Do Donors Discount Low-Quality Accounting Information?

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 1041-1067 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle H. Yetman ◽  
Robert J. Yetman
Keyword(s):  
Accounting Information ◽  
Financial Data ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fund Balances ◽  
Complex Methods ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT Prior research finds that donors reward nonprofits that report larger program ratios with more donations and that program ratios frequently are subject to intentional manipulation as well as unintentional errors. We examine how donors react to low-quality ratios. We find that the average donor discounts ratios that are inflated by only the simplest and most observable of methods. We then examine the effect of financial data availability on the average donor's ability to unravel inflated ratios by using the historical shift in data availability that occurred in 1997 and 1998. We find that donors began to discount ratios only after 1998. Finally, we examine whether the discount applied to program ratios varies across donor sophistication (measured as the percentage of fund balances with restrictions) and find that sophisticated donors apply incrementally larger discounts to inflated ratios and discount ratios that are inflated by more complex methods. JEL Classifications: G1; G18; G3; G38; L3; L30; L31; M4; M41; M43; M48 Data Availability: The data are available from public sources identified in this study.

Analysts, Taxes, and the Information Environment

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sangwan Kim ◽  
Andrew P. Schmidt ◽  
Kelly Wentland
Keyword(s):  
Accounting Information ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Information Environment ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Complete Understanding ◽  
The Public ◽  
Earnings Information ◽  
Earnings Components ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the extent to which analysts incorporate tax-based earnings information into their earnings forecasts relative to other earnings information. We find that analysts' misreaction to tax-based earnings information is distinct from their misreaction to other (nontax) accounting information, on average. We then show that analysts differ in their misestimation of tax and other (nontax) earnings components only when firms have weak information environments; when firms have strong information environments, analysts' forecasts fully incorporate tax-based earnings information and exhibit no difference incorporating tax-based earnings information relative to other accounting information. Our evidence suggests that, on average, forecasting tax-based earnings information is more difficult for analysts relative to forecasting other accounting information. However, access to appropriate information and resources enables analysts to better process tax information. Overall, we contribute to the literature by providing a more complete understanding of the source of analysts' tax-related forecast errors. JEL Classifications: H25; M41; D82; G14. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources identified in the text.

Interim Reporting Frequency and the Mispricing of Accruals

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Shou-Min Tsao ◽  
Hsueh-Tien Lu ◽  
Edmund C. Keung
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Sample Composition ◽  
Reporting Frequency ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Accrual Mispricing

SYNOPSIS This study examines the association between mandatory financial reporting frequency and the accrual anomaly. Based on regulatory changes in reporting frequency requirements in Taiwan, we divide our sample period into three reporting regimes: a semiannual reporting regime from 1982 to 1985, a quarterly reporting regime from 1986 to 1987, and a monthly reporting regime (both quarterly financial reports and monthly revenue disclosure) from 1988 to 1993. We find that although both switches (from the semiannual reporting regime to the quarterly reporting regime and from the quarterly reporting regime to the monthly reporting regime) hasten the dissemination of the information contained in annual accruals into stock prices and reduce annual accrual mispricing, the switch to monthly reporting has a lesser effect. Our results are robust to controlling for risk factors, transaction costs, and potential changes in accrual, cash flow persistence, and sample composition over time. These results imply that more frequent reporting is one possible mechanism to reduce accrual mispricing. JEL Classifications: G14; L51; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Teleological versus Non-Teleological Perspectives in Financial Statement: The Debate between Chambers and Onida

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-179
Author(s):  
Enrico Gonnella ◽  
Lucia Talarico
Keyword(s):  
Accounting Information ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Pure Science ◽  
Scientific Debate ◽  
Multiple Realities ◽  
Italian Journal ◽  
Italian Author ◽  
Objective Being ◽  
Chartered Accountants ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the scientific debate that took place in 1973 in the journal Rivista dei Dottori Commercialisti (Italian Journal of Chartered Accountants) between Pietro Onida and Raymond J. Chambers concerning the nature of financial statement information. Our research revealed that Onida was the advocate of a teleological theory of the financial statement, whereas Chambers supported the perfect neutrality of accounting information. Going back to theoretical precedents, the thoughts of the two scholars have different ontological and epistemological assumptions. If, ontologically, Chambers conceives reality as unique and objective, being inspired by the neopositivism of the “received view,” Onida admits the existence of multiple realities by adopting an interpretivist perspective. Epistemologically, the Australian scholar approaches accounting as a pure science by leveraging its deductive moment rather than empirical recognition, whereas the Italian author conceives accounting as an “application science” and adopts a method where the inductive approach prevails.JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M49.

