The Effect of Corporate Governance on Auditor-Client Realignments

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cory A. Cassell ◽  
Gary A. Giroux ◽  
Linda A. Myers ◽  
Thomas C. Omer
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Portfolio Decisions ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Governance Index

SUMMARY Events leading up to the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) increased the public's focus on corporate governance and increased regulatory scrutiny of corporate governance mechanisms. These events also contributed to a massive restructuring in the audit market that resulted in the transfer of a large number of clients from Big N to non-Big N audit firms. We extend prior research examining the determinants of auditor-client realignments by investigating the effect of corporate governance on downward (i.e., from Big N to non-Big N auditors) switching activity. We develop a corporate governance index comprised of governance characteristics that we expect auditors to find more desirable in their clients (specifically, board and audit committee independence, diligence, and expertise). The results suggest that Big N auditors consider client corporate governance mechanisms when making client portfolio decisions. Specifically, downward auditor-client realignments are more likely for clients that score lower on our corporate governance index. However, the influence of audit committee-related corporate governance components on downward auditor-client realignments decreased post-SOX. The reduced effect of audit committee-related corporate governance components is consistent with what would be expected if the audit committee-related rules imposed by SOX reduced the variation in audit committee quality across clients. Data Availability: The data used are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 658-681 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yousef Hassan ◽  
Rafiq Hijazi ◽  
Kamal Naser
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-financial companies. Design/methodology/approach Using substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48 nonfinancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used to identify the influence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the effectiveness of the AC after controlling for firm size, auditor type, industry type and profitability. Findings While AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and government ownership suggests substitutive relations. Research limitations/implications The main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines the influence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate governance mechanisms may, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The findings of the study can be used by companies’ managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system. Originality/value To the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the first evidence about the interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in Middle East and North African countries in general and Arab World in particular.

scholarly journals Pengaruh Ukuran Perusahaan Dan Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen Laba Di Industri Perbankan Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-120
Author(s):  
Karina Karina ◽  
Sutarti Sutarti
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Size Firm

The purpose of this research is to provide empirical evidence of the affect of ownership concetration, firms size, and corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management. Ownership concetration was measure by the biggest stock of individual or organization, firms size was measure by natural logaritma of net assets, and corporate governance mechanisms were measure by three variabels (composition of board of commisioner, audit quality were measure by industry specialize audit firm, and composition of audit committee). Earnings management was measure by discretionary accruals use Modified Jones Method. The population of this research is 41 companies in the banking sector which were listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). The research data were collected from banking companies financial statement for the period of 2016 to 2018. Based on purposive sampling method. The reseacrh hypotesis were tested using multiple regression analysis. The results of this research show that firm size, firm of commissioner and proportion of commissioner have significant relationships with earnings management. Next, variables composition of board of commissioner, ownership concetration and specialize audit firm have no significant relationship with earnings management. Keywords: ownership concetration, firms size, corporate governance, earnings management

scholarly journals Are Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Corporate Strategy, and Corporate Financial Characteristics Related to Earnings Management?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 48-57
Author(s):  
Clarissa Tonay ◽  
Paulina Sutrisno
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Corporate Strategy ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Operating Cash Flow ◽  
Financial Characteristics ◽  
Company Growth

Objective – This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance and several factors of corporate financial characteristics on earnings management. Corporate governance mechanisms such as an independent board, board size, and audit committee size are expected to be able to limit the ability of management to carry out earnings management. Meanwhile, a company's financial characteristics such as corporate strategy, company age, operating cash flow, company growth, profitability, company size and leverage are predicted to affect earnings management. Methodology/Technique – Many previous studies have involved the examination of corporate governance mechanisms and corporate financial characteristics of earnings management however, the results of those studies give rise to inconsistencies. Hence, this study seeks to re-examine the existence of corporate governance mechanisms and corporate financial characteristics of earnings management. The sample in this research is non-financial companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange between 2016 and 2018. Findings – This data in this study is analysed using statistical methods such as multiple regression linear. The results of this study indicate that one mechanism of corporate governance, the size of the audit committee, has a positive effect on earnings management, while the financial characteristics of companies such as company size and operating cash flow negatively affect earnings management. Novelty – Other corporate financial characteristics such as corporate strategy, company age, operating cash flow, and profitability have a positive effect on earnings management. Meanwhile, the other variables such as board size, leverage, and company growth do not have an influence on earnings management. Type of Paper: Empirical. JEL Classification: G3, G34, G39. Keywords: Earnings Management; Corporate Strategy; Audit Committee Size; Company Age; Operating Cash Flows. Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Tonay, C; Sutrisno, P. 2020. Are Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Corporate Strategy, and Corporate Financial Characteristics Related to Earnings Management? J. Fin. Bank. Review, 5 (2): 48 – 57 https://doi.org/10.35609/jfbr.2020.5.2(2)

scholarly journals Relationship Analysis of Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Audit Fees, and Financial Report Quality in Indonesia

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3.21) ◽  
pp. 73
Author(s):  
Dody Hapsoro ◽  
. .
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Financial Report ◽  
Relationship Analysis ◽  
Report Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

The aim of this study is to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the financial reporting quality and examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on audit fees. In addition, this study also aimed to examine the effect of audit fees on the financial report quality. The sample in this study is manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in the period 2014 and 2015. The total sample is 144 companies. Data analysis was performed using Partial Least Squares (PLS). The results of this study show that the proportion of independent commissioners and audit committee from the board of commissioners and audit committee negatively affect audit fees; the proportion of independent commissioners and audit committee from the board of commissioners, audit committee, and board of directors negatively affect audit fees; the proportion of independent commissioners and audit committee from the board of commissioners and audit committee do not positively affect the financial report quality; the proportion of independent commissioners and audit committee from the board of commissioners, audit committee, and board of directors do not positively affect the financial report quality; and audit fees negatively affects the financial report quality.  

