State Constitutional Law in 1932–33

1933 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-596
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines

One of the best known members of the bench in the United States raised the query whether constitutional law was not becoming so textual and so formal in its applications that it was losing touch with the realities of life. For the operations of government to be “cabined and confined” under ordinary circumstances raises difficulties not readily surmounted; but in times of unusual stress, either constitutional limitations unduly restrict urgent and necessary action or they must be ignored to permit emergency measures. A resumé of the decisions of state and federal courts affecting state constitutions for the year 1932–33 indicates the tendency both toward undue formality in interpretation and toward the warping of the constitutional mold to sanction ways and means of dealing with extraordinary conditions. Law, like life, is a matter of growth, and, as Lord Bryce long since observed, under written constitutions ways of growth must be found either within or without the provisions of fundamental laws.


1947 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 700-732
Author(s):  
Foster H. Sherwood

The oft-heard argument in behalf of federalism that the states furnish important laboratories for social and political experimentation is illustrated by a good many new constitutional provisions interpreted for the first time this year. Two states, Missouri and Georgia, adopted entirely new constitutions in 1945, important sections of which have come before the highest courts for interpretation. One of these, the Georgia constitution of 1945, provides specifically: “Legislative acts in violation of this constitution or the constitution of the United States, are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them.” Such a provision may very well raise more questions than it settles—for example, what effects can be accorded unconstitutional acts?; can the other agencies of government refuse to perform under statutes they consider unconstitutional?; can the judiciary declare acts of the governor and other officers unconstitutional?; etc. Such questions have not as yet been raised. But there is some evidence that we may be embarking on an era of constitutional revision similar to that which followed the Civil War. If so, the problems of constitutional law now being discussed may furnish a clue to the kind of new documents to be written. This year the emphasis has been on civil rights and methods of adjusting state finances to the rapidly fluctuating value of the dollar—problems which naturally arise out of the intense social and economic conflicts of the past decade.



1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan R. Macey

The existence of a meaningful distinction between economic rights and “other rights” has been a cornerstone of constitutional law for the past sixty years. During this period, the federal courts consistently have taken the position that Congress is free to abuse citizens’ economic liberties, but is not permitted to interfere with such other, noneconomic “rights” as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion.



2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-200
Author(s):  
Stephen Gageler

James Bryce was a contemporary of Albert Venn Dicey. Bryce published in 1888 The American Commonwealth. Its detailed description of the practical operation of the United States Constitution was influential in the framing of the Australian Constitution in the 1890s. The project of this article is to shed light on that influence. The article compares and contrasts the views of Bryce and of Dicey; Bryce's views, unlike those of Dicey, having been largely unexplored in contemporary analyses of our constitutional development. It examines the importance of Bryce's views on two particular constitutional mechanisms – responsible government and judicial review – to the development of our constitutional structure. The ongoing theoretical implications of The American Commonwealth for Australian constitutional law remain to be pondered.



Author(s):  
Jean Galbraith

Over its constitutional history, the United States has developed multiple ways of joining, implementing, and terminating treaties and other international commitments. This chapter provides an overview of the law governing these pathways and considers the extent to which comparative law has influenced them or could do so in the future. Focusing in particular on the making of international commitments, the chapter describes how, over time, the United States came to develop alternatives to the process set out in the U.S. Constitution’s Treaty Clause, which requires the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. These alternatives arose partly from reasons of administrative efficiency and partly from presidential interest in making important international commitments in situations where two-thirds of the Senate would be unobtainable. These alternatives have had the effect of considerably increasing the president’s constitutional power to make international commitments. Nonetheless, considerable constraints remain on presidential power in this context, with some of these constraints stemming from constitutional law and others from statutory, administrative, and international law. With respect to comparative law, the chapter observes that U.S. practice historically has been largely but not entirely self-contained. Looking ahead, comparative practice is unlikely to affect U.S. constitutional law with respect to international agreements, but it might hold insights for legislative or administrative reforms.



1936 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 102 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. D. G. Ribble ◽  
Hugh Evander Willis


1911 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 545
Author(s):  
Thomas Reed Powell ◽  
Westel Woodbury Willoughby


2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Alexander

AbstractA constitution is, as Article VI of the United States Constitution declares, the fundamental law of the land, supreme as a legal matter over any other nonconstitutional law. But that almost banal statement raises a number of theoretically vexed issues. What is law? How is constitutional law to be distinguished from nonconstitutional law? How do morality and moral rights fit into the picture? And what are the implications of the answers to these questions for such questions as how and by whom should constitutions be interpreted? These are the issues that I shall address.Alexander proceeds as follows: In section I he takes up law's principal function of settling controversies over what we are morally obligated to do. In section II he then relate law's settlement function to the role of constitutional law. In particular, he discusses how constitutional law is distinguished from ordinary law, and he also discusses the role of constitutions in establishing basic governmental structures and enforcing certain moral rights. In section III he addresses the topic of constitutional interpretation, and in section IV the topic of judicial review. Finally, in section V, he discusses constitutional change, both change that occurs through a constitution's own rules for amendments and change that is the product of constitutional misinterpretations and revolutions.





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