Why Do Some Accelerated Filers with SOX Section 404 Material Weaknesses Provide Early Warning under Section 302?

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana R. Hermanson ◽  
Zhongxia (Shelly) Ye
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Early Warning ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Initial Section ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Section 302

SUMMARY: During the first year of the SOX Section 404 reporting requirements (effective November 15, 2004), many adverse Section 404 audit reports were a “surprise” in that management had not previously warned investors of the internal control deficiencies (ICDs) in SEC filings under Section 302 (effective August 29, 2002). Based on 451 accelerated filers with adverse initial Section 404 reports, we look back in time to previous disclosures under Section 302 and find that only 27 percent of the companies provided early warning of any of the ICDs during the fiscal year. We examine the association of early warning during the fiscal year under Section 302 with material weakness characteristics, litigation risk, subsequent financing, auditor characteristics, and management and governance traits. We find that early warning of ICDs is positively associated with the severity and number of material weaknesses, prior earnings restatements, auditor independence and effort, CFO change, the number of institutional investors, and the number of audit committee meetings, and negatively associated with future equity financing activities and CEO/board chair duality. Overall, the results underscore previous research documenting the effect of management incentives on disclosure behavior and the benefits of rigorous auditing and monitoring. We offer implications and directions for future research.

Early Warnings of Internal Control Problems: Additional Evidence

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vishal Munsif ◽  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Section 302 ◽  
Early Warnings

SUMMARY: Hermanson and Ye (2009; hereafter, HY) find that in the initial year of SOX Section 404 implementation, only 27 percent of accelerated filer firms with an adverse Section 404(b) report had disclosed such material weaknesses (MWs) in internal control in Section 302 certifications in previous quarters of the same fiscal year. We extend HY by examining (1) a more recent time period (using data from fiscal years 2007 and 2008), and (2) both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. We find that the proportion of accelerated filers (with adverse Section 404 reports) that have early warnings (in Section 302 certifications in previous quarters of the same fiscal year) is less than 50 percent even in the fourth and fifth years of Section 404 reporting. We also find that, after controlling for other factors, non-accelerated filers were more likely to have early warnings than accelerated filers in 2008; however, the difference is not significant in 2007. Early warning is more likely for firms with (1) a higher number of MWs, (2) a new CFO, (3) more audit committee members, and (4) more frequent audit committee meetings.

Corporate Governance and Internal Control over Financial Reporting: A Comparison of Regulatory Regimes

2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 839-867 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udi Hoitash ◽  
Rani Hoitash ◽  
Jean C. Bedard
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Financial Expert ◽  
Section 302

ABSTRACT: This study examines the association between corporate governance and disclosures of material weaknesses (MW) in internal control over financial reporting. We study this association using MW reported under Sarbanes-Oxley Sections 302 and 404, deriving data on audit committee financial expertise from automated parsing of member qualifications from their biographies. We find that a lower likelihood of disclosing Section 404 MW is associated with relatively more audit committee members having accounting and supervisory experience, as well as board strength. Further, the nature of MW varies with the type of experience. However, these associations are not detectable using Section 302 reports. We also find that MW disclosure is associated with designating a financial expert without accounting experience, or designating multiple financial experts. We conclude that board and audit committee characteristics are associated with internal control quality. However, this association is only observable under the more stringent requirements of Section 404.

Unexpected Fees and the Prediction of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control Over Financial Reporting

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan M. Albring ◽  
Randal J. Elder ◽  
Xiaolu Xu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
New Material ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Section 302

We investigate whether prior year unexpected audit fees help predict new material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Predicting material weaknesses may be useful to investors and other financial statement users because these disclosures have adverse economic impacts on disclosing firms. Unexpected fees are significantly associated with material weaknesses reported under Section 404, even after controlling for Section 302 disclosures and other factors associated with internal control weaknesses. Unexpected fees are associated with company-level weaknesses but are not significantly associated with account-specific weaknesses, consistent with differences in the nature and severity of the two types of material weaknesses. Our results are consistent with unexpected audit fees containing information on unobserved audit costs and client control risks, which help predict future internal control weaknesses.

Audit Fees after Remediation of Internal Control Weaknesses

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vishal Munsif ◽  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama ◽  
Meghna Singhvi
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Future Research ◽  
First Year ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
The Third ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Audit Fee

SYNOPSIS: In this study, we examine audit fees for SEC registrants that remediate previously disclosed material weaknesses in internal control. We find that remediating firms have lower audit fees when compared to firms that continue to report material weaknesses in internal control. However, the remediating firms continue to pay, in the year of remediation as well as one and two years subsequent to remediation, a significant audit fee premium compared to firms that have clean Section 404 reports in each of the first four years. Firms that had an adverse Section 404 report only in the first year, but remediated the problems in year two and had clean Section 404 reports in years three and four, pay an audit fee premium of 32 (21) percent in the third (fourth) year when compared to firms that had clean Section 404 reports in each of the first four years. The results, thus, suggest that audit fees are “sticky” for firms that have material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting, and suggest some interesting questions for future research.

