The Role of Accounting Conservatism in the Equity Market: Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings

2013 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 1327-1356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongtae Kim ◽  
Siqi Li ◽  
Carrie Pan ◽  
Luo Zuo

ABSTRACT Using seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from 1989 to 2008, we examine the role of accounting conservatism in the equity market. We find that issuers with a greater degree of conservatism experience fewer negative market reactions to SEO announcements. We further show that an important mechanism through which conservatism affects SEO announcement returns is by mitigating the negative impact of information asymmetry. Additional analyses suggest that our results are not driven by the effects of other forms of corporate governance. We also find evidence that conservative issuers continue to use conservative accounting after the equity offerings. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the argument that accounting conservatism reduces financing costs in SEOs. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 182-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Kang ◽  
Gerald J. Lobo ◽  
Michael C. Wolfe

Previous research shows that accounting conservatism facilitates debt contracting. Extending this line of literature, we examine whether the role of accounting conservatism in accessing external debt to attain firm growth varies with its maturity. We find evidence of a positive relationship between conservatism and debt maturity. We also observe a positive relationship between conservative accounting and future growth funded by all classes of debt, but this relation is due to long-term rather than short-term debt, which is less prone to agency risk. Furthermore, the associations between conservatism and debt maturity and conservatism and growth financed by long-term debt are mostly observed for firms with fewer anti-takeover provisions in place. These findings suggest that the demand for accounting conservatism is not uniform across different debt maturity horizons.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 1223-1236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jungeun Cho ◽  
Won-Wook Choi

This study examines the effectiveness of accounting conservatism in monitoring and controlling managers’ decision-making regarding opportunistic investment. We find that accounting conservatism is negatively associated with over-investment. This suggests that conservative accounting policies serve as an efficient monitoring and controlling mechanism for opportunistic investment decisions. We also find a stronger negative association between accounting conservatism and over-investment in firms with low managerial ownership and low ownership by foreign investors. The results of our analysis imply that the impact of timely loss recognition on over-investment is more significant in firms with high agency problems and weaker monitoring ability, and that this factor complements other governance mechanisms, thereby helping to control managers’ myopic investment decisions. We provide evidence for a role of financial disclosure in mitigating managers’ opportunistic over-investment decisions. Though managers’ over-investment decisions are motivated by private gain, which reduces firm performance and compromises investors’ welfare, limited research exists on the role of financial information in alleviating such behavior. We suggest that timely loss recognition in financial statements can serve as an effective monitoring mechanism to aid in control of managers’ myopic over-investment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (6) ◽  
pp. 77-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Hsu ◽  
Kirill E. Novoselov ◽  
Rencheng Wang

ABSTRACT Overconfident CEOs are more willing to initiate investment projects that require experimentation, yet tend to defer responding to the bad news when the project is not performing as planned. Accounting conservatism accelerates the recognition of the bad news and its dissemination to gatekeepers, making it more likely that the CEO will acknowledge the problem earlier and start searching for solutions. Therefore, firms where both characteristics—CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism—are present should perform better. Our empirical tests confirm this prediction: firms that practice conservative accounting and are run by overconfident CEOs exhibit better cash flow performance. Our results continue to hold in a variety of settings, including market reactions to acquisitions, cash flow downside risk, and analyst following. Further, the joint positive effect of CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism on firm performance is stronger in high-uncertainty environments and in firms facing less stringent financing constraints, consistent with theoretical predictions.


2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 867-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anwer S. Ahmed ◽  
Bruce K. Billings ◽  
Richard M. Morton ◽  
Mary Stanford-Harris

Using both a market-based and an accrual-based measure of conservatism, we find that firms facing more severe conflicts over dividend policy tend to use more conservative accounting. Furthermore, we document that accounting conservatism is associated with a lower cost of debt after controlling for other determinants of firms' debt costs. Our collective evidence is consistent with the notion that accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy, and in reducing firms' debt costs.


Author(s):  
Matheus da Costa Gomes ◽  
João Paulo Augusto Eça ◽  
Marcelo Botelho da Costa Moraes ◽  
Maurício Ribeiro do Valle

ABSTRACT Objective: this study aims to verify if companies that practice equity market timing have higher earnings management levels around the stock issue period. Method: we used a sample of 68 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in Brazil from 2004-2015. First, we ranked the sample among companies that used market timing (timers) behavior in the SEOs and those that did not (non-timers). Second, we estimated each company’s earnings management levels by the Modified Jones and Modified Jones with ROA models. Finally, we tested the relationship between earnings management and equity market timing using a linear regression model. Results: the results show that the timers managed earnings more intensively in the quarters around SEOs than the non-timers. This happens to increase net income and consequently improve profitability ratios. Therefore, to explore opportunity windows, managers can inflate accounting profit through accruals and influence the market’s ability to correctly price shares. Conclusion: Brazilian companies practice earnings management as a way of exploiting opportunity windows in the stock market. The conclusion reinforces the need for a careful analysis of the company’s profits by investors, analysts, auditors, and regulators while allowing efforts to avoid such practices through compliance, governance, and regulation.


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