Direct Legislation in United Germany

2018 ◽  
pp. 148-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hermann K. Heußner
Keyword(s):  
1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard D. Hamilton

Any middle-aged member of the political science guild in a retrospective mood might ponder a question: “What ever happened to direct democracy?” In our halcyon student days the textbooks discussed the direct democracy trinity—initiative, referendum, and recall—described their mechanics and variations, explained their origin in the Progressive Era, told us that the United States, Australia, and Switzerland were leading practitioners of direct democracy, cited a few eccentric referenda, gave the standard pro and con arguments, and essayed some judgments of the relative merits of direct and representative democracy. Latter day collegians may pass through the portals innocent of the existence of the institutions of direct government. Half of the American government texts never mention the subject; the others allocate a paragraph or a page for a casual mention or a barebones explanation of the mechanics.A similar trend has occurred in the literature. Before 1921, every volume of this Review had items on the referendum, five in one volume. Subsequently there have been only seven articles, all but two prior to World War II. “The Initiative and Referendum in Graustark” has ceased to be a fashionable dissertation topic, only four in the last thirty years. All but two of the published monographs antedate World War II.


2002 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoltan L. Hajnal ◽  
Elisabeth R. Gerber ◽  
Hugh Louch
Keyword(s):  

1975 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh A. Bone ◽  
Robert C. Benedict
Keyword(s):  

2001 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Smith

Recent macro-level studies examining the indirect effects of direct legislation on public policy in the American states are decidedly mixed. This study tests whether the macro-level logic of legislative behavior in response to ballot initiatives holds true at the micro-level for individual legislators. I examined the determinants of legislative votes on “counter-majoritarian” legislation—bills that directly challenge the outcomes of earlier statewide ballot initiatives. In 1999, the Colorado state legislature tried to overturn the outcomes of three previous ballot contests. I find that in two of the three cases, a legislator's vote on these bills was related to the vote in his or her district on the respective ballot initiative. This helps explain why many legislators will vote contrary to the outcome of a statewide initiative vote.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document