Early Warnings of Internal Control Problems: Additional Evidence

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vishal Munsif ◽  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Section 302 ◽  
Early Warnings

SUMMARY: Hermanson and Ye (2009; hereafter, HY) find that in the initial year of SOX Section 404 implementation, only 27 percent of accelerated filer firms with an adverse Section 404(b) report had disclosed such material weaknesses (MWs) in internal control in Section 302 certifications in previous quarters of the same fiscal year. We extend HY by examining (1) a more recent time period (using data from fiscal years 2007 and 2008), and (2) both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. We find that the proportion of accelerated filers (with adverse Section 404 reports) that have early warnings (in Section 302 certifications in previous quarters of the same fiscal year) is less than 50 percent even in the fourth and fifth years of Section 404 reporting. We also find that, after controlling for other factors, non-accelerated filers were more likely to have early warnings than accelerated filers in 2008; however, the difference is not significant in 2007. Early warning is more likely for firms with (1) a higher number of MWs, (2) a new CFO, (3) more audit committee members, and (4) more frequent audit committee meetings.

Why Do Some Accelerated Filers with SOX Section 404 Material Weaknesses Provide Early Warning under Section 302?

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana R. Hermanson ◽  
Zhongxia (Shelly) Ye
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Early Warning ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Initial Section ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Section 302

SUMMARY: During the first year of the SOX Section 404 reporting requirements (effective November 15, 2004), many adverse Section 404 audit reports were a “surprise” in that management had not previously warned investors of the internal control deficiencies (ICDs) in SEC filings under Section 302 (effective August 29, 2002). Based on 451 accelerated filers with adverse initial Section 404 reports, we look back in time to previous disclosures under Section 302 and find that only 27 percent of the companies provided early warning of any of the ICDs during the fiscal year. We examine the association of early warning during the fiscal year under Section 302 with material weakness characteristics, litigation risk, subsequent financing, auditor characteristics, and management and governance traits. We find that early warning of ICDs is positively associated with the severity and number of material weaknesses, prior earnings restatements, auditor independence and effort, CFO change, the number of institutional investors, and the number of audit committee meetings, and negatively associated with future equity financing activities and CEO/board chair duality. Overall, the results underscore previous research documenting the effect of management incentives on disclosure behavior and the benefits of rigorous auditing and monitoring. We offer implications and directions for future research.

Corporate Governance and Internal Control over Financial Reporting: A Comparison of Regulatory Regimes

2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 839-867 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udi Hoitash ◽  
Rani Hoitash ◽  
Jean C. Bedard
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Financial Expert ◽  
Section 302

ABSTRACT: This study examines the association between corporate governance and disclosures of material weaknesses (MW) in internal control over financial reporting. We study this association using MW reported under Sarbanes-Oxley Sections 302 and 404, deriving data on audit committee financial expertise from automated parsing of member qualifications from their biographies. We find that a lower likelihood of disclosing Section 404 MW is associated with relatively more audit committee members having accounting and supervisory experience, as well as board strength. Further, the nature of MW varies with the type of experience. However, these associations are not detectable using Section 302 reports. We also find that MW disclosure is associated with designating a financial expert without accounting experience, or designating multiple financial experts. We conclude that board and audit committee characteristics are associated with internal control quality. However, this association is only observable under the more stringent requirements of Section 404.

Audit Committee Quality and Internal Control: An Empirical Analysis

2005 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 649-675 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jayanthi Krishnan
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Control Sample ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Recent Policy

I examine the association between audit committee quality and the quality of corporate internal control. While information on the quality of internal control is not generally available, companies changing auditors are required to disclose any internal control problems that were pointed out by their predecessor auditors. The empirical results are based on a comparison of companies disclosing such internal control problems with a control sample of companies changing auditors but not disclosing internal control problems. Audit committee quality is measured in three dimensions: its size, its independence, and its expertise. The internal control problems are observed at two levels of increasing seriousness: reportable conditions and material weaknesses. The sample time period precedes the effective dates of recent policy changes regarding audit committees. The results indicate that independent audit committees and audit committees with financial expertise are significantly less likely to be associated with the incidence of internal control problems. This is true for both levels of internal control problems. The results are consistent with recent policy emphasis on audit committee independence and expertise.

The Influence of Auditor and Client Section 404 Processes on Remediation of Internal Control Deficiencies at All Levels of Severity

2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 45-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynford Graham ◽  
Jean C. Bedard
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Financial Risk ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Level Control ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Internal Control Deficiencies ◽  
Using Data

SUMMARY This paper examines remediation of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 internal control deficiencies (ICDs) at all levels of severity, before the balance sheet date. While a number of studies investigate remediation of publicly disclosed material weaknesses (MWs), the activity we study takes place out of public view and occurs among companies with both clean and adverse Section 404 opinions. Using data provided by multiple auditing firms, we find that about one-fourth of detected ICDs are remediated before year-end, leaving many uncorrected. We model remediation activity with direct measures of company and auditor Section 404 processes not available to prior research. Model results show that companies' effective information technology integration and early start to control testing are positively associated with remediation. In contrast, remediation is negatively associated with discovery by auditors, discovery by substantive tests, and related financial misstatements. Following prior research on MWs, we also observe that ICD remediation is less likely for smaller companies with greater financial risk, and for certain entity-level control problems.

