Restricted Stock is on the Rise: What Does this Mean for Whistleblowing?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Scheetz ◽  
Joseph Michael Wall ◽  
Aaron Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Strike Price ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
The Future ◽  
Opposite Behavior ◽  
Restricted Stock ◽  
Option Compensation ◽  
Stock Compensation

The use of restricted stock compensation to supplement or to give a bonus to executives is on the rise. What happens when things go wrong? Research finds that those in private companies are less likely to whistleblow than those in public companies overall. Literature also reveals that restricted stock may positively influence whistleblowing when large financial rewards are present. Further, vesting period and strike price influence whistleblowing for those with stock option compensation. Yet, little is investigated regarding whistleblowing related to the vesting period of the restricted stock and the type of organization -public or private- granting this compensation. We find that for those in public companies, whistleblowing tends to increase as the vesting period of the stock compensation is farther in the future. Those in private companies have the opposite behavior. Agency theory focused within whistleblowing theory helps resolve this seeming juxtaposition. Implications for practice and policy are offered.

The Valuation Differences Between Stock Option and Restricted Stock Grants for U.S. Firms

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
James H. Irving ◽  
Wayne R. Landsman ◽  
Bradley P. Lindsey
Keyword(s):  
Stock Option ◽  
Restricted Stock

Audit Committee Incentives and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 109-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marsha B. Keune ◽  
Karla M. Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Option Compensation ◽  
Stock Option Compensation

SUMMARY We investigate the role of audit committee economic incentives in judgments involving the resolution of detected misstatements. The results reveal a positive association between audit committee short-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-decreasing misstatements that, if corrected, would have caused the company to miss its analyst forecast. Complementary results reveal a positive association between the audit committee long-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-increasing misstatements when the company reports just missing, meeting, or beating its analyst forecast. These findings illustrate agency conflicts that can arise when compensating audit committees with options. We obtain these results while controlling for CEO option compensation and audit committee characteristics, along with indicators of corporate governance, auditor incentives, and company characteristics. Data Availability: Data used in the study are available from public sources

Fake News im Wahlkampf

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Flint
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Election Campaigns ◽  
Fake News ◽  
Forming Process ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
The Future

The urgency of regulating fake news on social networks regarding election campaigns is more evident than ever. This poses considerable difficulties for legislative practice. It is important to consider the fundamental rights of the parties involved without the state's influence on the formation of public opinion becoming too great. The current options of reacting to fake news do not suffice to ensure a free opinion-forming process. This publication makes an innovative proposal as to how social networks – especially Facebook – can be regulated in the future in such a way that the discourse is strengthened and the alarming influence of private companies on the formation of opinion is limited.

scholarly journals Extract Or Not Extract? The Effect of Familism on Stock Option Plans

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Arena ◽  
Simona Catuogno ◽  
Alessandro Cirillo ◽  
Luca Pennacchio
Keyword(s):  
Family Involvement ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Rent Extraction ◽  
Strike Price ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Market Index ◽  
Managerial Positions

<p>There is an ongoing debate in managerial literature regarding the aim of stock option plans (SOPs). In this paper we analyse whether and to what extent the family involvement in ownership and managerial positions affects the use of SOPs as tools to extract rents. By examining a sample of plans issued by Italian listed firms, we classify the SOPs according to their characteristics (i.e. vesting period, lock-up, strike price, market index) and identify three different clusters namely Rent SOPs, Non-Rent SOPs, Hybrid. After controlling for CEO family, board size, equity owned by minority shareholders, and other firm-specific characteristics, we find that family firms are less likely to adopt SOPs for rent extraction purpose. We also find that SOPs specifically granted to family members are less likely to pursue rent extraction goals. Our findings are robust against different specifications of family firms. This paper offers important theoretical contributions to management research and insightful policy implications for all family owned listed firms.</p>

scholarly journals DAMPAK STRUKTUR MODAL PADA SENSITIVITAS PENERAPAN KOMPENSASI OPSI SAHAM KARYAWAN TERHADAP KINERJA

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Nur Fadjrih Asyik
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Employee Stock Option ◽  
Sensitivity Level ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Option Compensation ◽  
Stock Option Compensation

This study aims to test whether the management that receive compensation in the form of stock options having an positive impact on company performance. This study considers the external performance measurement by identifying Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR). In addition, this study aims to test whether the company's capital structure affects the sensitivity level of employee stock option compensation and firm performance. Capital structure is measured with debt to equity ratio. The result indicates that the proportion of Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) influence company performance in accordance with the predictions. This shows that the more stock options offered to employees then came a sense of belonging which resulted in more motivated managers to improve company performance. Furthermore, the higher the market performance of companies that can be achieved, the higher the profit (gain) will be obtained by the recipient of stock options. In addition, this study also shows that the impact of stock option grants at the company's performance declined with the greater capital structure of liability. This shows that the capital structure of liabilities will lower the sensitivity level of employee stock option compensation and firm performance. The higher the company's liabilities would reduce the rights of the owner of the dividends each period in accordance with the ownership of shares held since the company must take into account the interest costs to be paid to the creditor.

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