Constitutional Law. Revocation of License of Foreign Corporation for Removing Suit to Federal Courts. Unconstitutional Conditions

1922 ◽  
Vol 31 (7) ◽  
pp. 772



2018 ◽  
pp. 88-97
Author(s):  
Eric M. Freedman

The notion of an independent judiciary that restrained the other branches was an infant with a questionable life expectancy when John Marshall stated in placatory dicta in Ex Parte Bollman (1807)—quite wrongly as a matter of both British history and American constitutional law— that the federal courts had no inherent authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus in the absence of legislation. The Suspension Clause, he claimed, was merely precatory, an injunction to Congress to pass such legislation. The highly political case involved Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, alleged members of the Aaron Burr conspiracy, and pitted prominent federalists such as petitioners’ counsel Robert Goodloe Harper and Charles Lee against the administration of Thomas Jefferson. After reviewing the factual and political background, this chapter details the arguments of counsel in favor of inherent judicial authority to grant the writ and Marshall’s rejection of them. Judicial autonomy was under threat at the time and Marshall was trying to defend it But his words were a judicial sea mine that created a long-term danger: Congress could by simple inaction evade the bedrock prohibition against suspension of the writ.



1933 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-596
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines

One of the best known members of the bench in the United States raised the query whether constitutional law was not becoming so textual and so formal in its applications that it was losing touch with the realities of life. For the operations of government to be “cabined and confined” under ordinary circumstances raises difficulties not readily surmounted; but in times of unusual stress, either constitutional limitations unduly restrict urgent and necessary action or they must be ignored to permit emergency measures. A resumé of the decisions of state and federal courts affecting state constitutions for the year 1932–33 indicates the tendency both toward undue formality in interpretation and toward the warping of the constitutional mold to sanction ways and means of dealing with extraordinary conditions. Law, like life, is a matter of growth, and, as Lord Bryce long since observed, under written constitutions ways of growth must be found either within or without the provisions of fundamental laws.



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