Tax-Advantaged Trust Use Among IPO Executives: Determinants and Implications for Valuation and Future Performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 145-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Dambra ◽  
Matthew Gustafson ◽  
Phillip J. Quinn
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Estate Taxes ◽  
Price Appreciation ◽  
One Year ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine the prevalence and determinants of CEOs' use of tax-advantaged trusts prior to their firm's IPO. Twenty-three percent of CEOs use tax-advantaged pre-IPO trusts, and share transfers into tax-advantaged trusts are positively associated with CEO equity wealth, estate taxes, and dynastic preferences. We project that pre-IPO trust use increases CEOs' dynastic wealth by approximately $830,000, on average. We next examine a simple model's prediction that trust use will be positively related to IPO-period stock price appreciation. We find that trust use is associated with 12 percent higher one-year post-IPO returns, but is not significantly related to the IPO's valuation, filing price revision, or underpricing. This evidence is consistent with CEOs' personal finance decisions prior to the IPO containing value-relevant information that is not immediately incorporated into market prices. JEL Classifications: D14; G12; G32; M21; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Concurrent Earnings Announcements and Analysts' Information Production

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Driskill ◽  
Marcus P. Kirk ◽  
Jennifer Wu Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Announcements ◽  
Financial Analysts ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Conference Calls ◽  
Stock Recommendations ◽  
Rich Information ◽  
Sample Firm ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine whether financial analysts are subject to limited attention. We find that when analysts have another firm in their coverage portfolio announcing earnings on the same day as the sample firm (a “concurrent announcement”), they are less likely to issue timely earnings forecasts for the sample firm's subsequent quarter than analysts without a concurrent announcement. Among the analysts who issue timely earnings forecasts, the thoroughness of their work decreases as their number of concurrent announcements increases. In addition, analysts are more sluggish in providing stock recommendations and less likely to ask questions in earnings conference calls as their number of concurrent announcements increases. Moreover, when analysts face concurrent announcements, they tend to allocate their limited attention to firms that already have rich information environments, leaving behind firms in need of attention. Overall, our evidence suggests that even financial analysts, who serve as information specialists, are subject to limited attention. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Come on Over: Analyst/Investor Days as a Disclosure Medium

2016 ◽  
Vol 91 (6) ◽  
pp. 1725-1750 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus P. Kirk ◽  
Stanimir Markov
Keyword(s):  
Information Content ◽  
Short Duration ◽  
Price Impact ◽  
Senior Management ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Temporal Proximity ◽  
Conference Presentations ◽  
Close Temporal Proximity ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT Our study introduces analyst/investor days, a new disclosure medium that allows for private interactions with influential market participants. We also highlight interdependencies in the choice and information content of analyst/investor days and conference presentations, a well-researched disclosure medium that similarly allows for private interactions. Analyst/investor days are less frequent, but with longer duration and greater price impact than conference presentations. They are mostly hosted by firms that already have opportunities to interact with investors at conferences, but whose complex and diverse activities make the short duration and rigid format of a conference presentation an imperfect solution to these firms' information problems. Analyst/investor days and conference presentations tend to occur in different quarters, consistent with their competing for the time and attention of senior management. When these two mediums are scheduled in close temporal proximity to each other, analyst/investor days diminish the information content of conference presentations, but not vice versa, consistent with managers' favoring analyst/investor days over conference presentations as a disclosure medium. JEL Classifications: D82; M41; G11; G12; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Auditors and the Principal-Principal Agency Conflict in Family Controlled Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-55
Author(s):  
Chiraz Ben Ali ◽  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Michel Magnan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
The Public ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY This paper examines whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) affect audit fees in firms where the largest controlling shareholder (LCS) is a family. Results show that there is a negative relationship between audit fees and the presence, number, and voting power of MLS. This is consistent with the view that auditors consider MLS as playing a monitoring role over the LCS, mitigating the potential for expropriation by the LCS. Therefore, our evidence suggests that auditors reduce their audit risk assessment and audit effort and ultimately audit fees in family controlled firms with MLS. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; M42; D86.

