Digital campaigning as a policy of democracy promotion: Applying deliberative theories of democracy to political parties

Today’s election campaigns are heavily data-driven. Despite the numerous skeptical voices questioning the compatibility of specific campaigning practices with fundamental principles of liberal democracies, there has to date been little comprehensive work in this area from the perspective of normative democratic theory. Our article addresses this gap by drawing on recent research on the normative theory of political parties in the field of deliberative democratic theory. The deliberative theories of democracy proposed by Habermas and Rawls contain structural elements of a normative theory of the political party: the special status of political parties as mediators between background culture and the political forum, between the political system and the public sphere, and between the individual and the state, confers on them a central position as actors in in the public use of reason and deliberation.We argue in this article for a view of digital campaigning as a policy of democracy promotion and for the proposition that, alongside other actors, political parties have a special responsibility in this regard. We point to the implications for the evaluation and design of digital political microtargeting that arise from the application of deliberative principles to political parties and consider the need they reveal for the ongoing development of detailed, nuanced normative theories of democracy.

Costly Signals?

Developed states increasingly turned to democracy assistance strategies as the Cold War came to an end. A number of recent studies conclude that such aid positively affected democratization in recipients. But, like foreign aid, democracy assistance allocations are subject to change, sometimes dramatically. In foreign aid, sudden, sizable reductions – or aid shocks (e.g., Nielsen et al. 2011) – can have severe consequences, precipitating conflict in the recipient state. How do democracy aid shocks affect recipient states? This analysis examines the effects of sudden withdrawals of democracy aid – or democracy aid shocks – by the U.S. on recipient regime behavior, specifically, their treatment of citizens and civil society groups. We argue that democracy aid shocks trigger repressive action by recipients resulting in harmful human rights practices by the regime. Examining U.S. democracy aid to the developing world from 1982-2013, we find that, after controlling for other relevant factors likely to affect the human rights practices of a regime, democracy aid shocks are associated with subsequent repression of human rights in the recipient state. Our analysis thus sheds light on an external factor affecting human rights practices within states, as well as an important element of the consequences of democracy aid decisions. We conclude by assessing the implications for democracy promotion strategies and human rights behavior.

Washington's Africa policy still lacks a framework

Significance President Joe Biden’s core Africa team has been in place for several months now but the development of Washington’s Africa policy appears awkwardly caught between the president’s democracy promotion agenda, his broad concern about global competition from China and lingering assumptions from the war on terror. Impacts Chinese and Russian activity in countries usually seen as peripheral is becoming more significant for Washington. As more crises affect the Horn and the Sahel, Washington will pay greater attention to anchor countries such as Kenya and Senegal. In keeping with long-term trends, Africa does not appear likely to become a high priority for the Biden administration.

“Instrumentalize” the Assistance. The Changing Legitimacy of ingo s in Democratizing Tunisia

This study provides two theoretical insights that contribute to the debate on the legitimacy of ingo s that promote democracy to intervene in the third countries’ political affairs. First, it argues that the level of legitimacy that political parties endow to ingo s depends on the “instrumental role” that ingo s play in bolstering the achievements of national partners’ goals and is not based on the values and norms that the ingo s promote. Second, it suggests that the degree of legitimacy that political parties grant to ingo s has to be understood as temporarily limited and context dependent. Using the case of ingo s involved in democracy promotion during the Tunisian democratization, this article argues that Tunisian political elites welcomed ingo s assistance during the initial phase of the democracy transition (2011–2014) because their assistance was helpful to enhance the establishment of democracy system and its procedures. The article suggests that since 2015, political parties are showing less enthusiasm about ingo s’ pressure and interference in national affairs because the action of ingo s is no longer useful to their political agenda.

Russia’s Policies in the Post-Soviet Space: Between Constructive Relations and Fighting the New Cold War

The article challenges the view that Russia’s goal in the post-Soviet space is to make the region an exclusive zone of Russian influence and keep other world powers out entirely. In fact, Russia has two policies towards the influence of other powers that are active in the region: a ‘business as usual’ approach, applied to China and Turkey; and a securitized ‘New Cold War policy’, applied to the US and West (especially towards their presence in Ukraine). Growing Chinese and Turkish influence has not been ‘securitized’, although the presence of both powers creates clear obstacles to the reintegration of former Soviet countries around Russia. The article draws on three bodies of literature (Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism) to explain this variation. While Moscow perceives growing Western influence in Ukraine as a threat to its domestic regime and identity as a great power and regional leader, it finds common ground with Beijing and Ankara in its concerns about the Western liberal democracy promotion agenda and views both powers as potential allies in the construction of a ‘multipolar world’.

Back to Westminster: A new transatlantic agenda to defend democracy

Across the transatlantic area and, indeed, across the democratic world, democracy is under strain from domestic and external factors, while throughout the world, authoritarian and totalitarian forces continue to quash people’s desire for freedom and human dignity. In this context, this article takes stock of the ongoing challenges, and argues for a renewed transatlantic agenda that returns to the spirit of President Ronald Reagan’s 1982 Westminster Speech. It should achieve this by developing an ambitious programme that defends democracy within the transatlantic area and supports people’s desire for freedom globally, while avoiding the dogmatic approaches and ossification that have characterised democracy promotion over the past two decades.

How ‘making the world in its own liberal image’ made the West less liberal

How did the attempt to make the world more liberal end up making the West less liberal? Following the end of the Cold War the US tried to promote liberalism in various parts of the world. This promotion took place under the liberal belief in its universality. A few of these attempts succeeded, most notably the integration of China into the global economy. Many other liberalizing endeavours failed, notably democracy-promotion in China, Russia and the Middle East. Yet, both the successes and the failures resulted in the rise of illiberal elements in the West as reflected in Brexit and Trumpism. The article shows how the outcomes of the attempts at liberalization—both the failures and the successes—generated these populist forces. The Chinese economic success took place at least partly because of the US-led integration of China into the international order. Yet, this success produced adverse economic effects in the West. Such outcomes led to the rise of economic populism. The American liberal interventions in the Middle East affected the rise of terrorism and of Muslim migration to the West. These developments influenced the rise of cultural populism in the West, which advances resentment of foreigners, migrants and minorities.