Auditor Attestation under SOX Section 404 and Earnings Informativeness

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Huajing Chen ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Heibatollah Sami ◽  
Haiyan Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Control Sample ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Test Sample ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Earnings Informativeness ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Reports ◽  
Section 302

SUMMARY Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires managers to assess, and their auditors to express an opinion on, the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). Policymakers expect the ICFR audits to enhance the credibility of firms' financial statements. Prior research argues that audit characteristics that enhance the credibility of financial reporting are associated with stronger earnings-return associations. We examine whether earnings accompanied by the first-time Section 404 ICFR reports were associated with higher informativeness compared with earnings in the prior year when only financial statement audit reports were available. We conduct our analysis for a test sample of accelerated filers with clean ICFR reports and clean previous Section 302 disclosures. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we compare the change in earnings informativeness for the test sample with that for a control sample of non-accelerated filers. We find that earnings informativeness for companies with clean internal control reports was greater in the Section 404 adoption year than in the previous year, while there was no change in earnings informativeness for the non-accelerated filers. Also, there is no difference in the increase in earnings informativeness across firms with small and large compliance costs (measured by change in audit fees), suggesting that both groups benefited from the Section 404 ICFR audits.

Observed effectiveness of the COSO 2013 framework

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-45
Author(s):  
Ifeoma Udeh
Keyword(s):  
Control Systems ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Control Process ◽  
Regression Analyses ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization’s 2013 Framework, by investigating how the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses compares for Early-, Timely- and Late-adopters of the framework, and how the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses changed for Early- and Timely-adopters following their adoption of the framework. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses regression analyses based on a sample of US firms subject to Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404(b). Findings Timely-adopters of the 2013 Framework continued to exhibit fewer instances of auditor-reported material weaknesses than Late-adopters, even though they had a marginal increase in the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses, in the post-2013 Framework period. Practical implications The findings suggest that the effectiveness of the 2013 Framework may lie in the iterative nature of the internal control process, and as firms remedy deficiencies they or their auditors identify, they will continuously improve the effectiveness of their internal control systems. Originality/value Unlike existing literature, this paper uses data from the pre-2013 Framework, transition and post-2013 Framework periods to examine changes in the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses, thus differentiating between Early-, Timely- and Late-adopters of the 2013 Framework. It also shows the effect of adopting the 2013 Framework on the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses.

Internal Control Quality and Audit Pricing under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rani Hoitash ◽  
Udi Hoitash ◽  
Jean C. Bedard
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Risk Adjustment ◽  
Initial Period ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Section 302

This paper extends prior research on audit risk adjustment by examining the association of audit pricing with problems in internal control over financial reporting, disclosed under Sections 404 and 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX]. While studies of auditors' responses to internal control risk provide mixed evidence, it is important to re-examine this issue using data on specific client problems not available prior to SOX. As a baseline, we first establish a strong association of audit fees with internal control problems disclosed in the first year of implementation of Section 404, consistent with prior research (e.g., Raghunandan and Rama 2006). We then address two issues on which prior results are contradictory. In a broadly based sample of accelerated filers, we find that audit pricing for companies with internal control problems varies by problem severity, when severity is measured either as material weaknesses versus significant deficiencies, or by nature of the problem. Also, while audit fees increase during the 404 period, our tests show less relative risk adjustment under Section 404 than under Section 302 in the prior year. Further examining intertemporal effects, we find that companies disclosing internal control problems under Section 302 continue to pay higher fees the following year, even if no problems are disclosed under Section 404. Overall, our findings provide detailed insight into audit risk adjustment during the initial period of SOX implementation.

scholarly journals The role of effective audit committee in strengthening the financial reporting: Evidence from Jordanian listed companies

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 59-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mo’taz Amin Al-Sa’eed ◽  
Soud M. Al-Mahamid
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Future Research ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Study Results

This study aims to understand the features of an effective audit committee and its role in strengthening financial reporting. A questionnaire based survey was circulated to public listed companies on the Amman Stock Exchange (Banking, insurance, and financial institutions). The study was aimed at internal audit managers and finance managers. Out of 156 questionnaires, we received 110 back which represents a 71% response rate. The study results show that the research respondents have a good level of education and experience. In addition, there is a relationship between internal controls, international standards on auditing, institute of internal audit; Jordan securities commission requirements, external audit, understanding of audit committee functions, and financial reporting. Furthermore, the internal control, international standard on auditing and institute of internal audit, Jordan securities commission requirements, External audit, understanding of audit committee functions can explain a significant amount of the variability in financial reporting. Finally, the research results also show that age and gender make a difference for our respondents when they evaluate financial reporting. The study like other cross sectional studies is not free of limitations. Managerial implications and new avenues of future research are supplied. Future research also can borrow the research model and apply a longitudinal study to solve the cross sectional study problems.

SOX Section 404 Material Weakness Disclosures and Audit Fees

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Control Material ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The Mean

Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 2004) require management and the auditor to report on internal controls over financial reporting. Section 404 is arguably the most controversial element of SOX, and much of the debate around the costs of implementing section 404 has focused on auditors' fees (Ernst & Young 2005). In this paper, we examine the association between audit fees and internal control disclosures made pursuant to section 404. Our sample includes 660 manufacturing firms that have a December 31, 2004 fiscal year-end and filed the section 404 report by May 15, 2005. We find that the mean (median) audit fees for the firms in our sample for fiscal 2004 is 86 (128) percent higher than the corresponding fees for fiscal 2003. Audit fees for fiscal 2004 are 43 percent higher for clients with a material weakness disclosure compared to clients without such disclosure; however, audit fees for fiscal 2003 are not associated with an internal control material weakness disclosure (in the 10-K filed following fiscal 2004). We also find that the association between audit fees and the presence of a material weakness disclosure does not vary depending on the type of material weakness (systemic or non-systemic).

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