The association between disclosure of forward-looking information and corporate governance mechanisms

2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (7) ◽  
pp. 578-595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Basil Al-Najjar ◽  
Suzan Abed
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Computerized Content Analysis ◽  
Forward Looking

Purpose – This paper aims to witness the importance of corporate governance mechanisms and investigates the relationship between the quality of disclosure of forward-looking information in the narrative sections of annual reports and the governance mechanisms for non-financial UK companies. Design/methodology/approach – Computerized content analysis using QSR NVivo 8 is used to measure the extent of forward-looking information in the narratives of the annual reports for 238 companies listed in the London Stock Exchange. Cross-sectional regression analysis is used to examine the impact of the corporate governance mechanisms on forward-looking information. Findings – The results show that board size and the independence of the audit committee are associated with the level of voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information. Research limitations/implication – One limitation of this study is that in controls for the effect of the financial crisis period, by selecting a representative year for a five-year period, 2006. The authors argument in using this year is based on the fact that the main variables of interest do not vary significantly with time, the cross-sectional analysis of the selected period will provide a fair view of the last five year-period. Practical implications – The authors report the importance of some governance practices in the UK, such as the role of the board members as well as the importance of audit committee independence. Originality/value – This paper contributes to the literature by using computerized content analysis to examine the relation between corporate governance mechanism and disclosure quality of forward-looking information using sample of companies before financial crisis period. The authors also examine governance mechanisms that are under-researched in the field of forward-looking disclosure.

The impact of external and internal corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Schäuble
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Frontier Analysis ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of external and internal corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs. Design/methodology/approach The author uses data from German firms that were listed in the regulated market of the Frankfurt Stock exchange during 2006-2011. Agency costs were measured using stochastic frontier analysis, a relatively new approach to estimate agency costs. The regression analysis is applied to test the model. Findings The results indicate that an industry specialized audit firm, the presence of a large audit firm, abnormal audit fees, management ownership and variable management compensation are significantly negatively associated with the level of a firms’ agency costs. In contrast, this seems not to be true for the existence of an audit committee for which the results of the paper document a non-significant association. Originality/value The paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the research design is to the best of the authors’ knowledge the first that investigates the influence of different corporate governance mechanisms on the level of agency costs. Second, previous studies are mainly focused on the US audit market. This focus on the US audit market leaves uncertainties regarding the direction and magnitude of the empirical relationship in the European and German environmental context. Finally, the paper provides initial empirical evidence for a sample of German IFRS listed companies (IFRS – International Financial Reporting Standards).

The Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Relationship Between Cash Holdings and Audit Fees in Egyptian Listed Companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 314
Author(s):  
Eman Abdel-Wanis
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This paper explores the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the nature of the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees, which helps provide an opportunity to identify whether these mechanisms enable to mitigate agency problems, and thus lower audit fees through a sample of 78 Egyptian listed firms in EGX 100 during the period 2014-2016 using panel data analysis. Results indicated that cash holding increases auditing fees. The board characteristics affect negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. Also, ownership structure affects negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. As well audit committee affects negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. There results support the view that corporate governance mitigate on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees.

The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management in Islamic banks in the Middle East region

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hounaida Mersni ◽  
Hakim Ben Othman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether corporate governance mechanisms affect the reporting of loan loss provisions by managers in Islamic banks in the Middle East region. Design/methodology/approach This empirical study uses balanced panel data from 20 Islamic banks, from seven Middle East countries for the period 2007 to 2011. The regression model is estimated using random effects specifications. Findings The empirical results show that discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP) are negatively related to board size and the existence of an audit committee. Results also report a positive relationship between sharia board size and DLLP. This indicates that small sharia supervisory boards are more effective than larger ones, which could be due to the higher costs and negative effects of large groups on decision-making. Results also highlight that the existence of scholars with accounting knowledge sitting on the sharia board reduces discretionary behavior. Additional results provide evidence that an external sharia audit committee is also found to reduce discretion in Islamic banks. The conclusions are found to be robust to endogeneity issues and potentially omitted variables. Practical implications The findings are potentially useful for regulators and shareholders. Regulators could use the findings to focus on corporate governance mechanisms that restrain earnings management practices in Islamic banks and implement regulations to strengthen them. Additionally, this study gives shareholders further insight which enables them to better monitor the actions of managers and thus increase their control over their investments. Originality/value This study provides two contributions to the literature on Islamic banking. First, to the authors’ knowledge, this study is only the second piece of research focused on the impact of corporate governance on earnings management in Islamic banks. Second, the authors have examined the effect of some new corporate governance mechanisms that have not been studied previously in the research literature.

scholarly journals The financial impacts of board mechanisms on performance: The case of listed Moroccan banks

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-113
Author(s):  
Issam El Idrissi ◽  
◽  
Youssef Alami ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Purpose: The present study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on listed Moroccan banks' financial performance. Research methodology: This study investigates the relationship between listed banks' governance mechanisms and financial performance in the CSE for six years between 2014-2019. This study employs three performance measures, return on assets, return on equity, and Tobin's Q, to determine bank performance. This research uses the GMM EGLS approach to analyze data. In the first phase of this empirical research, we did use OLS, Fixed Effects, and Radom Effects regressions to show their inefficiency. Results: Our results portray that most board mechanisms have a negative impact on financial performance. In comparison, the audit committee and nomination & remuneration committee have a positive effect on financial performance. Limitations: Many qualitative and quantitative factors could influence financial performance and not only the used variables in this paper. Contribution: This research shows that the dynamic connection between corporate governance and financial performance is robust in the Moroccan banking context. Also, our study has important implications for establishing good corporate governance practices in emerging economies.

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