Paradoxes of Rationalisation: Openness and Control in Critical Theory and Luhmann's Systems Theory

For the Critical Theory tradition of the Frankfurt School, rationalisation is a central concept that refers to the socio-cultural closure of capitalist modernity due to the proliferation of technical, ‘instrumental’ rationality at the expense of some form of political reason. This picture of rationalisation, however, hinges on a separation of technology and politics that is both empirically and philosophically problematic. This article aims to re-conceptualise the rationalisation thesis through a survey of research from science and technology studies and the conceptual framework of Niklas Luhmann's systems theory. It argues that rationalisation indeed exhibits a logic of closure, namely the ‘operational closure’ of sociotechnical systems of measurement, but that this closure in fact produces the historical logics of technical reason and, paradoxically, also generates spaces of critical-political openness. This opens up the theoretical and practical opportunity of connecting the politically just to the technically efficient.

The Practical-Technical Reason in the Aristotelian Concept of the Faculties of the Soul

When analyzing the structure of the soul, Aristotle distinguished three faculties: the theoretical, the practical and the technical one. The latter two are the focus of this paper. The division could be perceived as an abstract description of diverse functions and purposes of the faculties, but it does not imply factual dissociation between them if we take under consideration their functioning. On the contrary, Aristotle suggested that it would be impossible to detach the practical reasoning from the operational one, for the former stipulated the goal, whereas the latter provided the means for its fulfillment. The genuine intellectual disposition, which supplements the practical reason with the proper means was referred to as ‘cleverness’ (δεινότης). Cleverness has usually been associated with the technical faculty but it also seems to be, first and foremost, the disposition to inventiveness in a broader sense. Although Aristotle did not formulate this directly, it is plausible to view the practical and technical faculty as depending on each other, as far as their products and works are useful to pursue the practical goals and the practical reasoning determines the extent of the possibilities and limitations of their utility in the field of politics. The disposition to cleverness made the cooperation of those faculties possible.

The Practical-Technical Reason in the Aristotelian Concept of the Faculties of the Soul

When analyzing the structure of the soul, Aristotle distinguished three faculties: the theoretical, the practical and the technical one. The latter two are the focus of this paper. The division could be perceived as an abstract description of diverse functions and purposes of the faculties, but it does not imply factual dissociation between them if we take under consideration their functioning. On the contrary, Aristotle suggested that it would be impossible to detach the practical reasoning from the operational one, for the former stipulated the goal, whereas the latter provided the means for its fulfillment. The genuine intellectual disposition, which supplements the practical reason with the proper means was referred to as ‘cleverness’ (δεινότης). Cleverness has usually been associated with the technical faculty but it also seems to be, first and foremost, the disposition to inventiveness in a broader sense. Although Aristotle did not formulate this directly, it is plausible to view the practical and technical faculty as depending on each other, as far as their products and works are useful to pursue the practical goals and the practical reasoning determines the extent of the possibilities and limitations of their utility in the field of politics. The disposition to cleverness made the cooperation of those faculties possible.

Fair Chance and not a Blunt Refusal

Newly found documents demonstrate that Alfred Nobel’s 1887 patented smokeless Ballistite gunpowder was tested by the French Army in 1889, yielding unimpressive results. This and other technical reasons were the basis for final 1889 French rejection rather than political motives, as claimed by Nobel, repeated by an influential 1962 biography, and echoed on a current Nobel website. Nobel offered Ballistite to the French military in late 1887, but was refused by 1888 since the French smokeless poudre B of 1884 was already employed and Ballistite was considered erosive and unsafe to produce. However, letters from French officials (and the intervention of the French Minister of War) confirm that Ballistite was indeed tested by the French military in 1889. Ballistic results in the 8 mm Lebel rifle were unfavorable and this seems the final technical reason for the rejection, rather than French interests in promoting their supposedly inferior propellant. This case study highlights the question of balance between technical and social history of military technology. The latter, examining social factors often ignored in various past military technological histories, have shown to shape inventions. In this case, though, the author of the influential Nobel biography has missed the complex technical history of the issue, relying on the personal and political for explaining the decisions.

“Ruinensehnsucht”: Longing for Decay in Computer Games

There is no technical reason and no quality inherent to the medium of computer games that would require corrosion, dust, and ruins. Pixels do not corrode and 3D geometry is not affected by physical decay. Yet if we look at contemporary computer games we find an abundance of ruined buildings, of mould and of all forms of decay of organic matter and inorganic materials. It would be too easy to explain this fact by an attempt to increase realism, because some of these games clearly feature more decay than reality could ever produce. There must be a longing by designers and players to immerse themselves within an environment of disintegrating, decaying objects. The author investigates the longing for decay along four threads that are informed by computer games history, art history, psychoanalytic reasoning and the concept of transmedia megatext.

Aristotle on the Distinctness of Practical Reason

Aristotle famously holds that practical reason is different from other kinds of reason, including theoretical and technical reason. But in virtue of what is it different? On a standard interpretation, which I call the “Objects View,” Aristotle holds that practical reason is distinct because it thinks about a distinct kind of object or subject matter: it thinks about things that can be brought about or affected by our actions. But this view is unsatisfying. Why, we might wonder, should we need an entirely different kind of reason in order to think about a specific kind of object? As my account of practical truth shows, there is an easy answer to this objection. Aristotle does not distinguish practical reason from other kinds of reason by the object it thinks about. I explain the many difficulties with the Objects View as an interpretation of Aristotle in this chapter.

Technical Reason and Political Reason: Spaces/Times Not Considered

This speech was written in memory of Norbert Lechner.

Dictionary of Qur'anic Terms and Concepts

A long-awaited Muslim source and a nonorientalist handy reference book,this glossary (a more appropriate title for this dictionary) of the Qur'an fillsa major vacuum. To date, we had to rely solely on Penrice’s Dictionary andGlossary of the Qur'an. This process of generating sources (indexes,bibliographies, handbooks, dictionaries, glossaries, and the like) - a soleprerogative of the Western world-has recently been taken up by Muslims.A healthy trend in this regard is visible in the source under review.Though this book has covered mainly Qur’anic terms and concepts, ithas admittedly entered into the field of non-Qur’anic terms. This extensionof scope makes it more useful to the community of scholars and studentsof the Qur’an. As the author rightly mentions in his introduction: “In a fewcases, the Arabic terms used are the ones that have become traditionallyaccepted, even though they do not occur in the Qur’an (i.e., wudu') or occurin it in a different sense (i.e. qadhf); these include, in one or two cases,words which for some technical reason are to be regarded as ‘extra-Qur‘anic’even when words from the same root and with the same basic meaning occurin the Qur’an-i.e., bay'ah, though mubaya'ah (in perfect and imperfect forms,that is) occurs in the Qur'an” (pp. xiii-xiv).Mir has used the generally accepted meanings and notions in his scholarlywork. His explanations and notes are interesting and meaningful. For instance,explaining the term “Median Community” or “Ummah Wasat,” he goes onto say that the title of ”Median Community” is not only a prerogative, butalso carries with it a responsibility-the responsibility to stay on the medianpath and guide others to it (p. 132). Similarly, under the term “Repentance”we find “Adam, after he had sinned, repented and was forgiven by God (237).Thus, he was sent upon earth not to receive punishment for his disobedience,but in accordance with an already existing plan. Since Adam was forgiven,no original sin attaches to the human race” (p. 180). Similarly, we find atanother place: “Din has four meanings: 1. Submission . . . 2. A system ofbeliefs . . . 3. Law . . . and 4. Recompense . . .” (p. 49) ...