Manifest Destiny and the Regular Army

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (22) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Keith Simonton
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah K.M. Rodriguez

Between 1820 and 1827 approximately 1,800 U.S. citizens immigrated to northern Mexico as part of that country’s empresario program, in which the federal government granted foreigners land if they promised to develop and secure the region. Historians have long argued that these settlers, traditionally seen as the vanguard of Manifest Destiny, were attracted to Mexico for its cheap land and rich natural resources. Such interpretations have lent a tone of inevitability to events like the Texas Revolution. This article argues that the early members of these groups were attracted to Mexico for chiefly political reasons. At a time when the United States appeared to be turning away from its commitment to a weak federal government, Mexico was establishing itself on a constitution that insured local sovereignty and autonomy. Thus, the Texas Revolution was far from the result of two irreconcilable peoples and cultures. Moreover, the role that these settlers played in the United States’ acquisition of not just Texas, but ultimately half of Mexico’s national territory, was more paradoxical than inevitable.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 245-264
Author(s):  
Andrey Ganin

The document published is a letter from the commander of the Kiev Region General Abram M. Dragomirov to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia General Anton I. Denikin of December, 1919. The source covers the events of the Civil War in Ukraine and the views of the leadership of the White Movement in the South of Russia on a number of issues of policy and strategy in Ukraine. The letter was found in the Hoover Archives of Stanford University in the USA in the collection of Lieutenant General Pavel A. Kusonsky. The document refers to the period when the white armies of the South of Russia after the bright success of the summer-autumn “March on Moscow” in 1919 were stopped by the Red Army and were forced to retreat. On the pages of the letter, Dragomirov describes in detail the depressing picture of the collapse of the white camp in the South of Russia and talks about how to improve the situation. Dragomirov saw the reasons for the failure of the White Movement such as, first of all, the lack of regular troops, the weakness of the officers, the lack of discipline and, as a consequence, the looting and pogroms. In this regard, Dragomirov was particularly concerned about the issue of moral improvement of the army. Part of the letter is devoted to the issues of the civil administration in the territories occupied by the White Army. Dragomirov offers both rational and frankly utopian measures. However, the thoughts of one of the closest Denikin’s companions about the reasons what had happened are interesting for understanding the essence of the Civil War and the worldview of the leadership of the anti-Bolshevik Camp.


1948 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 466-466
Author(s):  
Pierre Vilar

« Amérique du Sud », « Latino », « Hispano », « Ibéro-Amérique » : l'auteur emploïe ces mots et ne choisit pas. II. est difficile de croire qu'il se leurre, ayant voyagé, sur l'unité qu'ils recouvrent. C'est devant son sujet qu'il y a unité : devant le grand Etat du Nord qui a réussi, et qui, depuis un siècle, périodiquement, sous des formes diverses, laisse entendre qu'il parle en maître, où le continent non anglo-saxon réagit sourdement, subit un complexe commun. C'est du moins ce qui s'impose à l'esprit quand an lit cette curieuse introduction de soixante-quinze pages que M. ALBERTO SANCHEZ a appelée « prejuicio », soit, au choix, « préjugé » ou « pré jugement ». On y voit, de naïfs élans d'une admiration comme filiale, toujours devant un nom d'homme : Washington, Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt. Et de dures réalités, qui, elles, ne meurent pas, et prennent des noms de slogans : « Doctrine de Monroe », « Manifest Destiny », « Dollar diplomacy », ” Big Stick », « I took Panama ».


Author(s):  
David G. Morgan-Owen

The period 1904–6 proved to be a fateful one for the CID. The government successfully divorced the Regular Army from its defensive duties and re-orientated it towards operations overseas—the necessary first step to producing a more coherent, complementary approach to imperial defence. Yet despite this change in military policy, the CID failed to become a forum in which the two services could debate and co-operate in the interests of producing a cohesive grand strategy. Political intervention thus merely changed the parameters within which quasi-independent naval and military strategies continued to compete, intersect, and diverge—to the detriment of overall British readiness for war.


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