The Debt-Equity Choice When Regulatory Thresholds are Based on Equity Values: Evidence from SOX 404

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 339-364
Author(s):  
David P. Weber ◽  
Yanhua Sunny Yang
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Economic Consequence ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
Equity Values ◽  
Market Values ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Financing Choices ◽  
Regulatory Regimes

ABSTRACT When larger market values of equity result in being subject to costly regulation, firms have incentives to shift their sources of financing toward debt and away from equity. We use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) as a setting to provide evidence of such incentives. Smaller firms were granted several reprieves and eventually exempted from the internal control audit requirements of SOX Section 404, which many consider the most costly and onerous aspect of SOX. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show that relative to control firms, firms just below the regulatory threshold have increased propensities to issue debt, decreased propensities to issue equity, and increased leverage levels in the post-SOX period. These results are consistent with firms altering their financing choices to maintain their exempt status and demonstrate an economic consequence of regulatory regimes that are tiered by equity values.

An exploration of the choice to comply voluntarily with SOX section 404(b)

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-110
Author(s):  
Alan Blankley ◽  
David Hurtt ◽  
Jason MacGregor
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Small Businesses ◽  
Small Companies ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Financial Perspective ◽  
The Law ◽  
Several Delays

Purpose Central to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was a requirement that every company have an audit of its internal control over financial reporting. However, there were concerns that this requirement was overly burdensome, from a financial perspective, for small businesses. This concern promoted several delays in enforcing the law for small companies and ultimately caused congress to permanently exempt small businesses. Yet, there are some small companies that voluntarily elect to comply with the law. The purpose of this paper is to explore why these companies elect to incur these costly audits. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 5,834 non-accelerator US firms, this paper uses a robust logistic regression model to examine why some firms comply voluntary with SOX Section 404(b). Findings This study shows that small companies getting audits of internal controls may be doing so to restore investor confidence after reporting failures, to appear credible prior to raising funds, as a response to organizational changes, or in anticipation of being required to comply. Practical implications This study provides regulators with an improved understanding of when it is necessary to implement mandatory rather than voluntary guidance. Originality/value This study is the first to document why a client would voluntarily comply with SOX Section 404 (b).

Auditor Attestation under SOX Section 404 and Earnings Informativeness

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Huajing Chen ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Heibatollah Sami ◽  
Haiyan Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Control Sample ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Test Sample ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Earnings Informativeness ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Reports ◽  
Section 302

SUMMARY Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires managers to assess, and their auditors to express an opinion on, the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). Policymakers expect the ICFR audits to enhance the credibility of firms' financial statements. Prior research argues that audit characteristics that enhance the credibility of financial reporting are associated with stronger earnings-return associations. We examine whether earnings accompanied by the first-time Section 404 ICFR reports were associated with higher informativeness compared with earnings in the prior year when only financial statement audit reports were available. We conduct our analysis for a test sample of accelerated filers with clean ICFR reports and clean previous Section 302 disclosures. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we compare the change in earnings informativeness for the test sample with that for a control sample of non-accelerated filers. We find that earnings informativeness for companies with clean internal control reports was greater in the Section 404 adoption year than in the previous year, while there was no change in earnings informativeness for the non-accelerated filers. Also, there is no difference in the increase in earnings informativeness across firms with small and large compliance costs (measured by change in audit fees), suggesting that both groups benefited from the Section 404 ICFR audits.

Observed effectiveness of the COSO 2013 framework

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-45
Author(s):  
Ifeoma Udeh
Keyword(s):  
Control Systems ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Control Process ◽  
Regression Analyses ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization’s 2013 Framework, by investigating how the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses compares for Early-, Timely- and Late-adopters of the framework, and how the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses changed for Early- and Timely-adopters following their adoption of the framework. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses regression analyses based on a sample of US firms subject to Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404(b). Findings Timely-adopters of the 2013 Framework continued to exhibit fewer instances of auditor-reported material weaknesses than Late-adopters, even though they had a marginal increase in the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses, in the post-2013 Framework period. Practical implications The findings suggest that the effectiveness of the 2013 Framework may lie in the iterative nature of the internal control process, and as firms remedy deficiencies they or their auditors identify, they will continuously improve the effectiveness of their internal control systems. Originality/value Unlike existing literature, this paper uses data from the pre-2013 Framework, transition and post-2013 Framework periods to examine changes in the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses, thus differentiating between Early-, Timely- and Late-adopters of the 2013 Framework. It also shows the effect of adopting the 2013 Framework on the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses.

The Cost of Compliance to Sarbanes-Oxley: An Examination of the Real Estate Investment Industry

2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne H. Shaw ◽  
William D. Terando
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Industrial Firms ◽  
The Real Estate ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Foreign Operations ◽  
Dichotomous Variables ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Audit Independence

SUMMARY Studies documenting the increased audit cost of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 have focused on large cross industry samples of industrial firms. To control for differences in industry and business complexities such as foreign operations or segments, these studies have relied on various dichotomous variables. In addition, the studies have either focused on the cost of Section 404 related to internal control testing or assumed that the increases in audit pricing occurred in 2002 when the law was enacted. By focusing on one industry (REITS), we find that dummy variables may not adequately capture the effect of complexity in an industry. We also show that considering within-industry variations in audit pricing leads to the conclusion that the increase due to SOX is actually lower than previously thought. Finally, by structuring the tests to measure separately for the costs of the audit independence provisions and the internal control provisions, we find that the costs of SOX were much greater than that shown in prior studies, resulting in a 200 percent increase in SOX related costs to REITs with about 75 percent of that increase related to Section 404.

