scholarly journals Constitutional Interpretation and Foreign Law: A Comparative Analysis between the U.S. Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (66) ◽  
pp. 85-129
Author(s):  
Mher Arshakyan ◽  
Jacopo Paffarini ◽  
Márcio Ricardo Staffen

The central purpose of this paper is to show that there are no major differences in the methods of constitutional interpretation in countries with varying degree of judicial review. Despite the fact that legal culture and traditions, underlying political theories, and values all affect methods of interpretation, there is no big gap in constitutional interpretation in practice in view of wide interpretive discretion. Obviously all legal systems require compliance with some fundamental interpretive standards irrespective of the legal system, and in a democratic society judicial decisions should be justified at least to avoid arbitrariness. The question is what are the limits beyond which judges cannot go in constitutional democracies? Can the foreign law be a parameter for judicial review of legislation? Hence, the style and method of legal argumentation that are used to justify the decision may differ in the countries belonging to different legal systems. Whether there are significant differences between the common law and civil law constitutional interpretation will be assessed through the comparative analysis of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court.

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 1337-1344
Author(s):  
Federico José Arena

In his paper The Impact of Legal Systems on Constitutional Interpretation: A Comparative Analysis: The U.S. Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court, Arshakyan carries out an interesting and detailed comparison between American and German constitutional courts by individualizing the properties shared by both courts and identifying the differences.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 1297-1335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mher Arshakyan

The central purpose of this paper is to show that there are no major differences in the methods of constitutional interpretation in countries with varying degrees of judicial review. Despite the fact that legal culture and traditions, underlying political theories, and values all affect methods of interpretation, there is no big gap in constitutional interpretation in practice in view of wide interpretive discretion. Obviously all legal systems require compliance with some fundamental interpretive standards irrespective of the legal system, and in a democratic society judicial decisions should be justified at least to avoid arbitrariness. The question is what are the limits beyond which judges cannot go in constitutional democracies? Hence, the style and method of legal argumentation that are used to justify the decision may differ in the countries belonging to different legal systems. Whether there are significant differences between the common law and civil law, constitutional interpretation will be assessed through the comparative analysis of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court.


Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-296
Author(s):  
Nils Grosche

Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit steht im Zentrum der Auseinandersetzung über die Kompetenzabgrenzung durch die Verfassungsgerichte im europäischen Verfassungsverbund. Auf den ersten Blick wirkt seine Heranziehung schlicht als fortgesetzte Proliferation eines gleichermaßen tradierten wie profilierten öffentlich-rechtlichen Maßstabs in einem unionseigenen Kontext, dem Vorgaben für die Kompetenzabgrenzung einfach entnommen werden können. Der Beitrag behandelt die Möglichkeit einer hiervon abzugrenzenden Verständnisweise des Abstellens auf den Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz seitens des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Hiernach soll die Anknüpfung an den Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz lediglich dazu dienen, spezifische Anforderungen an eine effektive Kompetenzabgrenzung einzulösen, ohne diese notwendig selbst zu enthalten. Die in Rede stehenden Anforderungen sind Antworten auf ein bestimmtes Problem: die Fähigkeiten des Normadressaten, durch geschickte Konstruktionen Kompetenzbindungen abzustreifen. The principle of proportionality is at the center of the judicial controversy concerning the question of EU institutions exceeding their respective competences. At first glance the reference to the principle of proportionality simply marks a new use case of a ubiquitously utilized standard of judicial review entailing specific requirements for the delimitation of competences. The article argues for a different perception of the application of the principle of proportionality by the German Federal Constitutional Court. According to this perception the principle of proportionality serves as a proxy in order to incorporate certain requirements for the effective delimitation of competences. These requirements are triggered by a specific problem: the capabilities of an addressee of a rule to circumvent it via smart design.


2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jana Gogolin

Much attention has been given to a series of decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the effects of the decisions of the International Court of Justice interpreting the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. On 19 September, 2006, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG - German Federal Constitutional Court), has made its first judgment on the issue. The decision is significant for international law and even more specifically for U.S. jurists: Its outcome differs significantly from the U.S. Supreme Court decisions.


1976 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fritz Nova

The Watergate controversies and especially the recent decision in Richard M. Nixon versus the United States on July 24, 1974 have again raised in the United States the problem of the political limits to judicial policy making and the need to strike a new balance among the three branches of government for preserving and maintaining a democratic policy. In this paper, which is based on largely primary judicial, political, and academic German sources up to the year 1972, the development of jurisprudence of the West German Federal Constitutional Court is analyzed and discussed, particularly the Court's experience with judicial review. The article is geared toward the student of comparative constitutionalism and comparative government, offering possible lessons to the United States and other Common Law constitutional courts. Less concerned with the practical work of the Court, except for brief comments on actual performance, the paper focuses on such problems as past and present German approval and disapproval of the notion of judicial review, the often erudite disputation on the merits of constitutional—especially “creative”—jurisprudence; the discussion on the political limits of judicial review; and trends in particular philosophical positions of the Court in contemporary West Germany.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 979-994
Author(s):  
Mattias Wendel

AbstractThis contribution explores paradoxes of ultra vires review with specific regard to the PSPP decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the light of the decision’s initial reception. While some of these paradoxes are inherent in the very nature of ultra vires review, others are specific to the PSPP judgment. They relate to the underlying doctrinal and theoretical premises, to key concepts such as proportionality or the scope of judicial review, to the overall context in which the decision is embedded, and even to the community which is addressed and affected by the decision. It is the sad irony that the Federal Constitutional Court, while accusing others of manifestly exceeding their competences, does not sufficiently adhere to its own standards and increasingly risks overstretching the boundaries of its mandate under the Basic Law.


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