European War and Ethnic Mobilization

2021 ◽  
pp. 151-170
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
pp. 129-155
Author(s):  
Stephen Castles ◽  
Alastair Davidson
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (7) ◽  
pp. 831-867 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle L. Marquardt

The disintegration of the Soviet Union is an essential case for the study of ethnic politics and identity-based mobilization. However, analyses in this article demonstrate that commonly used measures of ethnic diversity and politically relevant group concentration show little consistent relationship with events of ethnic mobilization in Soviet regions during the period 1987-1992. In contrast, the proportion of a regional population that did not speak a metropolitan language has a consistently strong negative relationship with mobilization across these regions. In line with recent work on identity politics, I argue that a lack of proficiency in a metropolitan language marks nonspeakers as outsiders and hinders their social mobility. Regions with many of these individuals thus have a relatively high potential for identity-based mobilization. These findings provide further impetus for looking beyond ethnic groups in measuring identity-based cleavages, and indicate that language can play an important role in political outcomes aside from proxying ethnicity.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Ochieng' Opalo ◽  
Leonardo R. Arriola ◽  
Donghyun Danny Choi ◽  
Matthew Gichohi

In order to comply with electoral rules incentivizing cross-ethnic mobilization, candidates in divided societies often campaign in opponents’ strongholds among non-coethnics. In this paper, we show that such cross-ethnic campaign rallies may actually depress outgroup candidates’ support among non-coethnics. We argue that candidates’ holding of campaign rallies in non-coethnic constituencies can inadvertently trigger perceptions of intergroup competition, increase the salience of ethnicity, and depress support for non-coethnic candidates. We leverage a natural experiment that exploits the timing of an unscheduled campaign rally held by a presidential candidate in a non-coethnic county in his opponent’s stronghold during Kenya’s 2017 election. In comparing survey respondents before and after the rally, we find that the candidate’s post-rally favorability significantly decreased among non-coethnic voters, while the proportion of voters identifying in ethnic terms simultaneously increased. These findings have important implications for the efficacy of institutional design to promote cross-ethnic political mobilization in polarized societies.


2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 925-939
Author(s):  
Roland Spickermann

Discussions about ethnic mobilization in eastern Europe have emphasized efforts of nationalist leaders to demarcate their community from their neighbors in mixed areas where ethnic boundaries and identities were blurred. Demarcation became a common means of defining the community both geographically and culturally, a process which later facilitated the community's mobilization. In the German Empire, however, the Polish-German demarcation was already stark, since it mostly coincided with Catholic-Protestant demarcations. But while the Polish community mobilized quickly and showed great solidarity, the German community did not. Using the Bromberg/Bydgoszcz administrative district as a model, the article argues that the local German community's internal divisions limited its ability to mobilize. Germans agreed on the need for greater German community solidarity, but differed on conceptualizations of its ideal structure and form. Liberal nationalists, envisioning a more egalitarian community defined by a common ethnicity, fought with local conservatives, who were as intent on preserving their prominence within the community as they were on struggling with the Poles. Such divisions crippled local German mobilization on any scale comparable to their Polish neighbors, suggesting that an ethnic community's self-demarcation is necessary but not sufficient to ensure its mobilization.


Author(s):  
Manuel Vogt

This chapter introduces the puzzle that the book seeks to explain. Ethnic movements—that is, organized political campaigns by groups whose collective identity is defined by language, religion, or other ethnic markers to influence state policy—have haunted politics in almost all of today’s states. Yet, while they have provoked violent conflict in some countries, they have remained peaceful in others. Strikingly, some of the most unequal societies of today’s world have experienced mostly nonviolent ethnic group mobilization. Starting from concrete case examples, the chapter presents the book’s central question: why is ethnic mobilization more likely to trigger violent conflict in some countries than in others? By discussing the merits and shortcomings of existing studies, it reveals the need for a theory that explains both why ethnic groups rebel and how they rebel. The chapter then describes the study’s empirical approach and outlines the plan of the book.


2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Brosché ◽  
Hanne Fjelde ◽  
Kristine Höglund

Why do the first multiparty elections after authoritarian rule turn violent in some countries but not in others? This article places legacies from the authoritarian past at the core of an explanation of when democratic openings become associated with electoral violence in multi-ethnic states, and complement existing research focused on the immediate conditions surrounding the elections. We argue that authoritarian rule characterized by more exclusionary multi-ethnic coalitions creates legacies that amplify the risk of violent elections during the shift to multiparty politics. Through competitive and fragmented interethnic relations, exclusionary systems foreclose the forging of cross-ethnic elite coalitions and make hostile narratives a powerful tool for political mobilization. By contrast, regimes with a broad-based ethnic support base cultivate inclusive inter-elite bargaining, enable cross-ethnic coalitions, and reduce incentives for hostile ethnic mobilization, which lower the risk of violent elections. We explore this argument by comparing founding elections in Zambia (1991), which were largely peaceful, and Kenya (1992), with large-scale state-instigated electoral violence along ethnic lines. The analysis suggests that the type of authoritarian rule created political legacies that underpinned political competition and mobilization during the first multiparty elections, and made violence a more viable electoral strategy in Kenya than in Zambia.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-297
Author(s):  
Bert Klandermans
Keyword(s):  

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