Elementary completeness properties of intuitionistic logic with a note on negations of prenex formulae

1958 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Kreisel
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Formal Proof ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Open Problems

The purpose of the present article is to formulate in an intuitionistically meaningful manner the completeness problems for the intuitionistic predicate calculus, and to establish the completeness of certain fragments of it. In these proofs certain translations of classical logic into intuitionistic logic are used, in particular those discovered by Kolmogorov [11] and Gödel [3], and a new one in which negations of prenex formulae are central. Since the last one is of interest also independently of the completeness problems, the details are presented separately at the end of this paper.All arguments are intended to be intuitionistically valid unless the opposite is stated; in particular, ‘proof’ means intuitionistic proof, and ‘formal proof’ means proof in the relevant system of Heyting [4], [5].Open problems are mentioned in Remarks 3.1 and 8.1.German capitals denote formulae of predicate logic, Latin (italic) capitals denote predicate symbols or propositional letters.

A logic stronger than intuitionism

1971 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabine Görnemann
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Theoretical Methods ◽  
Axiom Scheme ◽  
Simple Notion ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Quasi Ordering

S. A. Kripke has given [6] a very simple notion of model for intuitionistic predicate logic. Kripke's models consist of a quasi-ordering (C, ≤) and a function ψ which assigns to every c ∈ C a model of classical logic such that, if c ≤ c′, ψ(c′) is greater or equal to ψ(c). Grzegorczyk [3] described a class of models which is still simpler: he takes, for every ψ(c), the same universe. Grzegorczyk's semantics is not adequate for intuitionistic logic, since the formulawhere х is not free in α. holds in his models but is not intuitionistically provable. It is a conjecture of D. Klemke that intuitionistic predicate calculus, strengthened by the axiom scheme (D), is correct and complete with respect to Grzegorczyk's semantics. This has been proved independently by D. Klemke [5] by a Henkinlike method and me; another proof has been given by D. Gabbay [1]. Our proof uses lattice-theoretical methods.

Embedding first order predicate logic in fragments of intuitionistic logic

1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 705-718 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. H. Löb
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Expressive Power ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
First Order ◽  
Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus ◽  
Individual Variables ◽  
The One ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

Some syntactically simple fragments of intuitionistic logic possess considerable expressive power compared with their classical counterparts.In particular, we consider in this paper intuitionistic second order propositional logic (ISPL) a formalisation of which may be obtained by adding to the intuitionistic propositional calculus quantifiers binding propositional variables together with the usual quantifier rules and the axiom scheme (Ex), where is a formula not containing x.The main purpose of this paper is to show that the classical first order predicate calculus with identity can be (isomorphically) embedded in ISPL.It turns out an immediate consequence of this that the classical first order predicate calculus with identity can also be embedded in the fragment (PLA) of the intuitionistic first order predicate calculus whose only logical symbols are → and (.) (universal quantifier) and the only nonlogical symbol (apart from individual variables and parentheses) a single monadic predicate letter.Another consequence is that the classical first order predicate calculus can be embedded in the theory of Heyting algebras.The undecidability of the formal systems under consideration evidently follows immediately from the present results.We shall indicate how the methods employed may be extended to show also that the intuitionistic first order predicate calculus with identity can be embedded in both ISPL and PLA.For the purpose of the present paper it will be convenient to use the following formalisation (S) of ISPL based on [3], rather than the one given above.

The consistency of classical set theory relative to a set theory with intu1tionistic logic

1973 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Classical Theory ◽  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Basic Tool ◽  
Axiom Scheme ◽  
Power Set ◽  
Image Position

Let ZF be the usual Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory formulated without identity, and with the collection axiom scheme. Let ZF−-extensionality be obtained from ZF by using intuitionistic logic instead of classical logic, and dropping the axiom of extensionality. We give a syntactic transformation of ZF into ZF−-extensionality.Let CPC, HPC respectively be classical, intuitionistic predicate calculus without identity, whose only homological symbol is ∈. We use the ~ ~-translation, a basic tool in the metatheory of intuitionistic systems, which is defined byThe two fundamental lemmas about this ~ ~ -translation we will use areFor proofs, see Kleene [3, Lemma 43a, Theorem 60d].This - would provide the desired syntactic transformation at least for ZF into ZF− with extensionality, if A− were provable in ZF− for each axiom A of ZF. Unfortunately, the ~ ~-translations of extensionality and power set appear not to be provable in ZF−. We therefore form an auxiliary classical theory S which has no extensionality and has a weakened power set axiom, and show in §2 that the ~ ~-translation of each axiom of Sis provable in ZF−-extensionality. §1 is devoted to the translation of ZF in S.

scholarly journals Pretopologies and completeness proofs

1995 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 861-878 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Sambin
Keyword(s):  
Classical Logic ◽  
Sequent Calculus ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Linear Logic ◽  
Double Negation ◽  
Open Problems ◽  
Completeness Proof ◽  
Structural Rules ◽  
First Order ◽  
Definition Of

Pretopologies were introduced in [S], and there shown to give a complete semantics for a propositional sequent calculus BL, here called basic linear logic, as well as for its extensions by structural rules, ex falso quodlibet or double negation. Immediately after Logic Colloquium '88, a conversation with Per Martin-Löf helped me to see how the pretopology semantics should be extended to predicate logic; the result now is a simple and fully constructive completeness proof for first order BL and virtually all its extensions, including the usual, or structured, intuitionistic and classical logic. Such a proof clearly illustrates the fact that stronger set-theoretic principles and classical metalogic are necessary only when completeness is sought with respect to a special class of models, such as the usual two-valued models.To make the paper self-contained, I briefly review in §1 the definition of pretopologies; §2 deals with syntax and §3 with semantics. The completeness proof in §4, though similar in structure, is sensibly simpler than that in [S], and this is why it is given in detail. In §5 it is shown how little is needed to obtain completeness for extensions of BL in the same language. Finally, in §6 connections with proofs with respect to more traditional semantics are briefly investigated, and some open problems are put forward.

