Suslin logic is obtained from by adjoining new propositional operators and . Let f range over elements of ωω and n range over elements of ω. Seq is the set of all finite sequences of elements of ω. If θ: Seq → is a mapping into formulas of then and are formulas of LA. If is a structure in which we can interpret and h is an -assignment then we extend the notion of satisfaction from to by definingwhere f ∣ n is the finite sequence consisting of the first n values of f. We assume that has ω symbols for relations, functions, constants, and ω1 variables. θ is valid if θ ⊧ [h] for every h and is valid if -valid for every . We address ourselves to the problem of finding syntactical rules (or nearly so) which characterize validity .


2019 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 1020-1048
Author(s):  
IAN PRATT-HARTMANN ◽  
WIESŁAW SZWAST ◽  
LIDIA TENDERA

AbstractWe study the fluted fragment, a decidable fragment of first-order logic with an unbounded number of variables, motivated by the work of W. V. Quine. We show that the satisfiability problem for this fragment has nonelementary complexity, thus refuting an earlier published claim by W. C. Purdy that it is in NExpTime. More precisely, we consider ${\cal F}{{\cal L}^m}$, the intersection of the fluted fragment and the m-variable fragment of first-order logic, for all $m \ge 1$. We show that, for $m \ge 2$, this subfragment forces $\left\lfloor {m/2} \right\rfloor$-tuply exponentially large models, and that its satisfiability problem is $\left\lfloor {m/2} \right\rfloor$-NExpTime-hard. We further establish that, for $m \ge 3$, any satisfiable ${\cal F}{{\cal L}^m}$-formula has a model of at most ($m - 2$)-tuply exponential size, whence the satisfiability (= finite satisfiability) problem for this fragment is in ($m - 2$)-NExpTime. Together with other, known, complexity results, this provides tight complexity bounds for ${\cal F}{{\cal L}^m}$ for all $m \le 4$.


1973 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-188
Author(s):  
Lars Svenonius

By an elementary condition in the variablesx1, …, xn, we mean a conjunction of the form x1 ≤ i < j ≤ naij where each aij is one of the formulas xi = xj or xi ≠ xj. (We should add that the formula x1 = x1 should be regarded as an elementary condition in the one variable x1.)Clearly, according to this definition, some elementary conditions are inconsistent, some are consistent. For instance (in the variables x1, x2, x3) the conjunction x1 = x2 & x1 = x3 & x2 ≠ x3 is inconsistent.By an elementary combinatorial function (ex. function) we mean any function which can be given a definition of the formwhere E1(x1, …, xn), …, Ek(x1, …, xn) is an enumeration of all consistent elementary conditions in x1, …, xn, and all the numbers d1, …, dk are among 1, …, n.Examples. (1) The identity function is the only 1-ary e.c. function.(2) A useful 3-ary e.c. function will be called J. The definition is


1979 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Krynicki ◽  
Alistair H. Lachlan

In [5] Henkin defined a quantifier, which we shall denote by QH: linking four variables in one formula. This quantifier is related to the notion of formulas in which the usual universal and existential quantifiers occur but are not linearly ordered. The original definition of QH wasHere (QHx1x2y1y2)φ is true if for every x1 there exists y1 such that for every x2 there exists y2, whose choice depends only on x2 not on x1 and y1 such that φ(x14, x2, y1, y2). Another way of writing this isIn [5] it was observed that the logic L(QH) obtained by adjoining QH defined as in (1) is more powerful than first-order logic. In particular, it turned out that the quantifier “there exist infinitely many” denoted Q0 was definable from QH because


2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 3091-3099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gui-Hong XU ◽  
Jian ZHANG

Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh

Chapters 6-12 are driven by questions about the ability to pin down mathematical entities and to articulate mathematical concepts. This chapter is driven by similar questions about the ability to pin down the semantic frameworks of language. It transpires that there are not just non-standard models, but non-standard ways of doing model theory itself. In more detail: whilst we normally outline a two-valued semantics which makes sentences True or False in a model, the inference rules for first-order logic are compatible with a four-valued semantics; or a semantics with countably many values; or what-have-you. The appropriate level of generality here is that of a Boolean-valued model, which we introduce. And the plurality of possible semantic values gives rise to perhaps the ‘deepest’ level of indeterminacy questions: How can humans pin down the semantic framework for their languages? We consider three different ways for inferentialists to respond to this question.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Walicki

Abstract Graph normal form, introduced earlier for propositional logic, is shown to be a normal form also for first-order logic. It allows to view syntax of theories as digraphs, while their semantics as kernels of these digraphs. Graphs are particularly well suited for studying circularity, and we provide some general means for verifying that circular or apparently circular extensions are conservative. Traditional syntactic means of ensuring conservativity, like definitional extensions or positive occurrences guaranteeing exsitence of fixed points, emerge as special cases.


1991 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Joachim Biskup ◽  
Bernhard Convent

In this paper the relationship between dependency theory and first-order logic is explored in order to show how relational chase procedures (i.e., algorithms to decide inference problems for dependencies) can be interpreted as clever implementations of well known refutation procedures of first-order logic with resolution and paramodulation. On the one hand this alternative interpretation provides a deeper insight into the theoretical foundations of chase procedures, whereas on the other hand it makes available an already well established theory with a great amount of known results and techniques to be used for further investigations of the inference problem for dependencies. Our presentation is a detailed and careful elaboration of an idea formerly outlined by Grant and Jacobs which up to now seems to be disregarded by the database community although it definitely deserves more attention.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document