An Important Question, Its Easy Answer, and the Consequent Paradox

2020 ◽  
pp. 3-14
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 01-06
Author(s):  
Mariana Malvezzi ◽  
Tassara Tassara

Identity acts as a nucleus to the subject's references, their memories, their choices of life, to the construction of their history. Identity is, therefore, a minimal cellular basis from which life develops in its poetics of creation. The construction of identity thus has potential for the development of a critique, the establishment of a grammar of rules and conditions, for standing before the world. The path towards emancipation implies in exercising an external look at one's identity, the inherent existing narrative, to discover the paradigm of the minimum base from which one's life develops. With the increasing complexity of the postcolonial world, no straight or easy answer is at hand. The effort should draw towards the construction of conceptual tools that can enable reflection and critique. The humanities education, is one possible tool towards autonomy and emancipation once it encourages knowledge, construction and appraisal. The reflections brought to light through this work intends to fertilize the discussions about identity construction in the Brazilian present day context, characterized by a discourse that foster ruptures and decreases the possibilities of one’s identity. For this purpose, the current challenge of emancipation, will be developed through 6 analytical semantic dimensions which express the diversity and complexity of the actual scenario: Understanding identity, (CIAMPA, 1987; RICOEUR, 1990), as the synthetic goal of existence has the dynamism to give new possibilities to the frontier-men (HARTOG, 2004; LEVINÁS, 1972), whose challenge is the gain of consciousness of one’s own movement in the world. Marked by perversity (HONNETH, 2003) the present world enforces political, social, motivational, and subjective domination (CASTORIADIS, 1987). This scenario compels the frontier-men towards an emptied signifier alienating his possibilities of recognition. The search for emancipation (HABERMAS, 1983) asks for a critical look at the current formation of people's strategic thinking.


Author(s):  
A. F. Garvie

Ajax, perhaps the earliest surviving tragedy of Sophocles, presents the downfall and disgrace of a great hero whose suicide leads to his rehabilitation through the enlightened magnanimity of one of his enemies. This edition attempts to show that Sophocles offers no easy answer to the question of why Ajax falls, and no simple solution to the problem of how we ought to live so as to avoid tragedy in our own lives. The introductory chapter focuses on Ajax, as one of the major characters in Homer's Iliadand the only hero in the story that never received direct help from a god. It looks into the Odyssey, which provides the earliest reference of Sophocles being concerned with Ajax. The next chapter provides the original text of Sophocles's play about Ajax. It talks about how the play began with the death of Achilles and Ajax's desire to be rewarded with his armor. It also mentions Ajax's shame and intention of suicide after killing Agamemnon and Menelaus when they gave Achilles's armor to Oddyseus. The chapter discusses the ending of the play in which Odysseus insisted that Ajax should be buried properly. The final chapter gives the commentary for the play. It talks about how Sophocles began his plays with dialogue in order to provide the audience with information about the story. It also mentions the introduction of Odysseus and reveal of Athena as the goddess in the beginning of the play. This chapter analyses the relationships among Ajax, Odysseus, and Athena. The book presents Greek text with facing-page English translation, introduction and extensive commentary.


Bridges ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-49
Author(s):  
L. A. Reed
Keyword(s):  

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 72 (6) ◽  
pp. 910-910
Author(s):  
FRANK A. OSKI

In Reply.— Dine raises a very important question which is continuously posed by the pediatrician in practice-what is the best (simple, inexpensive, and sensitive) test to determine whether an infant or child has iron deficiency? If there were an easy answer, this question would not be repeatedly asked. No single laboratory test is sufficiently sensitive and specific to detect all patients with iron deficiency or even iron deficiency anemia.1 For example, it has been demonstrated that close to one third of infants with hemoglobin in the low-normal range (11.0 to 11.4 g/dL) will display a significant increase in hemoglobin following a therapeutic trial of iron.2


Author(s):  
A.P. Martinich

According to Hobbes, God is a natural sovereign because of his omnipotence, not because of his goodness or creation. The relation between power and kingship is also expressed in the idea of Yahweh as a warrior god, for example in Deuteronomy and the Book of Psalms. Kings, “mortal gods,” need power to protect their subjects and could only do so if they had properties similar to those attributed to God. In the seventeenth-century, intellectuals sometimes made God the model for human sovereigns, and sometimes the reverse. Since both God and human sovereigns are owed obedience, a troubling question arises: “Should human beings obey God or their sovereign if there is a conflict?” Hobbes has an easy answer. God commands people to obey their human sovereign. Arash Abizadeh’s interpretation that God is a person by fiction is refuted.


1995 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-275
Author(s):  
Colin Renfrew ◽  
Theodora Bynon ◽  
Merritt Ruhlen ◽  
Aron Dolgopolsky ◽  
Peter Bellwood

There are few aspects of human behaviour more fundamental than our ability to use language. Language plays a key role in the study of any living human society, and of all historical communities which have left us written records. In theory it could also throw enormous light on the development and relationships of prehistoric human communities. But here there is a huge and obvious problem: what evidence can there be for human languages in the pre-literate, prehistoric age? In other words, what hope is therefor a prehistory of linguistics? There is no easy answer, yet it is hard to accept that any account of human prehistory can be considered adequate without some knowledge of prehistoric languages and linguistic relationships, if only at the broadest scale.The list of questions we might wish to pose stretches back to the period of the very earliest hominids. When did our human ancestors first begin to talk to each other? Was language acquisition sudden or gradual? Did human language arise in one place, and then spread and diversify from- that point? Or did it emerge independently, among separate groups of early humans in different parts of the world?Leading on from this is the study of ethnicity and ethnogenesis. Since the end of the nineteenth century one of the biggest problems facing prehistoric archaeologists has been the identification and interpretation of archaeological cultures and cultural groups. Do these have any social or ethnic reality? Is it right to speak of a Beaker ‘folk’? Was the Bandkeramik colonization the work of one people or of many? These questions would be so much easier to resolve if only we could trace the prehistory of languages, and could establish, for instance, whether all Bandkeramik and Beaker users spoke the same or a related language.Such possibilities may seem exciting and hopeful to some, irredeemably optimistic to others. Whatever view we take, they clearly merit serious discussion. In the present Viewpoint, our third in the series, we have asked five writers — two archaeologists (Renfrew & Bellwood), three linguists (Bynon, Ruhlen & Dolgopolsky) — to give their own, personal response to the key question ‘Is there a prehistory of linguistics?’ Can we, from the evidence of archaeology, linguistics (and now DNA studies), say anything positive about langtiage in prehistory?


Author(s):  
C. M. M. Olfert

Aristotle famously holds that practical reason is different from other kinds of reason, including theoretical and technical reason. But in virtue of what is it different? On a standard interpretation, which I call the “Objects View,” Aristotle holds that practical reason is distinct because it thinks about a distinct kind of object or subject matter: it thinks about things that can be brought about or affected by our actions. But this view is unsatisfying. Why, we might wonder, should we need an entirely different kind of reason in order to think about a specific kind of object? As my account of practical truth shows, there is an easy answer to this objection. Aristotle does not distinguish practical reason from other kinds of reason by the object it thinks about. I explain the many difficulties with the Objects View as an interpretation of Aristotle in this chapter.


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