scholarly journals Completeness of the propositions-as-types interpretation of intuitionistic logic into illative combinatory logic

1998 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 869-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wil Dekkers ◽  
Martin Bunder ◽  
Henk Barendregt
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Lambda Calculus ◽  
Preceding Paper ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Combinatory Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Two Systems

AbstractIllative combinatory logic consists of the theory of combinators or lambda calculus extended by extra constants (and corresponding axioms and rules) intended to capture inference. In a preceding paper, [2], we considered 4 systems of illative combinatory logic that are sound for first order intuitionistic propositional and predicate logic. The interpretation from ordinary logic into the illative systems can be done in two ways: following the propositions-as-types paradigm, in which derivations become combinators, or in a more direct way, in which derivations are not translated. Both translations are closely related in a canonical way. In the cited paper we proved completeness of the two direct translations. In the present paper we prove that also the two indirect translations are complete. These proofs are direct whereas in another version, [3], we proved completeness by showing that the two corresponding illative systems are conservative over the two systems for the direct translations. Moreover we shall prove that one of the systems is also complete for predicate calculus with higher type functions.

scholarly journals The Collapse Argument Reconsidered

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 413-427
Author(s):  
Hamid Alaeinejad ◽  
Morteza Hajhosseini ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Relevant Logic ◽  
Logical Pluralism ◽  
Valid Argument ◽  
Normativity Of Logic ◽  
Refined Version

According to Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism, classical logic, relevant logic, and intuitionistic logic are all correct. On this version of logical pluralism, logic is considered to be normative, in the sense that someone who accepts the truth of the premises of a valid argument, is bound to accept the conclusion. So-called collapse arguments are designed to show the incompatibility of the simultaneous acceptance of logical pluralism and the normativity of logic. Caret, however, by proposing logical contextualism, and Blake-Turner and Russell by proposing telic pluralism, have sought to nullify the collapse problem. In the present article, after setting out these two approaches to the collapse problem, we argue that by using the concept of the ‘rationality of beliefs’ in order to frame the canonical purpose of logic, it can be demonstrated that if logical contextualism and telic pluralism are considered as philosophically significant logical pluralisms, a refined version of the collapse argument is still a threat for both of these kinds of logical pluralism.

scholarly journals On Correspondence between Selective CPS Transformation and Selective Double Negation Translation

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 385
Author(s):  
Hyeonseung Im
Keyword(s):  
Programming Languages ◽  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Proof System ◽  
Double Negation

A double negation translation (DNT) embeds classical logic into intuitionistic logic. Such translations correspond to continuation passing style (CPS) transformations in programming languages via the Curry-Howard isomorphism. A selective CPS transformation uses a type and effect system to selectively translate only nontrivial expressions possibly with computational effects into CPS functions. In this paper, we review the conventional call-by-value (CBV) CPS transformation and its corresponding DNT, and provide a logical account of a CBV selective CPS transformation by defining a selective DNT via the Curry-Howard isomorphism. By using an annotated proof system derived from the corresponding type and effect system, our selective DNT translates classical proofs into equivalent intuitionistic proofs, which are smaller than those obtained by the usual DNTs. We believe that our work can serve as a reference point for further study on the Curry-Howard isomorphism between CPS transformations and DNTs.

scholarly journals On density of truth of the intuitionistic logic in one variable

2008 ◽  
Vol DMTCS Proceedings vol. AI,... (Proceedings) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zofia Kostrzycka
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Propositional Variable ◽  
Intuitionistic Propositional Logic ◽  
International Audience

International audience In this paper we focus on the intuitionistic propositional logic with one propositional variable. More precisely we consider the standard fragment $\{ \to ,\vee ,\bot \}$ of this logic and compute the proportion of tautologies among all formulas. It turns out that this proportion is different from the analog one in the classical logic case.

An embedding of classical logic in S4

1970 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melvin Fitting
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Barcan Formula ◽  
Complete Sequences

There are well-known embeddings of intuitionistic logic into S4 and of classical logic into S5. In this paper we give a related embedding of (first order) classical logic directly into (first order) S4, with or without the Barcan formula. If one reads the necessity operator of S4 as ‘provable’, the translation may be roughly stated as: truth may be replaced by provable consistency. A proper statement will be found below. The proof is based ultimately on the notion of complete sequences used in Cohen's technique of forcing [1], and is given in terms of Kripke's model theory [3], [4].

On epistemic and ontological interpretations of intuitionistic and paraconsistent paradigms

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Carnielli ◽  
Abilio Rodrigues
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Constructive Proof ◽  
Technical Point ◽  
Preservation Of Evidence ◽  
Epistemic Approach ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation ◽  
Excluded Middle

Abstract From the technical point of view, philosophically neutral, the duality between a paraconsistent and a paracomplete logic (for example intuitionistic logic) lies in the fact that explosion does not hold in the former and excluded middle does not hold in the latter. From the point of view of the motivations for rejecting explosion and excluded middle, this duality can be interpreted either ontologically or epistemically. An ontological interpretation of intuitionistic logic is Brouwer’s idealism; of paraconsistency is dialetheism. The epistemic interpretation of intuitionistic logic is in terms of preservation of constructive proof; of paraconsistency is in terms of preservation of evidence. In this paper, we explain and defend the epistemic approach to paraconsistency. We argue that it is more plausible than dialetheism and allows a peaceful and fruitful coexistence with classical logic.

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