Internal Control Quality and Audit Pricing under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rani Hoitash ◽  
Udi Hoitash ◽  
Jean C. Bedard
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Risk Adjustment ◽  
Initial Period ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Section 302

This paper extends prior research on audit risk adjustment by examining the association of audit pricing with problems in internal control over financial reporting, disclosed under Sections 404 and 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX]. While studies of auditors' responses to internal control risk provide mixed evidence, it is important to re-examine this issue using data on specific client problems not available prior to SOX. As a baseline, we first establish a strong association of audit fees with internal control problems disclosed in the first year of implementation of Section 404, consistent with prior research (e.g., Raghunandan and Rama 2006). We then address two issues on which prior results are contradictory. In a broadly based sample of accelerated filers, we find that audit pricing for companies with internal control problems varies by problem severity, when severity is measured either as material weaknesses versus significant deficiencies, or by nature of the problem. Also, while audit fees increase during the 404 period, our tests show less relative risk adjustment under Section 404 than under Section 302 in the prior year. Further examining intertemporal effects, we find that companies disclosing internal control problems under Section 302 continue to pay higher fees the following year, even if no problems are disclosed under Section 404. Overall, our findings provide detailed insight into audit risk adjustment during the initial period of SOX implementation.

The Impact of SOX Section 404 Internal Control Quality Assessment on Audit Delay in the SOX Era

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael L. Ettredge ◽  
Chan Li ◽  
Lili Sun
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Small Sample ◽  
Impact Factors ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Control Quality ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Specific Material ◽  
The Impact

This study analyzes the impact of internal control quality on audit delay following the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) (SOX). Unlike prior studies of audit delay that obtain information about internal control strength via surveys, or use fairly crude proxies for internal control quality, our study employs external auditor assessments of internal control over financial reporting (ICOFR) that are publicly disclosed in SEC 10-K filings under SOX Section 404. Thus, the empirical evidence provided in this study is both timely and reliable (i.e., not subject to small sample bias or weak proxies). Consistent with our expectation, we find that the presence of material weakness in ICOFR is associated with longer delays. The types of material weakness also matter. Compared to specific material weakness, general material weakness is associated with longer delays. Additional analyses indicate that companies with control problems in personnel, process and procedure, segregation of duties, and closing process experience longer delays. After controlling for other impact factors, this study also documents a significant increase in audit delay associated with the fulfillment of the SOX Section 404 ICOFR assessment requirement. This suggests that Section 404 assessments have made it more difficult for firms to comply with the SEC's desire to shorten 10-K filing deadlines. Our finding thus supports and helps explain the SEC's decisions in 2004 and 2005 to defer scheduled reductions in 10-K filing deadlines (from 75 days to 60 days) for large, accelerated filers.

SOX Section 404 Material Weakness Disclosures and Audit Fees

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Control Material ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The Mean

Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 2004) require management and the auditor to report on internal controls over financial reporting. Section 404 is arguably the most controversial element of SOX, and much of the debate around the costs of implementing section 404 has focused on auditors' fees (Ernst & Young 2005). In this paper, we examine the association between audit fees and internal control disclosures made pursuant to section 404. Our sample includes 660 manufacturing firms that have a December 31, 2004 fiscal year-end and filed the section 404 report by May 15, 2005. We find that the mean (median) audit fees for the firms in our sample for fiscal 2004 is 86 (128) percent higher than the corresponding fees for fiscal 2003. Audit fees for fiscal 2004 are 43 percent higher for clients with a material weakness disclosure compared to clients without such disclosure; however, audit fees for fiscal 2003 are not associated with an internal control material weakness disclosure (in the 10-K filed following fiscal 2004). We also find that the association between audit fees and the presence of a material weakness disclosure does not vary depending on the type of material weakness (systemic or non-systemic).

Borrowers' Accounting Information and the Quality of Banks' Loan Portfolios

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Maria Gallimberti
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Public Funding ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Loan Portfolio ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Loan Portfolios ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Positive Effect

I examine the relation between borrowers' financial reporting (FR) and the quality of banks' loan portfolios. This relation is theoretically ambiguous as better FR improves banks' monitoring of loans but also grants more creditworthy borrowers cheaper access to alternative public funding, increasing competition and creating adverse selection problems for banks. Using the adoption of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to identify improvements in borrowers' FR, I find an overall positive effect of FR on banks' lending: the quality of loans extended to borrowers subject to Section 404 improves relative to the quality of loans extended by the same bank to other borrowers exempted from Section 404. Additional tests examining borrowers' internal control over FR and loan contracts' characteristics confirm that improved monitoring and screening are both responsible for the higher loan portfolio quality. Overall, my study highlights unexplored consequences of companies' FR on the quality of banks' assets.

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