Internal Control Reporting and Audit Report Lags: Further Evidence

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 203-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vishal Munsif ◽  
K Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Significant Decline ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Audit Report ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Significant Interest ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Jobs Act ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY Internal control reporting continues to be of significant interest to regulators and legislators, as evidenced by the internal control-related requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) and the JOBS Act (2012) to exempt smaller firms from the requirements of Section 404. We extend prior research on the association between internal control weaknesses and audit report lag by (1) using data from 2008 and 2009, (2) comparing accelerated and non-accelerated filers, and (3) examining the impact of remediation of previously disclosed internal control problems. We find that (1) in 2008, the increase in audit report lag in the presence of material weaknesses in internal control is lower for non-accelerated filers as compared to accelerated filers, and (2) while the effect of a material internal control weakness on audit report lag is significantly lower in 2009 than in 2008 for accelerated filers, there is no such change for non-accelerated filers. We also find that for firms remediating previously disclosed internal control problems, there is a significant decline in audit report lag; yet, the remediating firms continue to have higher reporting lags than firms that had clean Section 404 opinions in both years. We also find that, at least with respect to the effect of internal control problems on audit report lag, the “small accelerated filers” (defined as those with market capitalization less than $250 million) are treated by the auditors as being (1) substantively similar to other accelerated filers, and (2) quite distinct from non-accelerated filers.

Unexpected Fees and the Prediction of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control Over Financial Reporting

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan M. Albring ◽  
Randal J. Elder ◽  
Xiaolu Xu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
New Material ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Section 302

We investigate whether prior year unexpected audit fees help predict new material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Predicting material weaknesses may be useful to investors and other financial statement users because these disclosures have adverse economic impacts on disclosing firms. Unexpected fees are significantly associated with material weaknesses reported under Section 404, even after controlling for Section 302 disclosures and other factors associated with internal control weaknesses. Unexpected fees are associated with company-level weaknesses but are not significantly associated with account-specific weaknesses, consistent with differences in the nature and severity of the two types of material weaknesses. Our results are consistent with unexpected audit fees containing information on unobserved audit costs and client control risks, which help predict future internal control weaknesses.

Auditor Attestation under SOX Section 404 and Earnings Informativeness

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Huajing Chen ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Heibatollah Sami ◽  
Haiyan Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Control Sample ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Test Sample ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Earnings Informativeness ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Reports ◽  
Section 302

SUMMARY Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires managers to assess, and their auditors to express an opinion on, the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). Policymakers expect the ICFR audits to enhance the credibility of firms' financial statements. Prior research argues that audit characteristics that enhance the credibility of financial reporting are associated with stronger earnings-return associations. We examine whether earnings accompanied by the first-time Section 404 ICFR reports were associated with higher informativeness compared with earnings in the prior year when only financial statement audit reports were available. We conduct our analysis for a test sample of accelerated filers with clean ICFR reports and clean previous Section 302 disclosures. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we compare the change in earnings informativeness for the test sample with that for a control sample of non-accelerated filers. We find that earnings informativeness for companies with clean internal control reports was greater in the Section 404 adoption year than in the previous year, while there was no change in earnings informativeness for the non-accelerated filers. Also, there is no difference in the increase in earnings informativeness across firms with small and large compliance costs (measured by change in audit fees), suggesting that both groups benefited from the Section 404 ICFR audits.

Observed effectiveness of the COSO 2013 framework

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-45
Author(s):  
Ifeoma Udeh
Keyword(s):  
Control Systems ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Control Process ◽  
Regression Analyses ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization’s 2013 Framework, by investigating how the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses compares for Early-, Timely- and Late-adopters of the framework, and how the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses changed for Early- and Timely-adopters following their adoption of the framework. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses regression analyses based on a sample of US firms subject to Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404(b). Findings Timely-adopters of the 2013 Framework continued to exhibit fewer instances of auditor-reported material weaknesses than Late-adopters, even though they had a marginal increase in the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses, in the post-2013 Framework period. Practical implications The findings suggest that the effectiveness of the 2013 Framework may lie in the iterative nature of the internal control process, and as firms remedy deficiencies they or their auditors identify, they will continuously improve the effectiveness of their internal control systems. Originality/value Unlike existing literature, this paper uses data from the pre-2013 Framework, transition and post-2013 Framework periods to examine changes in the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses, thus differentiating between Early-, Timely- and Late-adopters of the 2013 Framework. It also shows the effect of adopting the 2013 Framework on the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses.

Internal Control Quality and Audit Pricing under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rani Hoitash ◽  
Udi Hoitash ◽  
Jean C. Bedard
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Risk Adjustment ◽  
Initial Period ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Section 302

This paper extends prior research on audit risk adjustment by examining the association of audit pricing with problems in internal control over financial reporting, disclosed under Sections 404 and 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX]. While studies of auditors' responses to internal control risk provide mixed evidence, it is important to re-examine this issue using data on specific client problems not available prior to SOX. As a baseline, we first establish a strong association of audit fees with internal control problems disclosed in the first year of implementation of Section 404, consistent with prior research (e.g., Raghunandan and Rama 2006). We then address two issues on which prior results are contradictory. In a broadly based sample of accelerated filers, we find that audit pricing for companies with internal control problems varies by problem severity, when severity is measured either as material weaknesses versus significant deficiencies, or by nature of the problem. Also, while audit fees increase during the 404 period, our tests show less relative risk adjustment under Section 404 than under Section 302 in the prior year. Further examining intertemporal effects, we find that companies disclosing internal control problems under Section 302 continue to pay higher fees the following year, even if no problems are disclosed under Section 404. Overall, our findings provide detailed insight into audit risk adjustment during the initial period of SOX implementation.

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