Avena and Sanchez-Llamas Come to Germany – The German Constitutional Court Upholds Rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jana Gogolin

Much attention has been given to a series of decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the effects of the decisions of the International Court of Justice interpreting the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. On 19 September, 2006, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG - German Federal Constitutional Court), has made its first judgment on the issue. The decision is significant for international law and even more specifically for U.S. jurists: Its outcome differs significantly from the U.S. Supreme Court decisions.

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 1337-1344
Author(s):  
Federico José Arena

In his paper The Impact of Legal Systems on Constitutional Interpretation: A Comparative Analysis: The U.S. Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court, Arshakyan carries out an interesting and detailed comparison between American and German constitutional courts by individualizing the properties shared by both courts and identifying the differences.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
NIELS PETERSEN

AbstractMany critics of the proportionality principle argue that balancing is an instrument of judicial self-empowerment. This contribution argues that the relationship between balancing and judicial power is more complex. Balancing does not necessarily create judicial power, but it presupposes it. This argument is confirmed through a case study of the German Federal Constitutional Court. The analysis shows that the German Constitutional Court was very reluctant to base decisions, in which it overturned legislation, on balancing in the first two and a half decades of its jurisprudence. However, in the late 1970s, once the Court had strengthened its own institutional position, it increasingly relied on balancing when declaring laws as incompatible with the constitution. Then, balancing developed into the predominant argumentation framework of constitutional review that it is today in the Court’s jurisprudence.


2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-53
Author(s):  
David P. Stewart

On July 7, 2011, the United States Supreme Court declined to stay the execution of Humberto Leal García, a Mexican national who had been convicted some sixteen years ago in Texas of murder.1 Relying on the decision of the International Court of Justice (‘‘ICJ’’) in the Avena case,2 García contended that the United States had violated his right to consular notification and access under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (‘‘Consular Convention’’).3 He sought the stay so that the U.S. Congress could consider enactment of proposed legislation to implement the ICJ decision.4 In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected his argument, stating that ‘‘[t]he Due Process Clause does not prohibit a State from carrying out a lawful judgment in light of unenacted legislation that might someday authorize a collateral attack on that judgment.’’5 García was executed by lethal injection that evening.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-382
Author(s):  
Asteris Pliakos ◽  
Georgios Anagnostaras

Preliminary references by national constitutional courts are not an everyday occurrence in Union law. No surprise, therefore, that they attract considerable publicity and give rise to a significant amount of academic comment. However, the recent preliminary request of the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) inGauweilerconstitutes undoubtedly the most important and historic preliminary reference made thus far by a constitutional court. This is not only because it is the very first preliminary request of this particular court, inaugurating potentially a whole new era in its institutional relationships with the Court of Justice and paving the way for other national constitutional courts to make more regular recourse to the preliminary reference procedure; but also because it relates to an issue of central importance for the process of European integration with far reaching economic and political repercussions.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 1297-1335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mher Arshakyan

The central purpose of this paper is to show that there are no major differences in the methods of constitutional interpretation in countries with varying degrees of judicial review. Despite the fact that legal culture and traditions, underlying political theories, and values all affect methods of interpretation, there is no big gap in constitutional interpretation in practice in view of wide interpretive discretion. Obviously all legal systems require compliance with some fundamental interpretive standards irrespective of the legal system, and in a democratic society judicial decisions should be justified at least to avoid arbitrariness. The question is what are the limits beyond which judges cannot go in constitutional democracies? Hence, the style and method of legal argumentation that are used to justify the decision may differ in the countries belonging to different legal systems. Whether there are significant differences between the common law and civil law, constitutional interpretation will be assessed through the comparative analysis of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (66) ◽  
pp. 85-129
Author(s):  
Mher Arshakyan ◽  
Jacopo Paffarini ◽  
Márcio Ricardo Staffen

The central purpose of this paper is to show that there are no major differences in the methods of constitutional interpretation in countries with varying degree of judicial review. Despite the fact that legal culture and traditions, underlying political theories, and values all affect methods of interpretation, there is no big gap in constitutional interpretation in practice in view of wide interpretive discretion. Obviously all legal systems require compliance with some fundamental interpretive standards irrespective of the legal system, and in a democratic society judicial decisions should be justified at least to avoid arbitrariness. The question is what are the limits beyond which judges cannot go in constitutional democracies? Can the foreign law be a parameter for judicial review of legislation? Hence, the style and method of legal argumentation that are used to justify the decision may differ in the countries belonging to different legal systems. Whether there are significant differences between the common law and civil law constitutional interpretation will be assessed through the comparative analysis of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court.


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