The Association between Audit Manager and Auditor-In-Charge Experience, Effort, and Risk Responsiveness

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 121-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Contessotto ◽  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Robyn A. Moroney
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Core ◽  
Specific Experience ◽  
Primary Core ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Audit Team ◽  
Industry Experience ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Core Role

SUMMARY Audit quality is dependent on the experience and effort of the audit team to identify and respond to client risks (risk responsiveness). Central to each team are the core role holders who plan and execute the audit. While many studies treat the partner as the primary core role holder, the manager and auditor-in-charge (AIC) are also important. Using data for engagements from two midtier firms, we analyze the association between the experience and relative effort of the manager and AIC and risk responsiveness. We find a manager's client-specific experience is associated with risk responsiveness for non-listed clients but find no evidence that the general or industry experience of a manager, or the experience of the AIC, is associated with risk responsiveness. The client-specific experience and relative effort of the partner is associated with risk responsiveness. These results suggests that managers can provide an important, albeit limited, contribution to the audit. JEL Classifications: M2. Data Availability: The data were made available to the researchers on the understanding that they will remain confidential.

Active Learning, Cooperative Active Learning, and Passive Learning Methods in an Accounting Information Systems Course

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Riley ◽  
Kerry Ward
Keyword(s):  
Information Systems ◽  
Active Learning ◽  
Student Performance ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Exam Performance ◽  
Learning Methods ◽  
Accounting Information Systems ◽  
Passive Learning ◽  
Learning Conditions

ABSTRACT We report the results of a study to examine the effectiveness of active versus passive learning methods in the accounting information systems area. Two groups of students completed an assignment under two active learning conditions (individual and cooperative), while a third group covered the same topic in a passive lecture. Our findings indicate support for active learning, measured through student performance on exam questions and student feedback on a questionnaire. However, compared to passive learners, we find significantly improved exam performance only for students who work individually in an active environment. Students in the cooperative active environment posted exam scores that were not statistically different from passive participants' scores. Students in both individual and cooperative active environments reported positive feedback on satisfaction, perceived learning, and effectiveness of the method. We conclude that active learning enhances student outcomes, particularly for those who work individually. Data Availability: Data are available upon request.

scholarly journals Accounting Engineering and Management of Results

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura-Maria Popescu ◽  
Ileana Nișulescu-Ashrafzadeh
Keyword(s):  
Economic Activity ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Management Plan ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Financial Data ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Management Objectives ◽  
Economic Reality ◽  
Source Of Information ◽  
Over Time

Accounting means normally a basis while making management decisions; it is the information tool in order to highlight the strategies and to confirm their success. There are also cases where the roles are reversed and the management delineates the accounting directions according to the results obtained, thus being transformed from the company management for results to the results themselves. Even if over time, the information and activity monitoring techniques improved, the precision of the economic and financial data remains dependent on the reporting referential and the manipulation technique of the results. The article is meant to highlight the items capable to characterise the choice of a management based on results, the conditions of its development, how the financial and accounting information users are affected, particularly the investors, as well as how it can be detected. It is also highlighted the fact that the management based on results plays a very important role for the apparition and development of the accounting engineering at the level of company by the determination it exercises over the managers while achieving or surpassing the objectives. Thus, there is the issue of a false reflection of the company’s activity, regarded by the prism of the management objectives, making particularly sensitive the passage from the economic reality of the company to the management ideals of the management. The financial and accounting information remains as main source of reflection of the economic activity and of the results of these activities, both for the own managers of the entities and for the large diversity of third parties: providers, customers, employees, investors, banks, State institutions etc., that makes it vulnerable in front of the external actions. It is important that in any management plan, its accounting represents a source of information for the management and not a means of obtaining the results.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document