The Reagan Administration, Cuba, and the Cold War

2017 ◽  
pp. 53-73 ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Daniel P. Volman

Studies of U.S. government relations with Africa have generally focused on the role of the executive branch, specifically by examining and analyzing the views and activities of administration officials and the members of executive branch bureaucracies. This is only natural, given the predominant role that the executive branch has historically played in the development and implementation of U.S. policy toward the continent. However, the U.S. Congress has always played an important role in determining U.S. policy toward Africa due to its constitutional authority over the appropriation and authorization of funding for all foreign operations conducted by the executive branch. Furthermore, Congress enacted legislation on several occasions during the Cold War period that directly affected U.S. policy. For example, Congress approved the Clark Amendment prohibiting U.S. intervention in Angola (although it later voted to repeal the amendment) and also passed the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which imposed sanctions on South Africa over the veto of the Reagan administration.


Author(s):  
Simon Miles

Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy legacy remains hotly contested, and as new archival sources come to light, those debates are more likely to intensify than to recede into the background. In dealings with the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration set the superpowers on a course for the (largely) peaceful end of the Cold War. Reagan began his outreach to Soviet leaders almost immediately after taking office and enjoyed some success, even if the dominant theme of the period remains fears of Reagan as a “button-pusher” in the public’s perception. Mikhail Gorbachev’s election to the post of General Secretary proved the turning point. Reagan, now confident in US strength, and Gorbachev, keen to reduce the financial burden of the arms race, ushered in a new, cooperative phase of the Cold War. Elsewhere, in particular Latin America, the administration’s focus on fighting communism led it to support human rights–abusing regimes at the same time as it lambasted Moscow’s transgressions in that regard. But even so, over the course of the 1980s, the United States began pushing for democratization around the world, even where Reagan and his advisors had initially resisted it, fearing a communist takeover. In part, this was a result of public pressure, but the White House recognized and came to support the rising tide of democratization. When Reagan left office, a great many countries that had been authoritarian were no longer, often at least in part because of US policy. US–Soviet relations had improved to such an extent that Reagan’s successor, Vice President George H. W. Bush, worried that they had gone too far in working with Gorbachev and been hoodwinked.


2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 52-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
William E. Odom

During the Carter administration the Middle East and Southwest Asia became a third major theater in the Cold War struggle along with Europe and the Far East. Initially, President Jimmy Carter tried to remove this region from the Cold War competition, but the collapse of the shah's regime in Iran prompted Carter to reverse course and to build a “Persian Gulf security framework” that later allowed the United States to deal with three wars and many smaller clashes. The interagency process implementing this dramatic change was rent with clashes of departmental interests. The State Department and the military services resisted the structural changes they would later need to confront not only the Soviet threat but also intraregional conflicts. Moreover, the Reagan administration, after forcing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make the Central Command formal, actually slowed the process of its growth, leaving it far from ready to embark on the Gulf War in 1990–1991.


2020 ◽  
pp. 205-248
Author(s):  
Vanessa Walker

This chapter examines the dramatic reinvention of U.S. human rights policy during Reagan's first year in office. The Carter administration pursued human rights as a corrective to U.S. interventionist legacies, emphasizing pluralism and eschewing regime change. The Reagan administration, in contrast, aggressively promoted human rights within a reinvigorated but narrow Cold War framework. This construction, championing a limited range of civil and political rights, downplayed the human rights violations of pro-American governments, focusing instead on what it considered the much greater moral flaws and violations of communist regimes. The Cold War framing of human rights under Reagan empowered a pairing of military power and moral values, leading the United States to not only not limit arms sales to governments but also recast military aid as a critical aspect of both hemispheric defense against communism and the advancement of human rights. The chapter studies this policy shift in the Reagan administration's first year in regard to Chile and Argentina.


1983 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 233-262
Author(s):  
Jyotirmoy Banerjee

In September 1982 the Social and Free Democratic coalition1 collapsed after thirteen years' rule; the conservative Union parties coalesced with the Free Democrats to return to power in Bonn. Two months later Brezhnev died in Moscow amidst an ongoing new Cold War with the Reagan Administration. His successor, as the Chief of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), turned out to be the former KGB chief, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov. With time running out for NATO's deployment of new missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and other West European states, and a significant conservative victory in the United Kingdom elections in June 1983, elements of uncertainty in the crucial relations between Bonn and Moscow may have increased. Between 1969 and 1982 the (SPD) had managed to reverse the (CDU's) twenty years of hardline approach to the Soviet bloc. Despite irritations, Bonn under SPD-led governments managed to keep its ostpolitik on an even keel. Central European detente seemed to have survived the collapse of the larger, superpower rapprochement. The critical question in mid-1983, following the conservative election victories in Bonn and London and against the background of significant US-USSR rivalry, is whether the latter rivalry would also suck into its vortex relative peace in Central Europe. Should that happen, the Cold War would return to Europe, reinforce the anomalies emanating from a divided Germany as well as the superpower adversary relationship in turn. In this context the present article will, first, take a retrospective look at ostpolitik, its causes and achievements, then explore Bonn's relations with Moscow as they evolved while the SPD was in power and, finally analyze the implications of the leadership changes in Bonn and Moscow for the future of ostpolitik.


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