NEUSPEH ŽENEVSKIH PREGOVORA O PREKIDU RATA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI JANUARA 1993.

The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia was created in London in August of 1992 as an instrument for the negotiations conducted by the United Nations and the European Community, represented by Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen. Until the end of the year, they developed a detailed proposal to settle the Bosnian conflict, known as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). The VOPP was presented to the leaders of the warring factions in Geneva during the first session of talks in January of 1993. On the basis of archive material, judicial records, published documents, and memoirs of the participants, this article aims to reconstruct the dramatic negotiation process, which consisted of several rounds. An analysis of the declared Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian positions during the negotiations, as well as the interactions among the delegations and relations within them, reveals that all the parties were had been deeply engaged in double dealing. The Croatian side was seemingly ready to sign the VOPP but was undermining it by launching a conflict in the field at the same time. The Serbian side was escalating as well, the Bosnian Serb leaders were not ready to accept the plan, despite the suggestions they had received from Belgrade. Sarajevo was procrastinating, hoping for a direct US involvement in the crisis following the inauguration of the new Clinton Administration. That administration did undermine the plan, which damaged the credibility of the international negotiators. In such circumstances, the plan had slim chances of succeeding. Although a ceasefire would have shortened the Bosnian war by almost three years and cut human losses by at least half, the main negotiators found a compromise solution to be unacceptable. As they defined and propagated maximalist goals, acceptance of a compromise was both damaging their grip on power and defying their worldview.

The Clinton Healthcare Reform Plan: A Resort to Place

Geographers have given little attention to the attempts by the Clinton administration to reform the US health care “system”. This paper considers the use of spatialized language in key documents and debates associated with the reform process. It considers the ways in which the administration exercised a Foucauldian form of governmentality appealing to interest groups and individuals on the basis of notions of place-in-society, place-in-life cycle, place-in-health care system and geographical place. These tactics are set in the context of the identified key principles underpinning the need for reform. The paper concludes by suggesting that whilst Clinton, in his attempts to achieve health care reform, may have appeared politically naive, his strategic use of sense of place was, on the contrary, very perceptive.

The Peace versus Justice Debate Revisited

Critics of international criminal tribunals (ICTs) charge that they undermine peace processes. Advocates of ICTs maintain that there can be no peace without justice. There is still much to learn about wartime ICTs’ impact on peace processes. This chapter addresses how the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) affected efforts to end the Bosnian War. Drawing on over 100 interviews with key stakeholders from the Bosnian peace process, and declassified data from the Clinton administration, the chapter finds that ICTY played a key role in facilitating peace efforts. Among other things, the ICTY’s indictments strengthened mediators’ hand in implementing crucial participation decisions. The ICTY also helped parties to overcome commitment problems. The analysis suggests that the ICTY’s cautious approach to indicting top leaders, coupled with the fact that mediators exercised discretion over the arrest and transfer of suspects, both capture why the ICTY facilitated, versus undermined peace efforts.

Countering Harmful Tax Practices

This chapter shows that the Clinton administration promoted an international campaign against underregulated financial centers. It did so because it was concerned about the impact of tax havens on the perceived fairness of the US tax system, international financial stability, and the US sanctions regime. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), however, made the strategic mistake to tackle tax evasion by individuals and tax avoidance by multinationals in a single project, creating opposition from business associations in the United States and elsewhere. Instead of credibly linking noncompliance with OECD recommendations to economic sanctions, the Clinton administration thus accepted the severe dilution of the harmful tax competition initiative's anti-avoidance elements even before the Bush administration took office in 2001. A nested comparison of two unilateral tax initiatives moreover reveals that the Clinton administration generally failed to pass regulations curbing tax avoidance but succeeded in passing regulations against tax evasion.

From Pararepublic to Parastate: International Leverage in Shaping Kosovo’s Secession

The Kosovo Albanian political movement in the 1990s contained three fluctuating factions with distinct strategies: boycotting Serbian institutions, participating in elections, and resorting to an armed insurgency. This article shows how expectations of external assistance, primarily from the Clinton administration, influenced which strategy was to dominate the movement at certain periods. It also shows how the movement successfully conflated the issues of human rights and the ethnonationalist secessionist agenda, even though the secessionist agenda predated the claims of human rights violations following the rise of Slobodan Milošević to power in Serbia. In the end, the article discusses how the Clinton administration’s failure in the Rambouillet peace talks, the diplomatic result of the NATO attack on Serbia, and the fall of Slobodan Milošević set the foundations for freezing the conflict and turning Kosovo into a parastate.