The U.S. Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court:

2016 ◽  
pp. 229-253
Author(s):  
Klaus Stüwe
2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 1337-1344
Author(s):  
Federico José Arena

In his paper The Impact of Legal Systems on Constitutional Interpretation: A Comparative Analysis: The U.S. Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court, Arshakyan carries out an interesting and detailed comparison between American and German constitutional courts by individualizing the properties shared by both courts and identifying the differences.


2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jana Gogolin

Much attention has been given to a series of decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the effects of the decisions of the International Court of Justice interpreting the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. On 19 September, 2006, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG - German Federal Constitutional Court), has made its first judgment on the issue. The decision is significant for international law and even more specifically for U.S. jurists: Its outcome differs significantly from the U.S. Supreme Court decisions.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 1297-1335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mher Arshakyan

The central purpose of this paper is to show that there are no major differences in the methods of constitutional interpretation in countries with varying degrees of judicial review. Despite the fact that legal culture and traditions, underlying political theories, and values all affect methods of interpretation, there is no big gap in constitutional interpretation in practice in view of wide interpretive discretion. Obviously all legal systems require compliance with some fundamental interpretive standards irrespective of the legal system, and in a democratic society judicial decisions should be justified at least to avoid arbitrariness. The question is what are the limits beyond which judges cannot go in constitutional democracies? Hence, the style and method of legal argumentation that are used to justify the decision may differ in the countries belonging to different legal systems. Whether there are significant differences between the common law and civil law, constitutional interpretation will be assessed through the comparative analysis of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (66) ◽  
pp. 85-129
Author(s):  
Mher Arshakyan ◽  
Jacopo Paffarini ◽  
Márcio Ricardo Staffen

The central purpose of this paper is to show that there are no major differences in the methods of constitutional interpretation in countries with varying degree of judicial review. Despite the fact that legal culture and traditions, underlying political theories, and values all affect methods of interpretation, there is no big gap in constitutional interpretation in practice in view of wide interpretive discretion. Obviously all legal systems require compliance with some fundamental interpretive standards irrespective of the legal system, and in a democratic society judicial decisions should be justified at least to avoid arbitrariness. The question is what are the limits beyond which judges cannot go in constitutional democracies? Can the foreign law be a parameter for judicial review of legislation? Hence, the style and method of legal argumentation that are used to justify the decision may differ in the countries belonging to different legal systems. Whether there are significant differences between the common law and civil law constitutional interpretation will be assessed through the comparative analysis of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court.


2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany


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